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Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky:
Judicial Method and the
Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws
By ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 16, 1960, Georgia Babcock and her friends,
Mr. and Mrs. William Jackson, all residents of Rochester, New
York, left in Mr. Jackson's automobile for a week-end trip. The
trip culminated in an accident in Canada which caused Miss Bab-
cock to be seriously injured. Three years later Helen Wessling and
Lenice Paris, both residents of Louisville, Kentucky, were riding
in the Paris automobile. This trip resulted in an accident in
Indiana, and the passenger was once again injured. Each passenger
filed suit against her host. Georgia Babcock's suit was filed in the
Supreme Court of Monroe County, New York, and Helen Wess-
ling's in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Kentucky. Since
New York and Kentucky have always permitted a guest passenger
to recover against a negligent host, the cases would seem to pre-
sent little difficulty.' However, the legal doctrine created in
Georgia Babcock's case and later followed by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals in Helen Wessling's case may be said to have started a
"veritable revolution,"2 provoking the interest of the numerous
outstanding scholars who have tried to assess its impact.3 For you
see, the fact that the accident took place in a jurisdiction other
than that in which the suit was brought means that the issue is no
o Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky.
1 Kentucky had a "guest statute," but the Court of Appeals held that such
a statute was violative of the Kentucky Constitution. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky.
533, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
2 It is doubtful that an opinion involving choice of law in tort cases would
fail to cite it.
3 Shortly after the decision, the Columbia Law Review invited six outstanding
conflicts scholars to comment on the case. Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1212-57 (1963). The availability of these comments has proved
very helpful in light of the approach taken in the present writing.
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longer a simple negligence question. Indeed, it is necessarily most
complex, for it now gives rise to a question of the conflicts of law.
An eminent authority has said of the conflict of laws:
The realm of the conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled
with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters
in a strange and incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court
or lawyer is quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.4
While this may be so, another writer has observed:
On a generous estimate, one litigated case out of every
hundred may involve a question of the conflict of laws. Yet
the subject of conflicts has attracted the best thinking and
the most diligent research of a host of capable scholars.
Magnificent treatises explore its every intricacy; fruitful
theories abound by which it may be explained and under-
stood and reshaped; research into the subject is made easy
by a vast apparatus of digest topics and index headings.5
Certainly thi is true,_since legal scholars have never ceased to be
fascinated by questions of the conflict of laws. Many theories
abound, and it is rare to find any one theorist saying, "I fully
agree with my colleague on how conflicts problems should be
solved." However, courts do not share the same enthusiasm; in-
deed, as we will see, their attitude is quite the opposite.
A question of the conflict of laws may be said to arise when-
ever a case contains a foreign element, that is, whenever some or
4 Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MIcH. L. RE-v. 959, 971 (1953). The
perplexing nature of conflicts problems has long troubled the courts. In what must
have been one of the first conflicts cases in the United States, the court observed:
This statement of the matter at issue shows, that the only question
presented for our decision is one of law; but it is one which grows out
of the conflict of laws of different states. Our former experience had
taught us, that questions of this kind are the most embarrassing and dif-
ficult of decision, that can occupy the attention of those who preside in
courts of justice. The argument of this case has shown us, that the vast
mass of learning which the research of counsel has furnished, leaves
the subject as much enveloped in obscurity and doubt, as it would
have appeared -to our own understandings, had we been called upon to
decide, without the knowledge of what others had thought and written
upon it.
Saul v. is Creditors, 5 Mart. (N.S.) 569, 571-72 (La. 1827).
5 Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. Drr. L.J. 376
(1955).
6 Dean Prosser has observed that "the one thing upon which any four law
teachers can be found to agree is that, while the fifth may be a brillant man and
a delightful fellow, his ideas are fundamentally unsound." Prosser, Lighthouse No
Good, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 257, 264 (1948). No one would dispute the validity of this
observation as applied to teachers of the conflict of laws.
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all of the legally significant facts occurred in a jurisdiction other
than that in which the suit is brought and/or all the parties are
not residents7 of the forum state. Not only did the Babcock and
Wessling suits contain foreign elements, but there was also a
conflict of laws in the sense that the substantive laws of the
forum and the jurisdiction where the accident occurred differed in
both cases.
Under Ontario law a guest in an automobile is absolutely pre-
cluded from maintaining a suit against his host for personal
injuries arising out of the use of the automobile." The Indiana
statute is not quite so harsh: it permits the suit, but the passenger
cannot recover unless the accident was caused by the "wanton or
wilful misconduct" of the host.9 Since Helen Wessling did not
allege that her friend's conduct was "wanton or wilful," she finds
herself in a situation identical to Georgia Babcock's. How should
this conflict between the laws of the jurisdictions involved be
resolved? This was the question that confronted the courts in
these cases and in one sense the answer to this question will be
the subject of this paper. However, greater attention will be
focused on the court that must resolve the question and the pro-
cess by which the court arrives at its "solution" to the problem.
To place the matter in proper perspective, a historical excursion
may be helpful.
II. A HISTORICAL ExcuRsION: FROM MAGISTER ALDRICUS TO THE
RESTATEMENT
Questions of the conflict of laws arose early in recorded legal
history. It has been said that the legal order is decentralized among
a plurality of sovereign or autonomous authorities, each asseiting
7 The term "resident" is intended to refer to a person who is "domiciled in
the state" and who actually lives there. Of course, a person may have his
technical domicile in a state other than the state in which he is "resident." For
purposes of this writing, it is not necessary to pursue the distinction between
"residence" and "domicile." Those who are interested might consult Reese and
Green, That Elusive Word, "Residence," 6 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1953). The dis-
cussion will not be encumbered with a series of speculations like "what if he was
resident there, but had his domicile elsewhere." If such a case should ever arise,
the question would be whether the considerations applicable to a resident were
equally applicable to (1) a party who had his technical domicile elsewhere or
(2) a party who had a technical domicile in the state, but was not resident
there.
8 ONT. R v. STAT. ch. 172, § 105(2) (1960).
9 IND. STAT. ANN. § 47.1021 (1965).
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jurisdiction within a defined territory.10 Since people do not live
their lives within defined territories,1 disputes will invariably
arise involving the territory or people of two or more legal
systems. At that time, "the legal order tries to integrate the
diversity of laws of which it is composed."' 2 The presence of the
foreign element must at least be considered, and perhaps such a
case must be treated differently from one that is purely domestic.
Thus, in the Greek cities of the Hellenic period there were
separate courts for foreigners.'3 So too, in Rome, cases involving
foreigners were heard before the praetor peregrinus, who applied
the ius gentium rather than the Roman citizens' ius civile.
14
Separate courts for cases involving foreigners may be considered
the initial step in the development of the conflict of laws.' 5
It is generally agreed that the conflict of laws as we know it-
the use of law other than that of the forum to decide a case-
began to emerge in the early part of the thirteenth century in
Italy. Each of the autonomous city-states had its own system of
law, and there was extensive commerce between them. The dis-
putes that arose were truly international, and some way had to
be found to solve the conflicts of law. From the very first effort, two
salient points emerge. It was an academician who proposed the
solution, and the solution was one applicable to all conflicts cases.
This concept of an "academic solution of universal application"
has persisted to the present day.
The first such solution was proposed by Magister Aldricus, a
professor at the University of Padua, who is considered to be the
"founder of the conflict of laws."' 6 His solution was that the court
should look to the substantive content of the differing state's laws
connected with the case and resolve the conflict by applying the
'0 Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 297 (1953).
11 Realistically speaking, it is not -possible to do so, even if one never sets
foot outside his home. At a minimum, some product he uses will have been
manufactured in another state. Thus, we are always subject to a potential question
of the conflict of laws.2 Yntema, supra note"10.
13 Id. at 300.
14 Id.
cl15 In a sense, the merchants courts and the Court of Admiralty in England
could be considered as separate courts for cases involving foreigners.
16 G. STUM3ERG, CASES ON CoNitic-rs 2 (1956). This is in accordance with
the investigations of Neumeyer. Neumeyer, Dm GEMEitiNREcHLcHE ENrWsvwCE-
LUNG DES INTERNATIONAL PRIVATUND STRAFrsCIT BIs BA.ToLus (1916).
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"more effective and useful law." It has been suggested that this
meant the judge was to choose the law which would promote his
own conception of justice in the particular case.'7 The concept of
the "more effective and useful" law may be having a renascence
in the views of some commentators' s and even in judicial deci-
sion.19 But much has occurred in between.
The law has always resisted such a general approach. The need
for "certainty" gives rise to the establishment of specific rules and
internally consistent theories embodying such rules. Thus, a
variety of theories arose. The most prominent held that the court
should look to the nationality of the parties, and in a case
involving a foreign party, it should apply his national or "per-
sonal" law. An old gloss to the Code of Justinian-frequently cited
as the epitome of judicial tolerance and enlightenment-states
that "if a citizen of Bologna be sued in Modena, he is not to be
judged according to the statutes of Modena, to which he is not
subject."20 The concept was one of personal law which an indi-
vidual carried with him as he sojourned in alien lands.
However, an individual did not carry all of his personal law
with him. Obviously the place where a person engaged in trans-
actions might want to have something to say about regulating
such transactions. And furthermore, as has been demonstrated in
many contexts, simple solutions do not appear to be quite so
simple when they run up against the immense variety of factual
situations involving foreign elements. In time, a distinction was
drawn between laws (or statuta, as they were called) affecting
"persons" and those which affected "things." Only those laws
affecting "persons" were applied extraterritorially. 2'
The essence of the "statuist" theory became the interpretation
and classification of statutes to determine whether they were
capable of extraterritorial application. It is interesting to note
that the result depended on how the statute was classified by the
17 G. STuMBERO, supra note 16.
18 See e.g. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N'.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 295-300 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law, More on Choice-
rnfluencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584, 1585-88 (1966).
19 Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 207 (N.H. 1966) (guest statute unsound in light
)f modem conditions).
20 Yntema, supra note 10, at 302.
21 See the discussion in G. STUMBERO, CONFLICTS OF LAWS 3-4 (3rd ed.
[963).
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law of the foreign party's state rather than how it was classified by
the law of the forum.2 The wording of the statute was often an in-
sufficient guide, and courts and commentators employed different
formulas and techniques of classification as well as their own
notions of policy and fairness.23
According to Professor Yntema, by the fourteenth century
certain definite rules of application had been established, largely
due to the commentaries of Bartolus.24 As frequently happens,
rules perhaps designed to supplement and explain a general theory
soon supersede it, and the rules themselves form a complete
system. The system of Bartolus was based on the nature and sub-
ject matter of the various statutory provisions, and within that
system the following rules were developed. Matters of form were
governed by the law of the place where the parties executed the
document in question (lex loci actus). Substantive questions of
Contract law were governed by the law of the place where the
contract was entered into (lex loci contractus), while matters
arising after the execution of the contract were governed by the
law of the place where performance was to take place (lex solu-
tionis). Liability for torts was generally governed by the law of the
place where the tort occurred (lex loci delicti), although a for-
eigner could plead ignorance of an unusual local law. The ques-
tion of rights arising out of "things" was governed by the law of
the situs of the thing (lex rei sitae). The status of persons was
governed by the law of their state of nationality. Matters con-
cerning the conduct of the litigation were governed by the law
of the forum (lex fori). The reader will note the similarity of
the rules contained in this system to those found in the first
Restatement.
Professor Ehrenzweig has contended that these rules of the
statutist system were developed only as an exception to the "basic
rule" of the lex fori. Thus, "if jurisdiction was based on the place
of contracting, a Modena court would adjudicate a Modena con-
2 2 Cf. RET ATEFMNT OF THE CoNFLc'T OF LAws § 7(a) (1934), where it
is stated that "in all cases where as a preliminary to determining the choice of
law it is necessary to determine the quality and character of legal ideas, these are
determined by the forum according to its law."
23 Yntema, supra note 10, at 304.
24 Id. at 302.
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tract under Modena law even as to a Bologna citizen."25 However,
even if Professor Ehrenzweig is correct, the fact remains that later
scholars thought the rules were independent and treated them as
such. They did not consider that the lex fori was the basic law
having a greater claim to application than foreign law.
The statutist method was unchallenged until the seventeenth
century. It enjoyed a revival in part in Mancini's nationality theory
of the nineteenth century. Mancini's essential thesis was that law
is personal rather than territorial, and that it is made for a given
people rather than for a given territory. This being so, the laws
of a sovereign bind his subjects wherever they reside; conversely,
they do not bind foreigners within the territory. The only
exception was where the requirements of ordre public necessitated
the application of territorial law.26 Mancini's theory has had little
influence on continental conflicts law except as regards matters of
personal status.
27
In general, the concept of personal law, the essence of the
statutist method, has found little favor in this country. But if the
rights of Kentuckians involved in an accident in Indiana were
found to be governed by Kentucky law, is this not a variant of
"personal law" as some critics have observed?28 However, is the
choice necessarily restricted to personal law as opposed to what
may be called the territorial imperative?
2 9
The territorial imperative, or, if you wish, the territoriality
theory of the conflict of laws, was developed in the seventeenth
century as a challenge to the statutist method. Among the French
25 Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MiCH.
L. REv. 637, 648 (1960).
26 This summary is taken from G. Srtmmzc, supra note 16, at 5.
27 Thus, in a number of countries, partially due to the influence of the
Napoleonic Code, the law of nationality was substituted in situations where the
law of domicile had formerly prevailed. Id. at 5.
28 The court in Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 796 (1965),
observed that:
However appealing it might seem to give effect to our own public policy
on this issue, merely because the negligent driver of the car in the colli-
sion, and his guest, are domiciled here, to do so would be to totally
neglect the interests of the jurisdiction where the accident occurred,
where the relationship arose and where the parties were dwelling, and
to give an overriding significance to a single factor reminiscent of the
days when British citizens travelled to the four comers of the world
secure in the belief that their conduct would be governed solely by the
law of England.
29 For the view that there is a via media, see D. CAVERs, THE CHoicE Or
LAw Paocnss 150-59 (1965).
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writers, particularly d'Argentre', the tendency was to classify more
statutes as '"real'" so as to preclude their having extraterritorial
effect.30 Hovever, it was left to the Dutch writers to break fully
with the statutist method. As early as 1611 the famous Perpetual
Edict provided for the unrestricted application of the law of the
situs even as to such questions as testamentary capacity (hitherto
determined by personal law) and the form of wills (hitherto
determined by the lex loci actus).3' The basis of the territoriality
theory, as formulated principally by Voet and Huber, was poli-
tical, i.e., the power of a sovereign to regulate all activity taking
place in territory under his control. It constituted a scientific
recognition of the political situation prevailing in the seventeenth
century in which assertions of authority by national sovereigns-
such as the Netherlands, recently independent from Spain-were
recognized.32 The territoriality theory contained three proposi-
tions: (1) the laws of each state have force within the borders of
that state, but not beyond those borders; (2) all persons within
the borders of a state, whether permanently or temporarily, are
subject to those laws so long as they remain there; (3) rights
acquired in one state will be recognized in another state when
called into question there so long as the interests of the second
state are not prejudiced thereby.
33
The continental approach to the conflict of laws is important
because in this area of law, unlike practically all other areas of
American law, the source of thinking about the law and the ap-
proach taken to it did not devolve from England and the com-
mon law. No common law of conflicts was "received" from Eng-
land,34 and in a sense, it was the continental thinking about the
conflicts of law that was "received" in the United States. Until
the seventeenth century the rule in England was that "inter-
national" cases were not triable at common law.35 Common law
30 See the discussion in G. STUMBERG, supra note 21, at 4; Ehrenzweig,
supra note 25, at 653-54.
31 Ehrenzweig, supra note 25, at 657.
32 Yntema, supra note 10, at 305.
33 Id. at 306.
'34 There has been an indigenous common law for so long that this process
of reception may have been forgotten. With the recent independence of many
nations of Anglophoic Africa, attention has again been focused on it. See, e.g.,
A. ALLOTr, ESSAYS iN AFMRCAN LAW ch. 1 (1960).
35 See the discussion in Sack, Conflict of Laws in the History of English Law,
3 LAW: A CENTURY OF PnoOaEss 342 (1937), reprinted in ASsoCxAxoN OF
AmErmcAw LAW SCHOOLS, SELECTED READINGS ON CoNFLCT OF LAWS 2 (1956).
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trials were held before a jury of the vicanage, i.e., jurors from
the neighborhood where the events involved in the trial occurred.
It followed that if some or all of the events occurred outside of
the neighborhood, venue was lacking.3 6 International cases could
be brought before the merchant's courts and the court of ad-
miralty, where the "law of the international community of mer-
chants" was applied.3 7 Even when the jurisdictional barriers of
the common law courts were broken down by fictions,38 the courts
avoided conflicts questions by the simple expedient of applying
English law.39 As Professor Morris has stated:
It was not until the eighteenth century, when the common
law courts extended their jurisdiction to cases involving a
foreign element, and when the law merchant which has
formerly been applied in these cases, became a part of Eng-
lish domestic law, that the need for rules of the conflict of
laws arose in England, and the working out of the doctrines
now prevalent is essentially the work of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
40
Thus, at the time of our independence, there was no common
law of conflicts, as there was a common law of contracts, torts,
property and so on. It was the received common law in these
areas which enabled American courts to decide cases, as the cita-
tion of English authority in earlier opinions and the reliance on
Blackstone by early American lawyers indicates. By building on
the received common law, the courts were able to develop an
indigenous American common law which often departed from
English precedent.
41
However, it is generally agreed that the initial development of
an American "law of conflicts" was not through judicial decision,
but was the work of Joseph Story, in his role of theorist and
commentator rather than as judge.42 Professor Ehrenzweig sug-
gests that at the time when the first edition of Story's Com-
36 Id. at 3-4.
37 Ehrenzweig, supra note 25, at 661.3 8 See the discussion and examples in Sack, supra note 35, at 16-17.
39 A. EHRmFNWEIG, CONFLIcr oF LAWs 5 (1962).4 0 A. DicEy, CONrxLcr OF LAWS 5 (6th ed. J. Morris 1949).
41 See, e.g., Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Coles 395 (Iowa 1856), where the court
held that the English rule imposing strict liability on the owner of trespassing
cattle would not be applied in Iowa.
42 See Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One Hundred
Years After, 48 HIAsv. L. REv. 15 (1934); Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribu-
tion to American Conflicts Law: A Comment, 4 Am. J. LEGAL HisT. 230 (1961).
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mentaries appeared in 1834, American courts had not fully rec-
ognized the existence of a body of conflicts law nor were they
aware of the need for such law. International conflicts problems
were largely governed by international law, and interstate conflicts
were minimized by the recognition of a general commercial law
and the existence of a nearly uniform common law.43 Indeed, most
of the "early" cases involving choice of law 4 arose after the publi-
cation of Story's treatise, but the American and English courts
long regarded Story's treatise as authoritative.45 In this respect the
continental pattern was repeated: the courts "found" the solution
to conflicts problems in the writings of the leading theorist. The
case by case development of a body of decisional law did not
take place.
Story was fully conversant with all of the continental writers,
and relied primarily upon the ideas of Huber in developing his
theory of territoriality and comity as the basis of the conflict of
laws.46 The, three basic propositions, as in Huber's territoriality
theory, were as follows: (1) every state possesses absolute sover-
eignity within its own territory and may bind all persons or pro-
perty located there; (2) no sovereign can give laws beyond his
boundaries; and (3) consequently, whatever force the laws of one
state have beyond its borders depends on the comity given to
those laws by another state.47 Although Story found a "duty" to
give comity in a proper case, he recognized that this duty was one
of "imperfect obligation," since there was obviously no way by
which one sovereign could be compelled to give comity to the laws
of another.
It is immediately evident that there is nothing in the theory
itself that tells the court which law should be applied. As a theory
it is primarily a juristic explanation after the event: when the
forum does decide to give effect to foreign law, it does so on the
basis of comity.4s But relying upon continental sources and some
precedents, Story developed a comprehensive body of conflicts
43 A. ERHENzwEIo, supra note 39, at 4.
44 The concern for the recognition of judgments is reflected in the full faith
and credit clause. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
45 G. STUMBERG, supra note 21, at 6.
46 See the discussion in A. EHRENZWVEIG, supra note 39, at 6.
47 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAws 1 (5th ed. 1857).4 8 See the discussion of this point in Cheatham, American Theories of Con-
flict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361, 373 (1945).
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doctrine49 which stressed the territorial principle. It is the ter-
ritorial principle that has had the greatest influence on American
conflicts law, and its present influence can be found in a number
of contexts.
One example has been the "power myth" of jurisdiction, 50
in which courts justify the exercise of jurisdiction because of their
physical power over the defendant following personal service
within the state.r1 When this was buttressed by the concept of
jurisdiction over commercial entities on the basis of "doing
business," it was clear that many cases would arise where the
forum was a purely disinterested one, thereby giving rise to con-
flicts problems.5 2 The exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of phy-
sical power was never questioned under the territorial principle,
but absent such physical power the exercise of jurisdiction on the
ground that the harm occurred in the forum has been sustained
only after extensive litigation.- Even today it is not clear how
far a state may go in exercising jurisdiction over a non-resident
without physical power.
5 4
The territoriality principle also operates negatively in order
to avoid what may be called implicit conflict. Legislation is
ordinarily construed not to apply extra-territorially 55 so as to
49 G. STUiBERG, supra note 21, at 6.5o Ehrenzweig, Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L. J. 289 (1956).
5' Mr. Justice Holmes, in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917), said
that the foundation of jurisdiction is physical power ... "52 Although the "doing business" test may have been replaced with "minimum
contacts," International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945),
there is probably a residue of the former concept in cases where the forum is
urely disinterested. It is doubtful if jurisdiction would be sustained in a casclike McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), had the
plaintiff not been a resident of the forum. See Fisher Governor Co. v. SuperiorCour , 5 Cal. 2d 222, 347 P.2d 1, 3 (1959), where the cou t, through Judge
Traynor, observed that
although a foreign corporation may have sufficient contacts with a state
to justify an assumption of jurisdiction over it to enforce causes of action
having no relation to its activities in that state . . . more contacts are
reu aired for the assumption of such extensive jurisdiction than sales
sales promotion within the state by independent nonexciusive sales
representatives.
Cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
53 The statutes authorizing jurisdiction on the basis of "doing of an act"
vary, and not all states go as far as constitutionally permitted.54 Compare Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124
N.W.2d 824 (1963), with O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194
A.2d 568 (19683).
55 It is said that "all legislation is prima fade territorial." American Banana
Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). Examples of such construc-
tion will appear throughout the writing.
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avoid a conflict between that legislation and the law of a foreign
sovereign. This may be evidenced by the body of case law which
has grown up around the applicability of anti-trust and trademark
law to the activities of American firms abroad 56 and application of
the Jones Act 57 to foreign seamen. 8 It has recently been held that
the National Labor Relations Act 9 cannot be applied to a ship
flying a foreign flag despite extensive connections with the United
States. 60 The concept prevalent in continental criminal law of
secondary jurisdiction in the case of crimes committed abroad6'
is not generally recognized in the United States.62 American courts
think of the applicability of law in terms of the territorial im-
perative, and to this extent Story's propositions are recognized.
More significantly, as regards choice of law, it was Story's ter-
ritoriality principle that formed the basis of the vested rights
theory. This may seem paradoxical in the sense that the vested
rights theory was developed in reaction to the "defects" in the
comity- theory,63 but the defects stemmed from an absence of
compulsion to recognize the applicability of foreign law. In
practice, courts reluctant to displace the law of the forum, simply
refused to "give comity" to a distasteful foreign law.6" This could
not be permitted if a "universal solution" to conflicts problems
56 Compare the result in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213
U.S. 347 (1909), with Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962) (Sherman Act); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280
(1952), and Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. The T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.,
1956) (Lanham Act).
5746 U.S.C. § 688 (1958).58 See e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953); Romero v. Int'l
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
6929 U.S.C. § 159 (1965).
60 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10 (1964).
61 See the discussion in Cohn, Criminal Law Reform in Israel, 11 Am.
U. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1962).62 But see Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941), where it was held that
Florida could constitutionally apply a statute prohibiting sponge fishing to the
acts of its domiciliary in foreign waters.
63 See Cheatham, supra note 48, at 363. As Cardozo observed in Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918), "The misleading word'comity' has been responsible for much of the trouble." See also RESTATFmNT
OF ThE CONFLICT OF LAws § 6 (1934).
64 See, e.g., Hudson v. Von Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 823, 259 P. 374 (1927)
(vicarious liability of parents for torts of children). There was also the danger
that comity would be confused with reciprocity, so that the forum, for example,
would not enforce a foreign judgment if the state of rendition would not likewise
enforce a judgment of the forum. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). See also
Forgan v. Bainbridge, 34 Ariz. 408, 274 P. 155 (1928), where reciprocity was
the basis of the decision on an issue of priority of a title acquired in another state.
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was to be found.65 There was no disagreement with Story's first
two propositions which developed the territorial principle. How-
ever, it was a short step toward taking the territorial principle and
turning it into a concept of "jurisdiction"-as Story himself had
done in some instances66-thereby creating a "true duty" to
recognize a right (with the attendant responses this concept pro-
duces for the judicial mind) created by foreign law.
Story's first proposition was that every state possessed exclusive
sovereignty within its own territory and could bind all persons or
property located there, and his second proposition was that no
sovereign could give laws beyond his boundaries. This being so,
it followed that a sovereign could create a right if and only if it
had "jurisdiction" over the subject matter of the right. It had
such jurisdiction if the right was "created" within its territory,
that is, if the last act necessary to the existence of the right
occurred there. Since law is territorial, one state could not en-
force the law of another state. Story is correct up to this point, but
because one state cannot enforce the law of another state it does
not follow that it cannot enforce rights created by the law of
another state. Thus, under Story's principles, we have the basis of
the vested rights theory as developed by Professor Beale6 7 and
applied by judges such as Holmes6 s and Cardozo.69
According to Beale, a right, once created, exists with its attend-
ant legal consequences until the law that created it ends it and/or
the interest out of which it arose is extinguished. It is the purpose
of the conflict of laws to determine which state has the power to
create a particular right. This must be the state that has legislative
jurisdiction, i.e., the state where the last act necessary to the exis-
tence of the right occurred. Every other state is under a duty to
65 See the discussion in I J. BEar., TnE CONFLICT ov LAws, § 6.1 (1935).
66 See A. EHRENZMVEIG, supra note 39, at 8-9.
GTBeale's three volume treatise, supra note 65, represents the exposition of
his theory. The vested rights theory was favored by Dicey in England and Pillet
in France. See A. DIcEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 11 (1896); PiLLET, PRiNcIPLEs
495-571 (1903). See generallq 1 E. RtABL, Tn. CONFLICT oF LAWS: A CoM-
FARTnvE STuDY, 66-69 (2d ed. 1958).
38 Slater v. Mexican National R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904); Cuba R.R. v.
Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). Justice Holmes stressed the obligation of the
defendant rather than the right of the plaintiff. This is merely the other s;de of
the same coin.69 Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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recognize the right when it is called into existence. The territorial
principle, which was the basis of the comity theory, has now be-
come the basis of legislative jurisdiction, and hence of the vested
rights theory.7
0
Closely related to the vested rights theory is the highly homo-
logous right theory propounded by Judge Learned Hand.7' Under
this theory, strictly speaking, the forum does not enforce a right
created by the law of another state: it can only enforce a right
created by its own law. However, where legally operative facts
occurred elsewhere so that the forum's substantive law should not
govern, the forum will create a right that is identical-or highly
homologous-to the right created by the law of the foreign state.72
To determine which state can create a right, Hand would also
look to the state that had "legislative jurisdiction," and his treat-
ment of this concept is the same as that of the advocates of the
vested rights theory. Consequently, the result under this theory
will generally be the same as the result that would be reached
under the vefted rights theory. 3
The concept of legislative jurisdiction forms the basis of the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. The approach of the Re-
statement was to identify the one state-in the "plurality of sov-
ereign authorities that make up the legal order"-that could
create the particular right in question. If that state was not the
70See A. EmmaNzwExo, supra note 39, at 8-10.
71 See, e.g., his opinion in Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d
Cir. 1934); Siegmann v. Meyer, 100 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1938). Professor Morris
has substituted this approach for the vested rights approach of his predecessor.
See A. DicEY, CONFLiCr OF LAws 12 (6th ed. J. Morris 1949).
7
2 See Cheatham, supra note 48, at 385. In France, Professor Noboyet has
proposed a theory of territoriality, which is basically no different in result from
the other "rights' theories. See Niboyet, Territoriality and Universal Recognition
of Rules in the Conflict of Laws, 65 HAnv. L. REv. 582 (1952). Professor Rabel
also classifies Niboyet among the "rights" theorists. E. RABEL, supra note 67, at 67.
73 See A. EmENzwsc, supra note 39, at 11-12. For some time Hand's theory
was confused with the local law theory of Walter Wheeler Cook, to be discussed
infra, because both rejected the concept of enforcement of "rights created under
foreign law." See Cavers, The Two Local Law Theories, 63 HARv. L. 1Ev. 124
(1950). There is one situation in which the consistent application of the vested
rights approach and the highly homologous right approach will produce a dif-
ferent result. This is when the date on which the rate of exchange for a debt
payable in foreign currency is involved. Under the vested rights theory, that date
would be the judgment date (the "right" is not relevant in the forum until
enforcement is granted there), but under the highly homologous right theory, that
date would be the breach date (at the time of the breach a potential "right arose
in the forum under the forum's law). Both views are discussed in Die Deutsche
Bank Filiale Nurnberg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S. 517 (1926).
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forum, the forum had a duty to look to the foreign law to de-
termine if it created the right in favor of the plaintiff, and if it
did, the forum would have to enforce that right. The Restatement
was conceived of as containing a "few simple rules."74 By the
a priori application of these rules any conflicts problem could be
resolved. The magic key Aldricus and his successors had been
searching for had at last been found in the concept of legislative
jurisdiction.
The foregoing is not preparatory for an attack on the vested
rights theory of the conflict of laws and the Restatement which
it spawned. To the academic commentator it would seem that
such an attack would be "beating a dead horse," so to speak, since
the vested rights theory is said to be "generally discredited." 75 In
addition, new restaters have substantially completed a Restate-
ment Second, and they do not hesitate to enumerate the defici-
encies of the predecessor work. 76 But the academic world is not
the world of the courts, and in much of the latter world the
rationale of the first Restatement is alive77 or slowly dying.78
More significantly, the discussion that follows is equally applicable
to the Restatement Second and the entire "rules" theory it too
embodies. For, in the long run, the choice is not between the
Restatement and the Restatement Second, but between a "rules"
approach and the policy-centered conflict of laws.79 The substi-
tution of the "many complex rules" of the Restatement Second
for the "few simple rules" of the original Restatement will not
result in the adoption of a policy-centered approach to the
solution of conflicts problems. Nor will such a substitution reach
the basic problem of judicial method and the conflict of laws.
74 Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoN-
TErP. PROB. 679 (1963).
75 See B. CuHmE, SFLECTEm ESSAYS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAws 6 (1963).
He says that Walter Wheeler Cook discredited it "as thoroughly as the intellect
of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of afiother."
76 Reese, supra note 74, at 679-80.
77 This is demonstrated by the number of courts that continue to apply the
lex loci delicti rule in torts cases. See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del.
1965); White v. King, 223 A.2d 763 (Md. 1966).8 See Landers v. Landers, 216 A.2d 183 (Conn. 1966).
79 Professor Ehrenzveig has not yet ceased his herculean efforts to prevent
the adoption of the Restatement Second. See. e.g., Ehrenzweig, The Second Con-
flicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230
(1965).
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III. CONFLICTS CASES IN AMERICAN COURTS: FROM THE RuLEs
APPROACH TO THE POLICY-CENTERED CONFLICT OF LAWS
Professor Beale believed that the vested rights theory was an
"indigenous creation of the common law."80 This simply is not
so, as a comparison with Savigny's location of legal relations
theory,8' for example, will indicate.8 - Apart from this, it seems
clear that the "rules approach" to the solution of conflicts prob-
lems embodied in the Restatement is directly antithetical to the
common law method of judicial decision. The adequacy of any
Restatement as setting forth existing law may be questioned,
83
but the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws utterly failed to
operate in this manner. Rather it set forth a series of choice of
law rules based on the concept of legislative jurisdiction, which
were to be applied a priori to designated classes of cases, i.e., all
tort cases, all contract cases. Certainly this is not how the common
law developed,84 and as has been pointed out, the common law
method of development by judicial decision had never been
applied to the conflict of laws.
The common law is said to develop on a case-by-case basis.
When faced with a case of first impression-and for many courts,
cases involving application of the rules of the Restatement would
be cases of first impression 8 -the court would establish principles
of law to decide the case, and give reasons for establishing and ap-
plying these principles to the particular fact pattern before it. If
the court indulged in generalizations not necessary to the decision
of the case, these may be dismissed as dicta. If principles are ap-
plicable in future cases, but where the fact pattern is significantly
s Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 Micn.
L. REV. 637, 668 (1960).
81 See the discussion of Savigny's theory in Yntema, The Historic Basis of
Private International Law, 2 Am. J. Com,. L., 809-10 (1953).
82 See the further criticism of Beale's view in Ehrenzweig, supra note 80,
at 668-69.
83 See Milner, Restatement: The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. Prrr
L. REv. 795 (1959).
84 The only safe or reasonable procedure, the only procedure which con-
forms to common law traditions, is to test each case on its merits. Any
realistic or useful analysis must be planned on this basis. The vice of
the vested rights theory is that it affects to decide concrete cases upon
generalities which do not state the practical considerations involved and
so it must perforce obscure the issue.
Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 463
(1928).
85 As will be demonstrated, for the courts of an average state the number of
conflicts cases is relatively small.
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different or other factors necessitate a different result, the first
decision may be distinguished. If the rationale of the first decision
is equally applicable to the new fact pattern, the first decision may
be extended. And so on, as any first year law student knows. The
stare decisis effect of a decision then can only be determined
with reference to the facts of the case in which the decision was
rendered. 6 Under this system, legal theory develops in response
to principles of decision rather than the converse. The "rules" of
the conflict of laws, however, as embodied in the Restatement,
find their source in the underlying theory of vested rights. In
this respect the Restatement is scarcely distinguishable from a
civilian code,8 7 and like a civilian code, it is designed to supply a
solution in all cases by the a priori application of its rules. With
respect to torts the Restatement says:
§ 877 The Place of Wrong
The place of wrong is the state where the last event
necessary to make the actor liable for the alleged tort took
place.
§ 878 Law Governing Plaintiff's Injury
The law of the place of the wrong determines whether a
person has sustained a legal injury.
We may compare the tort rule of the Italian Code:
Art. 25 Law Governing Obligations
86Our reaction to the rigid doctrinal analysis of the past should not blind
us to the utility ef stare decisis when holdings are properly limited with reference
to the factual situation. See generally Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 6 Am.
LAw. SCHOOL REv. 215 (1928).87 When I was teaching in Ethiopia from 1963 to 1966, I explored the
prospective development of the conflict of laws in that country. My findings and
ideas were set forth in a small book, R. SEDLER, Tim CONFLIC'T OF LAws IN
E'TmoPIA (1965). Adoption of a "Code of the Conflict of Laws" was proposed,
and a draft code was appended to the book. This was done because all other areas
of Ethiopian law had been codified, and it could be expected that conflicts would
be codied as well. My hope was that the Ethiopian approach to conflicts would
be poliy-centered in nature, and the code was developed along these lines. Re-reading the provisions persuades me that I was not particularly successful in this
endeavor, and I certainly wish that I had drafted some of the provisions dif-
ferently. Professor Ehrenzeig's question in a letter, 
Have the experiences of
other countries with their codification of conflicts law really been that favorablethat another codificaion sh uld be attempted?" was hard to answer, and I didso only by the observation that conflicts law would be codified there anway, soan attempt should be made to guide the codification along policy-centered lines.
In any event, my suggestion has not yet been adopted. Certainly, I would not
favor anything like a code in the United States. With this explanation, an attack
fn the "code-like approach of the Restatement can be continued.
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Non-contract obligations are governed by the law of the
place where the facts from which they arose took place.
Or the Greek Code:
Art. 26 Delictual Obligations
Delictual obligations are governed by the law of the
state where the delictual act was committed.
There is a substantive difference between the Restatement and
these codes because the Restatement looks to the law of the place
where the harm was suffered and the Italian and Greek Codes
look to the law of the place where the act was committed.88 Who
is to say that it is any more "logical" to look to the place of harm
(in the absence of harm, there is no tort) or the place of the act
(if no act had been committed, there would have been no tort).
In terms of methodology, however, the approaches are identical.
If a tort has been committed, we reason a priori that the law of a
particular state governs. Never mind what kind of a tort, who the
parties were, and so on. In short, the rule applies without regard
to the particular fact pattern before the court.
Suppose, as in most other areas of law, that the academicians
had not preceded the courts. This would mean that when most
conflicts cases first came before American courts, there would
have been no Story's Commentaries, and in more modem times,
the Restatement would not have been available to provide the
rules. The court would still have had to decide whether in the
particular case before it the law of the forum would be displaced
in favor of foreign law. It may be safely assumed that the court
would have proceeded in the same way that it proceeded in other
cases. The case would have been decided with reference to the fact
pattern involved, or more accurately, fact-law pattern, and give
the reasons for its decision. The decision would be applied or
extended in later cases with identical or similar fact patterns. In
a case that was distinguishable, new principles would be estab-
lished. In time a body of conflicts law based on decided cases
would emerge in each jurisdiction, and the views of academic
commentators on the proper solution of conflicts cases could be
88 The Italian code provision is taken from McCusker, The Italian Rules of
the Conflict of Laws, 25 TuL. L. RE;v. 70 (1950). The Greek code provision is
taken from Nicoletopoulos, Private International Law in the New Greek Civil
Code, 23 TuL. L. IEv. 452 (1949).
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considered by the courts as in other areas of law. More im-
portantly, courts would not see themselves as compelled to accept
the "universal solution" proposed by a particular academic com-
mentator.
Needless to say, this is not what happened. Courts adopted a
series of "rules" applicable to all cases coming within general
categories such as "tort." From the beginning, as the historical
excursion indicates, there has been a search (conducted by the
academicians) for a key that would unlock the door to the solution
of all conflicts problems. While the rules that result from such an
approach may be suitable to the more generalized system of
jurisprudence reflected in continental codes,89 this is not the way
common law courts ordinarily proceed. Yet they have so proceeded
in conflicts cases. They have abandoned the traditional common
law method of case-by-case development of legal principles and
have substituted a "system of rules" founded on theoretical con-
sistency, to be deductively applied without regard for the par-
ticular fact-law pattern in the case before it. This may be why
the conflict of laws appears as a "dismal swamp" and why the
ordinary court is "quite lost in it."90 The court is "lost" because
it is departing from the judicial method it employs in other cases.
One may wonder what there is about the conflict of laws that has
caused courts to abandon the common-law method of judicial
decision?
The answer may be found in the reasons behind the conflict
of laws. The reason a court should put aside its own substantive
law and apply the law of another state has been assumed to relate
to the fact that suit may be brought in different states and that
the result should not differ from this reason. As the Supreme
Court has observed: "the purpose of a conflict-of-laws doctrine is
to assure that a case will be treated the same way under the
appropriate law regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which
often determine the forum." 91
89 Professor Ehrenzweig contends that the "lex fori" is operating as the
basic law in European countries as well. Ehrenzweig, supra note 80, at 655-56,
658, 660-61.90 Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MiCH. L. Rmv. 959 (1953). The failure
of the courts to follow common law method in conflicts cases has long been
recognized. See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAnv. L.
REv. 173, 177-78 (1933).
91 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 591 (1952).
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It has also been stated that:
the searching question may be put, why should there be any
special rules made for cases with foreign facts? The answer
to this fundamental question is seldom found stated in the
decisions. But it is nevertheless a major premise, even if an
unarticulated major premise, upon which many elaborate doc-
trines are based. The premise, spelled out, must be that fair-
ness to all the parties to a litigation requires a different treat-
ment of a Pennsylvania set of facts presented to a New York
court in a New York law suit than is given a New York set
of facts identical except that they took place on the other
side of a state boundary line. The outcome of litigation in-
volving the former should not be changed by the fact that
for one reason or another legal action is instituted some-
where else than at the place where the operative facts are
located. Fairness to the parties requires that the fortuitous
choice of a geographical place of suit should, as far as is
possible, not vary the way in which the suit will be
decided
9 2
In other words, uniformity of result is a desirable goal. The
plaintiff should not be able to "forum shop" in order to achieve
a favorable result.93 A priori rules applied by all courts in a
generalized class of cases remove any incentive to be found in
forum-shopping. Since choice of law rules must be uniform, such
rules cannot be developed on a case-by-case basis. If every court
accepts the "complete system of rules," a uniformity of result,
which is the purpose of the conflict of laws, will exist.
If our goal is to discourage forum-shopping, it is evident that
we go about it in a very strange way. The incidence of forum
shopping reflects the availability of potential fora, available be-
cause our law relating to jurisdiction 94 encourages the widest
possible forum-shopping. Since the individual defendant may be
sued in any place where he can be served with process and the
corporate defendant can be sued in any state where it is "doing
business," however that is defined, forum-shopping is a most
92 H. GOODRICH, CONFLICTr OF LAWS 4-5 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964).
93 It was the dire prediction of the dissenting justices in Wessling that "The
adoption of the rule in the majority opinion may well lead to 'court hopping' to
find a favorable forum." Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967). But
quaere. where should a Kentucky plaintiff sue a Kentucky defendant in a case
arising out of a single car accident if not in Kentucky?
94 See the discussion, supra notes 51-52, and accompanying text.
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sensible course of action for the plaintiff to follow. If there are
many New York cases where all the legally operative facts
occurred in Pennsylvania-so that only Pennsylvania law could
be constitutionally applied95--does this not suggest that some-
thing is wrong with our law of jurisdiction? Rather than making
available the widest possible number of fora while assuming that
the particular forum in which suit is brought will make no dif-
ference, since all courts apply uniform choice of law rules based
on consistent theory, would it not make more sense to limit the
number of potential fora, thereby reducing the number of cases
in which "foreign elements" would be present?
Suits are not instituted in jurisdictions other than that where
the operative facts occurred "for one reason or another." It is
rare that a choice of forum is fortuitous. Quite likely it has been
cooly calculated. The plaintiff in a personal injury action will try
to sue in an urban area where juries generally award high
verdicts. 96 Or, he may sue in a particular state to take advantage
of an aspect of "procedural" law, such as a rule that any issue
of contributory negligence must be determined by the jury.97 So
long as our present law of jurisdiction remains as it is, extensive
opportunities for forum-shopping will exist. Uniform choice of
law rules will have no effect on this aspect of forum-shopping.
However, the truly objectionable aspect of forum-shopping is
when it is done to obtain more favorable law. Uniform choice of
law rules are said to be necessary so that the "substantive result"
will not depend on the forum in which suit is brought. If the
facts giving rise to a tort case are connected with State A, where
contributory negligence is a complete bar, and with State B, which
has a comparative negligence statute, it is objectionable to permit
the plaintiff to sue in one state or another in hopes of obtaining
the application of State B law. His claim should be governed by
the same law irrespective of where the suit is brought. It should
95 See, e.g., Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
96See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
97 Questions relating to judge-jury allocation should be determined by the
law of the forumn, because they may be said to represent the forum's strong
procedural policy. See Hopkins v. Kum, 351 Mo. 41, 171 S.W.2d 62-5 (1943);
and the discussion in Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and
Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 813, 874-75 (1962). More-
over, the application of the forum's law on this issue may be constitutionally re-
quired. Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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be noted that there is apparently no objection to a choice of
forum on the ground that in a particular forum, as a matter of
"procedure," contributory negligence is a question for the jury,
which jury may well apply contributory negligence on an ad hoc
basis. There is objection only to a choice based on favorable sub-
stantive law, but none to a choice based on other "outcome-
determinative" considerations.9" Even if this is so, and the "com-
plete system of rules" is justified on the ground that it will pro-
duce uniformity of result, forum-shopping will still not be dis-
couraged for the fact remains that uniformity of result has never
been achieved, and cannot be within the framework of the system.
In the first place, the "few simple rules" are not all that simple
to apply to the myriad of fact-law patterns that make up actual
cases. Where is the "place of contracting" when the offeree speaks
his acceptance into the telephone in one state and the offeror
hears the acceptance in another?99 Since the rules are "simple" and
the fact situations varied, interpretation is necessary, and courts
may disagree on proper interpretation of conceptual doctrine.
More significantly, the court is not ignorant of the substantive
result that its "choice of law rule" will produce, even though it
may pretend to ignore it. There are enough manipulative tech-
niques within the system to enable any court willing to employ
them to achieve the substantive result it wants.100 It has long ago
been observed that "often the courts' deliberations will disclose a
happy coincidence between the dictates of justice in the instant
case and the factors decisive of a proper conflicts rule."'u0 Applying
a priori rules without regard to a particular case's fact-law pat-
tern will often result in the displacement of the law of the forum
and produce what the court considers to be an unsound result.
Sometimes this is accepted in silence, other times the court will
98 Under the existing "substance-procedure" dichotomy, many "outcome-
determinative" matters are governed by the law of the forum because they are
classified as "procedural." Ube of the procedural characterization as a manipula-
tive technique to bring about the application of forum law will be discussed
infra.
99 See Lian v. Employers Reinsurance Corp., 392 Pa. 58, 139 A.2d 638
(1958).
lo0 It has been suggested that the "very vagueness of choice-of-law principles
often makes it easy for the judge to deliberately select one which will lead him
to the domestic rule he prefers to apply." Hancock, Three Approaches to the
Choice of Law Problem, XXTH CmiTunY Co AATIVE AND CoNFmrs LAw 365,
366 (1961).
301 Cavers, supra note 90, at 181.
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gag, but still accept the result, justifying its action on the need for
uniformity. However, there are times when-if the court under-
stands how and is willing-it will manipulate the system to
achieve the desired result, generally the application of the forum's
law.
One manipulative technique employed is that of "disin-
genuous characterization."'11 2 When a Connecticut auto-rental
agency rented an automobile to a Connecticut driver who was in-
volved in an accident in Massachusetts, injuring his Connecticut
passenger, 103 the Connecticut court was most anxious to apply its
statute holding the lessor of an automobile liable for the harm
caused by the lessee.104 However, the tort occurred in Massa-
chusetts, and the court did not question-and still does not'05-the
rule that questions of tort are governed by the lex loci delicti, but
matters of contract were governed by the law of the place where
the contract was made, and this particular contract was made in
Connecticut. The court, therefore, concluded that the liability of
the lessor under the statute was a question of "contract" and
that, as a matter of law, the injured party was the third party
beneficiary of the contract between the lessor and lessee. While
the reasoning is somewhat incredible, the result is a very sensible
one since Massachusetts had no interest in applying its law to deny
recovery to a Connecticut victim against a Connecticut auto-rental
agency.106 Moreover, the defendant was fully cognizant of Con-
102 For a criticism of the concept of characterization, see Ehrenzweig,
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws: An Unwelcome Addition to American
Doctrine, XXTH CENTtniY COMYA ATVE An CONFLICTS LAw 395 (1961). The
criticism of the traditional concept is quite valid. The process by which the
court "identifies the problem area involved in a conflicts case, as in others, is
quite valuable. This will be the subject of a future paper.
103 It is interesting to note that the residence of the plaintiff is nowhere dis-
cussed in the opinion. It appears, however, that it was Connecticut.
104 Probably at this time, 1928, the court was more concerned with the
admonitory aspects of the statute than with shifting the loss to a responsible
enterprise. The Connecticut rental agency that was "careless" in renting auto-
mobiles could rent one to a driver who could cause an accident in Connecticut.
For a discussion of the distinction between admonitory torts and enterprise
Liability from the conflicts perspective, see A. EHRENZWIG, CONFLICT OF LAws
212 (1962). As regards admonitory torts, see Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in
Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN.
L. REv. 1 (1951). As regards enterprise liability, see Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes
In the Conflicts of Laws: Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Fore-
,eeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YAL L. J. 595, 794, 978 (1960). (See text
mupra, at p. 34).
105 See Landers v. Landers, 216 A.2d 183 (Conn. 1966).
105 Professor Currie sees the case as containing a problem that was "wholly
irtificial, being raised merely by the forum's choice of law rules." B. CuRuu,
upra note 75, at 184.
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necticut law, and if he insured against liability, he would have
insured against liability for the acts of the lessee.107 Thus, only
Connecticut liability insurance rates or auto-rental rates were in-
volved. Since the court was "bound" by conflicts rules of universal
application, it had to find a way out within the framework of
these rules. 08
Some years later, after the policy-centered approach had be-
gun to find its way into judicial decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court, in a similar situation, was more realistic. It rejected the
Restatement rule and applied its Dram Shop Act to a Minnesota
saloon-keeper who served liquor to an intoxicated Minnesota
driver, resulting in an accident injuring his Minnesota passenger
in Wisconsin. 109
Another manipulative technique has been to treat the question
in issue as one of "procedure" since it is a "universal rule" that all
matters of "procedure" are governed by the law of the forum." 0
Even the broadest definition of "procedure" '' would not include
questions such as: whether a suit can be maintained against the
estate of a deceased tortfeasor," 2 whether one spouse could sue
another for a tort,1 3 and the quantum of damages recoverable for
personal injury death." 4 But a court, faced with a desire to apply
the forum's law in a particular case in spite of the required rule,
has treated each of these as a matter of procedure." 5 Often, courts
will quickly withdraw the "procedural" characterization,' 0 but
107 See the discussion of the case from this aspect in Ehrenzweig, supra note
104, at 986-88.
108 See B. CuruE, supra note 75, at 614.
109 Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957).
110 RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLiCT OF LAWS 585 (1934). Although the
Restatement Second changes some of the rules, it follows this approach. Cf.
Sedler, supra note 97.
III It is my position that the concept of "procedure" as such is meaningless.
If the matter in question materially affects the outcome, it should be governed by
the law the forum uses as a model, except where to do so would interfere with
the efficient operation of the forum's judicial system or violate a strong procedural
policy of the forum. Id. The statement in the text, however, is equally applicable
to the concept of "procedure" under the "outcome determinative" test.
112 See, e.g., Coster v. Coster, 289 N.Y. 438, 46 N.E.2d 509 (1943).
113 See, e.g., Bohenek v. Niedzwiecki, 142 Conn. 278, 113 A.2d 509 (1955).
114 See, e.g., Stevens v. Missouri P. R.R., 355 S.W.2d 122 (Mo. 1962).
115 Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survival);
Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936) (spousal immunity); Kilberg
v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961) (limitation on
wrongful death recovery).
110 The New York court, for example, limited Kilberg to the "public policy"
basis, discussed infra. See Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902
(1962).
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not until this characterization has served its purpose to decide a
case, where application of the forum's substantive law would have
been sound and proper.
117
Still another technique has been the use of "public policy."
The public policy technique is where a court, in a case where
foreign law is applicable under its choice of law rule, refuses to
apply the particular substantive law because it would be against
its "public policy" to do so.118 It is the content of the foreign law
that precludes its application. The public policy technique is
recognized by the advocates of the vested rights theory and the
restaters,"9 but within very narrow limits. Cardozo made a classic
exposition of the public policy technique in Loucks v. Standard
Oil Company:
The courts are not free to refuse to enforce a foreign right at
- the pleasure of judges to suit the individual notion or ex-
pediency or fairness. They do not close their doors unless
-help would violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal.1 2
0
Some eighteen years later, however, the same court Cardozo
spoke for viewed "public policy" in a different light. A New York
wife brought suit against her husband to recover damages for in-
juries suffered in a Connecticut automobile accident. New York
law prohibited such suits, but Connecticut has abolished spousal
immunity. Thus, under the lex loci delicti rule, Connecticut
law would apply. It is unlikely that Cardozo would have thought of
a spousal suit as "violating some fundamental principle of justice.
117 In commenting on the opinion in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859,
264 P.2d 944 (1953), Judge Traynor observed:
It may not be amiss to add a postscript that although the opinion is my
own, I do not regard it as ideally articulated, developed as it had to be
against the brooding background of a petrified forest. Yet I would make
no more apology for it than that in reaching a rational result it was less
deft than it might have been to quit itself of the familiar speech of
choice of law. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TFx. L.
PEv. 657, 670 n. 35 (1959).
In Grant and Mertz both parties were residents of the forum state injured in an
out-of-state automobile accident. The Kilberg case is discussed infra, notes 389-
400 and accompanying text.
118 The public policy technique must be distinguished from "public policy"
is reflected in the forum's own law, which is just another way of saying
"policy." Note the confusion on this point in the majority opinion in Wessling.
Sce the discussion, infra note 338, and accompanying text. See text supra, at p. 37.
119 RESTATEMENr OF THE CoNFLicT oF LAws 612 (1934).
120224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common weal." The New York court, however,
now gave this definition of public policy:
The term "public policy" is frequently used in a very vague,
loose or inaccurate sense. The courts have found it necessary
to define its juridicial meaning, and have held that a state can
have no public policy except what is to be found in its Consti-
tution and laws... 121
Since New York recognized spousal immunity, which, incidentally,
the court characterized as a matter of "procedure," it was held to
be against New York's "public policy" to recognize the suit. In
later years, the New York court also used the public policy tech-
nique to avoid applying the locus' limitation of the quantum of
damages recoverable in a wrongful death case. -22
Of all the techniques to avoid the application of foreign
law, 3 "public policy" can be wielded most effectively. Once it is
said that the content of the foreign law is against the forum's
public policy, the law of the forum can be applied, at least
negatively. When New York held that the Connecticut law allow-
ing a spousal suit would be against its "public policy," the result
was that the suit could not be maintained, and thus, New York
reached the same result that would have been reached had New
York law been applied in the first place.
Loucks v. Standard Oil CompanyI2 4 involved a suit in New
York for wrongful death, but the death occurred in Massachusetts.
New York substantive law could not have been applied because
the New York wrongful death statute was not applicable to deaths
occurring in another state.2 5 However, both New York and Mas-
sachusetts recognized a cause of action for wrongul death, and
their laws "conflicted" only in the sense that recovery was based on
different considerations. Thus, there is no true conflict in the
sense that one jurisdiction, as in Mertz, would not permit the suit.
By the expedient of not recoganizing that right on "public policy"
grounds, the Mertz court, in effect, applied New York law to the
121 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (19.36).
122 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961)..
123 Other manipulative techniques are discussed in Ehrenzweig, supra note
82, at 678-85.
124 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
125 Whitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465 (1861).
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issue in question. In more recent cases involving suits between the
forum's spouses resulting from out-of-state accidents, some courts
have simply applied their own law to permit128 or disallow the
suit.1
27
Thus, if the justification for a system of choice of law rules is
that uniformity of decision will result, the system has been a
failure. The result may well differ depending on the forum in
which suit is brought, since different states have different con-
flicts "rules." Moreover, it is impossible to predict when a court
will use a manipulative technique to reach a desired result.128 The
rules of the Restatement Second, as we will see, are more difficult
to apply and give the court even more opportunity to bring about
a desired result.
No assistance in bringing about uniform rules can be expected
from the Supreme Court. After some early indications that the
vested rights theory would be raised to constitutional status, 2
the Supreme Court has decided to give the states wide latitude
in solving conflicts questions.130 Actually the crowning blow came
in 1940 when the Court held that federal courts would have to
apply state conflicts rules in cases governed by state law. 31 Not
only did this mean that the federal courts could not develop
uniform rules-if they did, perhaps state courts would follow
them as well-but it constituted judicial recognition at the highest
level that conflicts rules differed from state to state. It is difficult
for a court today to justify its acceptance of a system of rules on
the ground that this will insure uniformity of result when such
uniformity simply does not exist.
If it is recognized that uniformity of result will not be
achieved or even closely approximated, does this mean that the
system of rules approach to the solution of conflicts problems will
128 Sce, e.g., Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95
N.W.2d 814 (1959).
127 See, e.g., Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966). The
restaters would now look to the law of the domicile rather than the place of in-
jury in all cases. RESTATEmeNT (SEcoND) oF Tim CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, § 390g
(Tent. Draft No. 9 1964).
128This casts some doubt on the justification for the rules approach, i.e.,
that it is "predictable." See the concern of Montgomery, J., dissenting in
Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
129 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
110 See Clay v. Sun Ins. Offlice, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
1:1 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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readily be abandoned by the courts? The answer would seem to
be no, because the quest for uniformity has not been the primary
motivating force behind judicial acceptance of the system of rules
approach and the unwillingness to fashion a body of conflicts law
in the traditional common law manner. The goal of the advocates
of the vested rights theory and the restaters may have been uni-
formity of result, but it must have been evident to the courts that
such uniformity was not being achieved. The lack of uniformity
can not be doubted today, but many courts are still unwilling to
abandon the traditional approach. There must be another reason
why this approach has found such favor with the courts. The other
reason is elusive and difficult to articulate, but an attempt will be
made to analyze it.
Courts have shunned the responsibility for developing a body
of conflicts law through decisions. Rules set down by Story, and
later the Restatement, were applied "objectively" without regard
to the fact-law pattern of the particular case. Solutions to conflicts
questions are found by locating the correct rule, and the rule does
the rest. The court is not, in any meaningful sense, required to
make a choice of law. It is not required to consider the content of
the laws, relevant social and economic factors behind those laws,
or the position of the parties. In conflicts cases, this method has
found favor with the courts even though it is directly antithetical
to the common law method of judicial decision, which has for
many years been based. to some extent at least, upon considera-
tions of policy,132 and which has revolved around the factual
situation presented in the particular case.
To the extent that the courts have adopted the rules approach,
it can be said with fairness that they do not "want" to decide con-
flicts cases. The resolution of the conflicts issue in a case con-
taining a foreign element is a threshold question that must be
disposed of so that the court can get on with the business at hand,
i.e., determining the substantive rights of the parties. While the
threshold question may ultimately be dispositive of the case, the
court is, nonetheless, anxious to get on with a determination on
the merits. Cases in which conflicts questions arise are few in
132 Certainly this is indicated by the early negligence cases which stressed
the need to limit the liability of the new enterprises. See, e.g., Winterbottom v.
Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
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number,"33 and considerations of "judicial economy" may seem-
ingly justify resort to rules contained in an already-existing
system.1
34
The strongest consideration, however, is the "objective" nature
of the rules. There is something "political" about the choice of
law concept, where a court is asked to "choose" between its own
law and that of another state or states.135 On what basis should it
make its "choice?" Should it look to the content of the laws and
choose the "better" law? Should it look to the interests of the
states involved and "weigh" those interests? Questions of the
"better law" and the "greater interest" have a political aura about
them. If a court says that the law of another state is "better," does
this not mean that the forum should change its own law, and if
the basis of that law is legislation, is this a proper thing for a
court to say about its legislature? If it says that the other state has
a "greater" interest, is this not somehow a "political judgment,"
which courts may not be equipped to make? But if it says that the
forum's law is "better" or that the forum has the "greater" interest,
is it not then subject to the charge of "provincialism" and "ex-
pediency?" If these are the alternatives that result from choice,
it is not difficult to understand why courts wish to take refuge in
rules that are externally established and free from "judicial bias."
If the forum's law is to be displaced or preferred, as the case may
be, it is because the rules require it. The court's hands are
"clean"; it applies the rules "objectively" and "impartially."
Moreover, the court can always fall back on the need for uni-
formity of result.
The purpose of this article is not to set forth a theory of
judicial behavior in conflicts cases, but rather it is in an attempt
-without empirical data-to explain the courts' long-standing
acceptance of an externally established system of rules. The con-
clusion is that there is a "political aura" surrounding a conflicts
question. In order to avoid making what may be conceived to be
a "political judgment" as to the choice of law, the courts have
133 See the discussion in B. Cuimu, SELECTED EssAYs IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAws 629 (1963). As will be indicated, they may often present the same fact-
law pattern.
134 As to the matter of "judicial economy" in conflicts cases see id.
135 This is perhaps even more true when the forum is in the position of the
"disinterested third state." Concerning the "political nature" of a choice of law
decision, see id. at 181-83.
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taken refuge in "objective" rules. It is the rules that require the
choice of law rather than a conscious decision or preference by
the courts. Since conflicts cases are relatively few in number
when the totality of cases coming before a court is considered, the
court may be willing to "sacrifice" a desirable result in a parti-
cular case so that it will not have to make a "choice of law" in all
cases. Where the result would really be "shocking," manipulative
techniques to avoid it are at hand; perhaps they are the "safety
valve" of the system, although as has been pointed out, they
operate to prevent the achievement of the system's fundamental
goal, i.e., uniformity of result.
While a policy-centered approach to the solution of conflicts
problems with emphasis on the fact-law pattern in the particular
case, jand concepts of "basic law," "governmental interest" and
"principles of preference" may seem sound to academic com-
mentators, they have been anathema to many courts. In order to
avoid the responsibility for making a choice of law in the parti-
cular case, courts, have, in effect, accepted a system of rules to be
applied deductively in all cases coming within a broad general
category. However, the perspective to be gained from a cdse-by-
case analysis of specific questions and the formulation of narrow
principles susceptible of future extension or contraction has been
lost.
Of course, the above statements do not apply to all courts or
all judges or all cases. It is obvious that courts have often been
motivated by policy considerations when they were manipulating
the system to achieve desired results. It may be that when the
language is stripped from the decisions and the cases with no
actual conflict of laws are ignored, it would be found that many
of the decisions were based upon policy considerations. 136 None-
theless, the fact remains that courts have accepted a system of
rules approach to problems of the conflict of laws. Enough cases
have been decided without reference to policy considerations and
have reached results that would not have been reached if con-
siderations of policy had been paramount. Courts are still deciding
cases under the rules of the traditional system, and it cannot be
136 This is the essential thesis of Professor Ehrenzweig's "true rules." See
Ehrenzweig, Choice of Law: Current Doctrine and "True Rules," 49 CALM. L.
RE.m 240 (1981); Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: "A Restate-
ment" of the "Lex For Approach," 18 05.,A. L. REV. 340 (1965).
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doubted that it is the rules approach that has found the most
favor with courts.
Perhaps at this juncture, a definition of the policy-centered
conflict of laws would be in order. The policy-centered conflict of
laws rejects a priori rules to be applied in all cases of a particu-
lar category. Rather it looks to the individual fact-law pattern of
each case and would make the choice of law decision in light of
relevant social and economic policies found in the various laws
and considerations of fairness to the parties. Its genesis goes back
to the attacks mounted on the vested rights theory and the
Restatement by Lorenzen, 137 Yntema, 138 and most significantly,
Walter Wheeler Cook.139 Today, it is the basis of theories as to the
choice of law process propounded by Ehrenzweig,' 40 Currie,
141
Cavers,142 and other commentators. 143 It is said that the earlier
advocates of the policy-centered approach "spent their careers
attacking the Restatement,"' 44 and were not able to offer a
comprehensive approach in its stead. 45 Nonetheless, they did
propose solutions to a number of conflicts problems on the basis
of a policy-centered approach. It is submitted that Walter Wheeler
Cook, at least, developed a general theory of the policy-centered
approach, on which later writers have built. It must be admitted,
137 See, e.g., Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924).
138 See, e.g., Yntema, The Horbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37
YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
139 See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457 (1924).
140 Although Professor Ehrenzweig has prepared a complete treatise, A.
EHHeNZWEI, CONfliCr OF LAws (1962), it is his numerous articles which
develop his thesis most fully.
1
4 1 His thesis is set forth in the articles collected in B. CUPrJM, supra note 133.
142 Professor Cavers was one of the early critics of the traditional approach.
See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HA-v. L. REV. 173
(1933). After a number of years of reflection, his views have been set forth in
D. CAVERs, THE CHOicE-oF-LAw PRocEss (1965), which was based on the
Cooley Lectures he delivered at the University of Michigan Law School in 1964.
143 See, e.g., Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations. 54 CALTF. L. REv. 1584 (1966); Weintraub, A Method for Solving
Conflicts Problems-Torts, 48 CoR. L.Q. 215 (1962). This partial listing does
not exclude other commentators whose approach may, to a greater or lesser de-
gree, be said to be "policy-centered." Indeed, even Professor Briggs, the most
persistent advocate of tho "jurisdictional principle," relates the principle to a
policy-centered approach. See Briggs, The Utility of the Jurisdictional Principlein a Policy-Centered Conflict of Laws, 6 V,,mN. L. REv. 667 (1953).'44 Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal for ItsWrrmmaAL. 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230, 1231 (1965).
'
4 5 See Cavers, Book Review, 56 HARV. L. 11EV. 1170, 1172-73 (1943). Fora further reflection on this attitude, see D. CvEms" supra note 142, at 10-11.
1967]
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
however, that the later writers have gone much further than
Cook in elaborating a methodology for the solution of conflicts
problems under a policy-centered approach.
A brief discussion of the methodology proposed by Professors
Ehrenzweig, Currie and Cavers might be helpful at this point.
The following is a summarization of their views in connection
with the Babcock case.
Ehrenzweig: Professor Ehrenzweig's theory is that of the lex
fori. He contends that the basic rule is that the law of the forum
governs and foreign law is used only as an exception to this. When
foreign law is used, it is because, "as to certain important typical
fact situations, courts have in effect developed uniform interpreta-
tions which have resulted in generally recognized exceptions from
the lex fori principle."1 46 These "true rules" of choice of law
47
are based upon considerations of policy and fairness to the parties.
It must be remembered that Professor Ehrenzweig favors abolition
of our present concept of transient jurisdiction, so that in most
cases the forum would have some interest in the transaction and
the application of its law would be proper.148 As to torts, Professor
Ehrenzweig distinguishes between admonitory torts, which gen-
erally would be governed by the law of the place where the wrong-
ful act was done,149 and enterprise liability, which would be de-
termined with reference to reasonable insurability and calcul-
ability. 150
Currie: Professor Currie's theory is one of governmental in-
terest. His thesis is that the court must analyze the policy behind
various laws and determine, in light of that policy, what state or
states have an interest in having their law applied to the issue in
question. Frequently, he contends, only one state will have such
an interest, and its law should be applied. If the court, after con-
146 Statement of Professor Ehrenzweig in E. CnEATHAMf, E. GmswoLD, NV.
REESE and M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNFLIcr OF LAWS 479
(1964) [hereinafter cited as CHEATHAM].
147 See note 136 supra.
148 "Meanwhile a reform of the law of jurisdiction may help to minimize
the problem by limiting the choice of the forum on rational grounds to one
having such contact with the case as will justify the application of the chosen
forum's own law." Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction:
The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 292 (1956).
149 See Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1951).
150 See Ehrenzweig, Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability under "Fore-
seeable and Insurable Laws," 69 YALE L.J. 595, 794, 978 (1960).
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sidering the interests of the various states involved, finds an
apparent conflict in that more than one state may have an interest
in having its law applied, it should reconsider and ask whether
a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or
interest of one state may avoid the conflict. If a conflict is un-
avoidable and one of the states with an interest is the forum,
Currie insists that the forum must prefer its own governmental
interest and apply its law. If the forum is a disinterested state, it
should dismiss the case because there is a conflict of interests
between two other states which it cannot resolve. If the case can-
not with justice be dismissed, the court should either apply the
law that more nearly corresponds with its own, or, as Currie puts
it, "decide the case by a candid exercise of legislative discretion,
resolving the conflict as it believes it would be resolved by a
supreme legislative body having power to determine which in-
terest should be required to yield."' 51
An essential element of Professor Currie's thesis is that a
court cannot "weigh" conflicting interests and decide which state
has the "superior governmental interest" where there is a true
conflict. He asserts that this is simply not a judicial function.
Therefore, where two states have an interest in the application of
their law to the particular issue, each state, if it were the forum,
would apply its own law. Obviously, this would mean that in such
a case the result will depend on where suit is brought. 152 The law
of the forum-which Currie also considers to be the basic law-is
displaced only where another state has an interest in having its
law applied to resolve the particular issue and the forum has no
such interest.
Cavers: Professor Cavers would be in agreement with Pro-
fessor Currie up to the point where there is a true conflict of
151 Statement of Professor Currie, in CHEATHAM, supra note 146, at 477-78.
152But he says this does not imply "the ruthless pursuit of self-interest by
the states." B. CuaRm, supra note 141, at 185-87. The view that each of two
states having an interest in the transaction might apply its own law was also put
forth in Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong, 19 TuL. L. REv. 4, 29-30 (1944). A
variant of this is found in the approach of the German Reichsgericht to tort cases
where the place of acting and the place of injury differ. The court has held that
in such a case, the plaintiff may choose the more favorable law. For a summary
of a case applying such an approach, see 54 Ai. J. INT'L L. 427 (1960). The
case, Judgment of Oct. 22, 1957, 11 NJW 752, held that where the plaintiff's
restaurant in Germany was damaged by smoke emitted from the defendants
plant on the French side of the Saar, the plaintiff could elect either French or
German law. See also Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws, 47
L.Q. REv. 483, 491-93 (1931).
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interest.153 Indeed, there is general agreement as to the necessity
to identify the "false conflict.'1 54 But at the point where there is
a true conflict, Cavers, unlike Currie, would not "give up in
despair and apply the law of the forum,"' 55 but would resolve the
conflict in accordance with "principles of preference." As he has
stated:
affirmative propositions can be developed which, when ap-
plied to specific cases, can yield just solutions to choice-of-
law questions, solutions which are just not only because they
provide a fair accommodation of conflicting state policies but
also because they afford fair treatment to the individuals who
are caught in the hazards between state policies.'56
He goes on to say: "Where the conflict is neither false nor
readily avoided, agreement upon a limited number of principles
of preference that are broader than the specific conflicts posed by
particular cases may be easier to reach than agreement upon a
set of particularized solutions."' 57 He goes on to formulate a
number of principles of preference in various areas of conflicts
law, some of which will subsequently be considered in connection
with the Babcock case.
There will be frequent reference to the methodologies ad-
vocated by these three writers. By doing so, the intention is not
to imply that they are the only "policy-centered" theorists. Indeed,
it is accurate to say that most present writers are "policy-oriented"
to some degree.55 However, it is necessary to draw the line some-
where, and these three the writer considers to be the "most
policy-centered," if this is a valid expression. There is no intention
to "adopt" a particular one as the proper methodology. Nor will
this article attempt to formulate a methodology for the policy-
centered solution of conflicts problems.
This article is concerned primarily with the place of judicial
method in the solution of conflicts problems. There has been an
attempt to distinguish between the role of the academician in
developing a consistent theory or methodology and the role of the
153 See D. CAvERs, supra note 142, at 72-78.
154 See Traynor, supra note 118.
155 See the discussion of "The Task of Accommodating Conflicting State
Laws" in D. CAVERS, supra note 142, at 120-21.
156 Id. at 80.
157 Id. at 113.
158 Id. at 89-93.
[Vol. 56,
BABcocK V. JAcKSON IN KENTcKy
courts in deciding particular conflicts cases and in so doing, de-
veloping a body of conflicts "law." Courts should decide conflicts
cases with reference to policy considerations rather than by the
application of a priori rules forming part of a complete system,
and there is no reason for a court to accept the policy-centered
methodology formulated by a particular academic theorist.
The article will attempt to show how a policy-centered ap-
proach can be applied in the context of judicial method. This
will produce sound decisions which can be applied, extended, or
distinguished in future cases which present conflicts questions. In
other words, the judicial method, which has served to develop
a common law of contracts, torts, and the like, may serve to
develop a body of conflicts law as well. Not only is the substitution
of a policy-centered approach for a rules approach being ad-
vocated, but the application of judicial method to the solution of
conflicts problems and an acceptance by the courts of the responsi-
bility for "making" the law in this area is also urged.
For these two reasons any movement toward adoption by the
courts of the Restatement Second should be rejected. As with the
original Restatement, it represents an externally-established sys-
tem for the solution of all conflicts problems. It is granted that the
rules of the Restatement Second are more flexible, and in some
respects seem to carry policy overtones.159 It is also granted that
in deciding to prefer the Restatement Second over the original
Restatement, courts may stress some policy considerations. 160
Nonetheless, the approach is still one of a complete system of rules
designed to solve all cases of a particular category.
To illustrate, the approach to liability for torts under the
Restatement Second has been stated as follows:
The principal changes [over the original Restatement] are
(a) that torts are now said to be governed by the local law of
the state which has the most significant relationship with the
occurrence and with the parties and (b) that separate rules
are stated for different kinds of torts.16'
16 9In R. SEDLER, CoNFnLcT oF LAws llr ErmoprA 109-110 (1965), too
much emphasis was given to these policy overtones. Perhaps this was a reaction
to the departure from the rigid rules of the original Restatement. Nonetheless,
the book did not carefully distinguish between a policy-centered and a "rules"
approach, as this article attempts to do.
100 As in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
1 01 
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE CoNFLICr OF LAws, Introduction to
ch. 9 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
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Thus, while the Restatement Second may substitute the rule of
the "state of the most significant relationship" for the rule of
the lex loci delicti and may provide separate rules for different
kinds of torts, the concepts of rules as the solution to conflicts
problems remains. The court has more discretion under the rules
of the Restatement Second, which means that they may be mani-
pulated more effectively to produce the application of the desired
result. The implication, however, is that every court passing on
the question should apply the rule in the same way. Considera-
tion may be given to "the relevant purposes of the tort rules of
the interested states," but this is a very narrow consideration,
limited to the determination of whether the purpose is primarily
not a tort purpose, e.g., a purpose of preventing certain kinds of
suits from being brought, or a determination of whether the
purpose was primarily to compensate (so as to favor application
of the law of the place of injury) or to deter or punish conduct
(so as to favor application of the law of the place of acting).1 2
Moreover, the rules are intended to be applicable to all fact-
law patterns within their sweep. It is stated that intra-family im-
munity for tort is governed by the law of the family's domicile.153
This is true whether suit is brought in the state of injury or the
state of domicile, whether an admonitory tort or an ordinary
automobile accident is involved, whether it is the domicile or the
place of injury that recognizes immunity, and in all situations
where the question can be characterized as one of intra-family
immunity. Thus, the Restatement Second merely substitutes the
rule that the lex domicilii governs in all cases for the rule of the
original Restatement that the lex loci deliciti governs in all cases.
Therefore, while the rules of the Restatement Second may be
more flexible (and more complex) and permit some consideration
of policy, the system, nonetheless, is one of rules. Courts should
"leap the bridge" from the system of rules approach to the policy-
centered approach rather than "cross the bridge" from the "few
simple rules" of the original Restatement to the "many complex"
rules of the Restatement Second. In doing so they should also re-
turn to the judicial method of decision and accept responsibility
1 62 RESTATE ENT (SEcoND) or THE CoNFLICT OF LAws § 379, comment f
(Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
163 RSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Tm CoNFor OF LAws § 390g (Tent. Draft
No. 8, 1963).
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for the development of a body of conflicts law. Throughout the
remainder of this paper, this proposition will be developed
through a consideration of the case of Babcock v. Jackson and the
problem of guest statutes in the conflict of laws.
IV. BABCOCK v. JACKSON: THE DECISION, ITS JOURNEY TO
KENTUCKY AND ITS AFTERMATH
In Babcock v. Jackson, the New York Court of Appeals re-
fused to apply an Ontario statute to bar suit by one New York
resident against another, and thus rejected the traditional rule
that the lex loci delicti governs all questions of tort. The
decision was hailed by all. Professor Reese, Reporter for the
Restatement Second, interpreted the decision as adopting the
"basic principle of choice of law that the law of the most
appropriate state should govern the matter at hand."' 64 As Judge
Fuld, writing for the majority had said:
The "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" doctrine
adopted by this court in conflicts eases involving con-
tracts' 65 impresses us as likewise affording the appropriate
approach for accommodating the competing interests in tort
cases with multistate contacts. Justice, fairness and "the best
practical result" may best be achieved by giving controlling
effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties,
has the greatest interest with the specific issue raised in
the litigation. 16
Following Babcock, a number of courts have substituted the
"state of the most significant relationship" rule of the Restate-
ment Second for the lex loci delicti rule of the original Restate-
ment.""
The policy-centered theorists also were encouraged by the
164 Reese, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLUm-. L. Ruv. 1251
(1968).
165 In Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954), the court re-
placed the lex loci contractus rule with the "center of gravity" rule. A discussion
of the soundness of this approach to contract cases is beyond the scope of this
paper. Suffice it to say that the considerations are much different and the analogy
is questionable.
66 12 N.Y.2d 478, 481, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
10T See, e.g., Farbicus v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410, (1965);
Baits v. Baits, 142 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. 1966) (quaere); Griffith v. United Air
Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 138
N.W.2d 408 (1965).
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decision. Professor Ehrenzweig, although criticizing the court for
adopting the state of the most significant relationship rule and
referring to New York's "interest," was pleased to see that the
court stressed insurability. The court, quoting from Professor
Ehrenzweig, stated that "Indeed, such a result, we note, accords
with the 'interest of the host in procuring liability insurance
under the applicable law, and the interests of his insurer in
reasonable calculability of the premium."'-6 s In commenting on
the decision, Ehrenzweig says that it, "like the court's earlier
practice, remains reconcilable with a 'true rule' based on the lex
fori as supplemented by the law of the state in which the car is
permanently kept."' 69
Professor Currie construes the opinion in Babcock as "very
different from earlier opinions treating of the center of gravity."'17
Currie's theory is that the court determined the center of gravity
and thereby decided the case, "in the most reasonable and ob-
jective way that seems possible: by reference to the policies and
interests of the respective states, by construction and interpretation
of the respective laws."'' As the court stated:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New
York and Ontario in this litigation, vis-a-vis the issue here
presented, makes it clear that the concern of New York is
unquestionably the greater and the more direct and that the
interest of Ontario is at best minimal. The present action
involves injuries sustained by a New York guest as the result
of the negligence of a New York host in the operation of an
automobile, garaged, licensed, and undoubtedly insured in
New York, in the course of a week-end journey which began
and which was to end there. In sharp contrast, Ontario's sole
relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious
circumstance that the accident occurred there. 72
This is the classic case of Professor Currie's "false conflict," since
he believes only New York had an interest in the application of
its law and policy relating to host-guest recovery.
168 12 N.Y.2d at 483-84, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751.
169 Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1243,
1246-47 (1963).
170 Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REV. 1233,
1234 (1963).
171 Id.
172 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750.
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Professor Cavers is pleased with Babcock because:
not only is the court ready to separate the issue of the host-
driver's immunity to his guest-passenger's suit from any issue
regarding the tortiousness of his conduct, but also it ap-
proaches the former question by seeking to identify the
policies embodied in the particular laws in conflict, to ascer-
tain the interests of the states in the application of their
respective policies in the light of their contacts with the case,
and thereby to decide which state has "the superior claim
for application of its law." 173
Thus, as Professor Currie has observed, "The majority opinion
contains items of comfort for almost every critic of the tradi-
tional system."1 74
As the subsequent discussion will indicate, however, many were
disappointed when the New York court re-considered and decided
in favor of the rules approach rather than in favor of the policy-
centered'conflict of laws.
In Wessling v. Paris, Babcock came to Kentucky. Its journey
was a controversial one. In the first Wessling decision, the Court of
Appeals, by a vote of 4-3, applied the law of Indiana, the place of
injury, and upheld a dismissal of the suit. A petition for re-
hearing was filed, and in what was a rare instance, the petition
was granted, the former opinion withdrawn, and a new opinion
reversing delivered. In the new decision, the division was 5-2 for
reversal.' 75 In the first opinion, the retention of the lex loci
delicti rule was justified on essentially stare decisis grounds. In
the second opinion, however, the court merely observed that it
was "time to re-examine the rule." The latter approach is more
characteristic of a Court that in recent years has not hesitated to
overrule older cases in light of changed conditions.
76
An examination of the history of the lex loci delicti rule in
Kentucky is advantageous. An attempt has been made to trace
173 Cavers, Comments -on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1219,
1221 (1963).
174 Currie, supra note 170, at 1234.
175Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967). In the original decision
Judges Williams, Montgomery Moremen and Stewart comprised the majority, with
Judges Palmore, Milliken and Hill dissenting. By the time of rehearing Judges
Moremen and Stewart had been replaced by Judges Steinfeld and Osborne. Judge
Williams changed his vote-indeed he wrote the new opinion; Judge Steinfeld voted
with the new majority, and Judge Osborne dissented.
176 See, e.g., Mullikin v. Jewish Hospital Ass'n of Louisville, 348 S.W.2d
930 (Ky. 1961) (charitable immunity).
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the lex loci delicti rule through the "guest statute" cases since
1950 when they first appeared (they have been the only tort
conflicts cases to come before the court in recent years). There-
after, other tort cases, have been examined in an attempt to find
the source of lex loci delicti rule.
At the outset it should be noted that in 1930 the Kentucky
legislature enacted a guest statute barring recovery against the
host except where the accident "resulted from an intentional act
on the part of said owner or operator.' 77 However, in Ludwig
v. Johnson,1 8 the Court of Appeals found that the statute violated
three provisions of the Kentucky Constitution. 1 9 The Court
concluded its opinion with the following declaration:
The statute under consideration violates the spirit of our
Constitution as well as its letter as found in sections 14, 54,
and 241. It was the manifest purpose of the framers of that
instrument to preserve and perpetuate the common-law right
of a citizen injured by the negligent act of another to sue to
recover damages for the injury. The imperative mandate of
section 14 is that every person shall have remedy by due
course of law. If the allegations of the appellant's petition
are true, he has suffered serious injuries occasioned by the
negligent acts of the appellee, Darwin Johnson. The Consti-
tution guarantees to him his right to a day in court for the
purpose of establishing the alleged wrong perpetrated on
him, and recovery of his resultant damages. We conclude
that chapter 85 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1930
is unconstitutional and void. 80
This, then, represents the Court's treatment of guest statutes in a
domestic case. However, in foreign cases it was quite a different
matter until the final decision in Wessling.
In the original Wessling opinion, the Court cited three cases
as setting forth the lex loci delicti rule. One was Stewart v.
Martin,'81 a 1961 case involving two Kentucky residents injured
in an accident in Ohio. The sole question before the Court was
whether the plaintiff was a "guest" within the meaning of the
Ohio statute. 82 The Court never discussed the possibility of ap-
17
7 Law of March 21, 1930, ch. 85, [1930] Ky. Acts 253 (repealed 1940).
178 243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d 847 (1932).
179 Ky. CONST. §§ 14, 54, 241.
180 243 Ky. 534, 542-43, 49 S.W.2d 347, 351 (1932).
1813 49 S.W.2d 702 (Ky. 1961).
182
PA E's OHIo REv. CoDE § 4515.02 (1965).
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plying any other law than that of Ohio, citing Carter v. Driver'8 3
(a case also cited in the original Wessling opinion), for the
general proposition that the lex loci delicti governs. Carter was a
1958 case involving Kentuckians injured in Illinois, and again
the issue was whether the plaintiff was a "guest" within the
meaning of the Illinois statute. 84 The Court merely assumed
that the lex loci delicti applied.
The third case cited was Workman v. Hargadon,s5 a 1961
case involving Kentucky residents killed in Ohio. The Court
stated that the substantive law of the place of wrong applied,
citing two cases in which this proposition was enunciated, one
of which involved a question of proof of foreign law s3 and the
other a question of venue.'8 7 Thus, in the three cases cited as
authority, there was neither consideration of the soundness of
the rule nor discussion of the reasons why it was the rule. The
rule was assumed to be applicable without question. 88
In proceeding backwards from the original opinion and the
cases cited therein, cases such as Hugenot v. Scaff"' 9 (Kentucky
residents working in Ohio; accident occured there while on trip
to Kentucky) and Douglas v. Wood'90 (Kentucky residents, re-
turning from trip were injured in Virginia), where the parties
assumed that the law of the state of injury governed, or Drah-
mann's Administrator v. Brink's Administrator'9' (Kentucky
residents killed in plane crash in Georgia), where the court stated
the rule in a sentence, or Terbovich v. Spack, 92 (Kentucky resi-
dents, accident occurred in Indiana), where the court simply
proceeded under the substantive law of the place of injury, are
to be disregarded.
The first case to discuss the soundness of the lex loci delicti
rule as applied to guest statutes was Ansback v. Greenberg'93
183 316 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1958).
184 SNr=-HunD ILL. STAT., ch. 95V, § 9-201 (1958).
185345 S.W.2d 644 (Ky. 1961).
188 Stewart's Adm'r v. Bacon, 253 Ky. 748, 70 S.W.2d 522 (1934).
187 Melton's Adm'r v. Southern Ry., 236 Ky. 629, 33 S.W.2d 690 (1930).
'ss See also Darnell v. Hamilton, 358 S.W.2d 361 (Ky. 1962), involving
an accident in Virginia, where the court applied Virginia law without any
consideration of the conflicts question. Presumably the parties were Kentuckians,
although this does not appear rom the opinion.
189 294 S.W.2d 547 (Ky. 1956).
100 254 S.W.2d 490 (Ky. 1953).
191 290 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. 1956).
192 259 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1953).
103 256 S.W.2d 1 (Ky. 1952).
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decided in 1952. The Ansbacks went to Florida with Greenberg
in the latter's automobile. An accident occurred in Georgia, a
guest statute state, while Greenberg was driving. The Court of
Appeals stated the general rule, which the plaintiffs did not con-
test, that, "an action for personal injuries must be tried under the
law of the state where the injury occurred," citing the Restate-
ment.194 The plaintiffs argued, however, that in light of Ludwig
v. Johnson, 95 Kentucky's "public policy" prohibited application
of the Georgia statute. The Court rejected this argument, ob-
serving:
The Ludwig case, to our mind, is not applicable. The ques-
tion is whether the Ansbacks have a cause of action under
Georgia law. If they have no cause of action there, they have
none here, and we don't reach the question of enforcing a
right created by the law of another jurisdiction which might
be contrary to the public policy of this state.196
After assuming the plaintiffs were trying to employ the "public
policy technique,"'97 the Court correctly observed that this
technique is applicable only to prevent enforcement of a claim
arising under foreign law because of the nature of the claim. 98
However, as the Court pointed out in Wessling, the con-
clusion in Ansback begs the question. The real issue was whether
the plaintiff had a cause of action under Kentucky law, i.e.,
whether Kentucky or Georgia law governed the issue of the host's
liability to his guest. In Ansback, both the plaintiff in his argu-
ment and the Court in its analysis confused the-;public policy
technique with the policy-centered approach to the solution of
conflicts problems. 199 The plaintiff was contending that Ken-
tucky's policy against guest statutes-reflected in the Constitution
-was equally applicable to foreign guest statutes where Kentucky
parties were involved. The Court, following the territorialistic
dogma of the Restatement, looked to Georgia law to see if a
194 Id at 2.
195 243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
196256 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ky. 1952).
197 See the discussion of this technique, notes 118-20 supra, and accompany-
ing text.
'
9 8 See the discussion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120
N.E. 198 (1918).
199 This is not uncommon. The court in Wessling also confused the "tech-
nique" with "policy," but in light of the court's disposition, this error was
harmless.
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"right" was created under that law, and finding none, refused
recovery. Thus, in the one case where an issue as to the policy-
centered conflict of laws was raised, the Court and counsel
confused the issue by treating it as one involving the public-
policy technique. The case, therefore, cannot stand for rejection
of the policy-centered conflicts of laws. Rather it only serves to
indicate that the Court was so committed to the fullest application
of the vested rights theory embodied in the Restatement that it
did not understand the nature of a policy-centered approach.
The same fact-law situation was involved in Jones v. Jones,
200
where Kentucky residents were injured in Ohio. The plaintiff
here also made the "public policy" argument, but the Court, while
setting it out as a contention, did not discuss it. Disposition of
the conflict of laws question was as follows: "The accident
complained of occurred in Ohio. Suit was filed in Kentucky. The
law of the forum where the accident occurred applies."201
The first case involving a foreign guest statute that research
disclosed 202 was Fischer v. White,203 which, like Wessling, involved
Kentucky residents injured in Indiana. The Court did not dis-
cuss any conflicts issues and proceeded to decide the case under
Indiana law. These few cases represent the "authority" relied on
by the Court in the original opinion and the dissent in the final
one.
Search for the source of the lex loci delicti rule reveals a
dearth of decisions between the guest statute cases and other torts
cases, at least insofar as research has been able to disclose. Next
in the "chain" is the 1940 case of Feck's Administrator v. Bell
Line, Incorporated,2 4 involving an Indiana accident. The Court
merely observed that "it is conceded by the respective parties that
the case is triable under Indiana law .... ',205 In 1937, a case in-
volving Kentucky residents injured by an Indiana streetcar is re-
ported, but there is no discussion of any conflicts question.2 06 The
200 312 Ky. 240, 227 S.W.2d 182 (1950).
201 Id. at 185.
202 My research was aided by the amicus curiae brief filed by Farland Rob-
bins, Esq. Mr. Robbins brief contained cases that my research had failed to un-
cover.
203 312 Ky. 32, 226 S.W.2d 333 (1950).
204 284 Ky. 288, 144 S.W.2d 483 (1940).
205 Id. at 291, 144 S.W.2d at 484.
20 6 Hauser v. Public Serv. Co. of Indiana, 271 Ky. 206, 111 S.W.2d 657
(1937).
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important case of Stewart's Administrator v. Bacon,2 07 decided in
1934, involved proof of foreign law and will be discussed in that
context. However, the Court did state that questions of tort were
governed by the lex loci delicti, and cited a number of Kentucky
cases to which reference will be made.
At this point no case appears until 1914, when a number of
cases leading to the original source of the rule appeared. In
Williamson's Administrator v. Norfolk & Western Railr'oad,208
where the decedent was killed by a locomotive in West Virginia,
the Court observed: "It is well-settled that when an action is
brought in this state for injuries occurring in a foreign state, the
rights and liabilities of the parties are determined by the law of
the foreign state," citing Collins v. Norfolk Railroad Company.0 9
In Collins, where a West Virginia plaintiff was- injured in
West Virginia, but sued in Kentucky, the Courf observed: "It is
well-settled that, when an action is brought in this state for in-
juries occurring in a foreign state, the rights and liabilities of the
parties are determined by the law of the foreign %tate."2 10 In this
case, the Court cited three earlier cases. The most recent was
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Moran,21 decided
in 1912, which involved a railroad accident in Tennessee. The
Court stated, "As the accident happened in the state of Tennessee,
the rights of the plaintiff and the liability of the company are to
be determined by the laws of that State. 2 1 2 .The Court cited
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Smith,213 one of the
cases cited in Collins. The other case was Pittsburgh Railroad
Company v. Austin's Administrator, 214 decided in 1911, involving
an Indiana plaintiff struck in Indiana by the defendant's train.
The Court stated that Indiana law applied, without citing
authority.2 15 In Smith, decided in 1909, the employee was injured
207 253 Ky. 748, 70 S.W.2d 522 (1934).
208 160 Ky. 158, 169 S.W. 613 (1914).
209 152 Ky. 755, 154 S.W. 37 (1913).
21o In view of the fact-law pattern presented, Kentucky was a purely
disinterested forum, and t!-e application of West Virginia law was proper.
211148 Ky. 418, 146 S.W. 1131 (1912).
212 Id. at 419, 146 S.W. at 1131.
213 135 Ky. 462, 122 S.W. 806 (1909).
214 141 Ky. 722, 133 S.W. 780 (1911).
215 Again, note that the application of Indiana law was proper, since
Kentucky was a disinterested forum. In Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Ford, 141
Ky. 5, 131 S.W. 1010 (1910), the Court assumed that the law of the place of
injury applied.
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in Alabama, and the Court stated that it was a settled principle
that Alabama law applied, citing a number of cases.216
The first was Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Jordan,
217
decided in 1904, involving a railroad employee injured in Ten-
nessee. The Court stated, "The disposition of the questions can-
not be made under the rules of law which prevail in this juris-
diction, but must be done under the law of Tennessee, where the
accident happened."218 The Court cited Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Company v. Whitlow's Administrator,219 and quoted at
length from the opinion. Whitlow, cited in Smith, was also cited
in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Harmon,220 a
1901 case concerning a passenger injured in Tennessee. In Har-
mon, the Court declared that "the law of the place where the right
was acquired governs as to the right of action." Clearly, Whitlow
is the source of the lex loci delicti rule in Kentucky.
Whitlow, a resident of Kentucky, and employee of the rail-
road, was killed in Tennessee. His personal representative brought
suit in Kentucky under the Tennessee wrongful death statute.
Earlier decisions had held that a suit could be maintained under
a foreign wrongful death statute.22' In fact, all prior conflicts cases
had involved the question of whether suits under foreign law
were "transitory" and, therefore, maintainable in Kentucky.
222
Thus, Whitlow seems to be the first instance in which the choice
of law question in tort cases was discussed. 223 Under Kentucky law,
contributory negligence was an absolute bar, but under Tennessee
law, contributory negligence of the decedent operated merely to
216
In Murray's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 132 Ky. 336, 110 S.W. 334
(1908), the Court held that the law of the place of injury applied, citing texts and
encyclopedia references.
217 117 Ky. 512, 78 S.W. 426 (1904).
218 Id. at 514, 78 S.W. at 427.
219 114 Ky. 470, 43 S.W. 711 (1897).
22023 Ky. L. Rptr. 871, 64 S.W. 640 (1901).
2 2 l Wintuskas Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 14 Ky. L. Rptr. 579, 20 S.W.
819 (1892); Bruce's Adm'r v. Railroad, 83 Ky. 174 (1885), overruling Taylor's
Adm'r v. Pennsylvania Co., 78 Ky. 348 (1880).2 2 2 In what must be the first recorded conflicts case in Kentucky, Watts v.
Thomas, 5 Ky. 458 (1811), the Court allowed suit for an alleged assault,
battery and false imprisonment occurring in Indiana territory on the ground
that the action was "transitory."
223 In Louisville & N. R.R. v. Graham's Adm'r, 98 Ky. 688, 34 S.W. 229
(1896), suit was brought to recover for a death occurring in Alabama. The
original petition alleged that Alabama and Kentucky law were the same, but the
amended petition set out Alabama law. There was no discussion of any
conflicts issue.
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reduce the amount recoverable. The Court held that Tennessee
law applied, observing as follows:
It is a well-settled principle in all civilized countries, so far
as we are aware, that in matters ex contractu, the lex loci
contractu governs the construction and the validity of the
contract, and that the lex fori governs the remedy. The prin-
ciple is so familiar it would be a waste of time to cite elemen-
tary authorities or adjudged cases in support of it .... We
can see no reason why the doctrine as established as to
actions ex contractu may not be applied to actions ex delicto.
There seem to be but few decisions on the question. In the
case of Nonce v. Railroad Co., 33 Fed. 434, it was held that
there is no distinction on the subject between actions ex
contractu and ex delicto. Herrick v. Railway Co., 31 Minn.
11, 16 N.W. 413, was an action ex delicto, and the court held
that the law of the place where the right was acquired or
the liability incurred governs as to the right of action, while
all that pertains merely to the remedy is controlled bj the-
law of the state where the action is brought, thus recognizing
the principle as the same where the right of action is ex con-
tractu or ex delicto.
224
Further, the Court held that contributory negligence involved
the "right rather than the remedy" and was, therefore, controlled
by the lex loci, concluding as follows:
At the time the injury was inflicted the right of action became
fixed, and a legal liability was incurred. The liability which
the plaintiff seeks to enforce was incurred by virtue of the
law of Tennessee. The law of contributory negligence, as
adjudged in this state, cannot be applied so as to alter or
affect the right of action which arose in Tennessee.2 5
Thus, the basis of the lex loci delicti rule in Kentucky was an
analogy to the law governing contracts.2 26 The rule developed at
the time the vested rights theory was beginning to replace the
comity theory* 7 and strictly followed the rationale of the "new"
224 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Whitlow's Adi'r, 114 Ky. 470, 478, 43 S.W. 711,
712 (1897).
2,25 Id. at 483, 43 S.W. at 718.2 26 It is interesting to note that the Court in Babcock likewise drew an
analogyto the "proper' rule in contract cases as furnishing the guide for the
"proper" rule in tort cases. See the discussion at note 165 supra.
227 Compare the opinions of the Supreme Court in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l
Ry., 194 U.S. 120 (1904), and Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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theory. Only the state where the injury occurred could create a
tort right just as only the state where the contract was made had
"jurisdiction" to create a contract right. Since this was a conflicts
case, the Court enunciated a general rule to be uncritically ap-
plied in future cases perhaps involving entirely different fact-law
situations.
It must be remembered that Whitlow was a case brought by
a Kentucky plaintiff under a foreign wrongful death statute, a
case that could not be brought under Kentucky law, since the
Kentucky wrongful death statute was inapplicable to deaths
occurring elsewhere. 28 The only question was whether that part
of the statute providing for comparative negligence should be
applicable, and it is difficult to see any reason why it should not
have been.229 Indeed the real issue seemed to be whether com-
parative negligence affected the "right" or the "remedy".o Any
analogy between this case and a case involving a guest statute,
which is designed essentially to regulate insurance relationships,
is difficult to-;understand, but such has been the nature of the
conflict of laws. A rule is developed for a class of cases such as
torts and aplied mechanically in all cases where the plaintiff is
suing to recover for a "tort."
Of course, the Court never considered a policy-centered con-
flict of laws. No such concept existed at that time, and in future
years, the Court ignored the question by invoking stare decisis. In
the one case where a policy argument was raised, the Court con-
fused considerations of policy with the "public policy technique."
The Court never asked whether the policy against guest statutes
reflected in the Kentucky Constitution precluded the displace-
ment of Kentucky law notwithstanding that the accident occurred
elsewhere. Where a court has carefully considered a problem
and decided upon a rule or principle of law, it is proper under
the doctrine of stare deciss to rely on its former decision ex-
228 See Murray's Adin'r v. Luisville & N. R.R., 132 Ky. 336, 110 S.W.
334 (1908).
229 Cf. Kilberg v. Northeast Air Lines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961) (limitation on recovery contained in foreign wrongful
death statute not applied by Forum).
2 0 In some of the earlier cases the courts appear to have had difficulty with
the rule that "the law of the forum governs matters of 'procedure'" and con-
strued "remedy" as synoymous with "procedure." Since damages affected the
"remedy," they would look to the law of the forum. See, e.g., Dorr Cattle Co. v.
Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 127 Iowa. 153, 98 N.W. 918 (1905).
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cept where new knowledge or new conditions have rendered the
rationale of that decision inapplicable.' 1 Stare decisis does not,
however, justify a court's refusal to consider new ideas and to
perpetuate decisions resting on questionable premises. To apply
the Indiana guest statute to Kentucky residents injured there
might be justified, depending on the Court's conception of the
function of the conflict of laws. However, such application must
be justified for a reason other than that as matters of contract are
governed by the lex loci contractus, matters of tort must be
governed by the lex loci delicti.2 32 In no sense did the parties
"rely" on the fact that Indiana law would be applied if they were
involved in an accident in Indiana.2 33 The rejection of the stare
decisis argument by the Court simply by observing that "the time
has come to re-examine the principle of the lex loci delicti" is
perfectly in order. Indeed, a less likely case for the application of
stare decisis can hardly be imagined.
Having laid the groundwork f6r Babcock in Kentucky-and
presumably arriving at the point where the court is deciding
just how it will solve the problem-let us leave the Kentucky
Court wrestling with that question, and return to New York. The
New York Court that has "spawned the veritable revolution" by
discarding the rule of the lex loci delicti has not adopted a policy-
centered approach in its stead. Rather, a new rule has been sub-
stituted for the old, i.e., the "state of the most significant relation-
ship rule" of the Restatement Second for the lex loci delicti rule
of the Restatement "First." Previous discussion illustrated the
distinction between the Restatement Second's attempt to "lo-
calize" the tort, or more accurately, each issue in the tort case,
and the policy-centered approach.2 34 This distinction is most
cogently demonstrated by the New York court's treatment of the
post-Babcock cases.
In Dym v. Gordon,235 the passenger and driver were New York
students attending the University of Colorado. The driver had
231 As pointed out previously, the Kentucky Court does not hesitate to
overrule older decisions on these grounds.23 2 Louisvlle & N. R.R. v. Whitlow's Adhn'r, 114 Ky. 470, 478, 43 S.W. 711,
712 (1897).
233 Even where reliance on settled law can be shown, a change can be
accomplished by prospective ovtrruling. This is not likely to be necessary in
most conflicts situations.
234 SeC the discussion, supra, notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
235 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
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brought his New York registered and insured automobile with him,
and was driving the passenger in Colorado. The automobile col-
lided with another vehicle, and the plaintiff was injured. After the
parties returned to New York, the passenger filed suit, and the
defendant (more specifically, his insurer) pleaded the Colorado
guest statute.236
In a 4-3 decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that
the Colorado statute was applicable. The opinion of Judge Burke,
speaking for the majority, and the dissenting opinions of Judge
Fuld and Judge Desmond clearly demonstrate that Babcock must
be read as stating a new choice of law rule rather than as
adopting a policy-centered approach. As Judge Burke stated: "Our
courts now have adopted a rule of choice of law in a conflict
situation which looks to reason and justice in its selection of which
law should apply and which fits the needs of today's world where
long and frequent travel is no longer reserved to a few."' ' 7
Under this rule, the court would "first isolate the issue, then
identify the policies embraced in the laws in conflict, and finally
examine the contacts of the respective jurisdictions to ascertain
which has a superior connection with the occurrence and thus
would have a superior interest in having its law or policy
applied." 38 Using the rule formulated by Judge Burke and as-
suming both states have an interest in having their law applied,
the conflict is resolved by applying the law of the state which has
the more significant contacts with the case so that its interest
should be upheld. A consideration of the contacts rather than con-
sideration of the policies determines which law applies. New York
has, therefore, adopted the rule of the Restatement Second that
the law of the state of "the most significant relationship" governs
rather than a policy-centered approach. Policy is relevant only in
determining whether both states have an interest in the appli-
cation of their law; once that has been answered in the affirmative.
policy disappears from the case.
The court concluded that one of the purposes of the Colorado
236 COLO. REv. STARS. § 13-9-1 (1954). Recovery was authorized ,only
where the action was intentional, caused by intoxication, or negligence con-
sisting of a willful and wanton disregard for the rights of others."2 37 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 123, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463, 465-66 (1965).
238 Id.
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guest statute was to give priority to injured persons in the vehicle
of the non-negligent driver, and, therefore,
examining Colorado's interest in light of its public policy,
we find that over and above the usual interest which Colo-
rado may bring to bear on all conduct occurring within its
boundaries, Colorado has an interest in seeing that the negli-
gent defendant's assets are not dissipated in order that the
persons in the car of the blameless driver will not have
their right to recovery diminished by the present suit.239
For what it is worth, the driver of the other automobile was
a resident of Kansas and it may be questioned what "interest"
Colorado had in his recovery.2 40 Since Colorado had this interest-
as opposed to Babcock, where there was no collision and only
New Yorkers were involved in the accident-the case was decided
with reference to the factual contacts that each state had with the
transaction.
The court concluded that Colorado had the "more sig-
nificant contacts" primarily because the parties had "come to
rest in Colorado," and the guest-host relationship, involving a
trip between two points in Colorado, was formed there. The
court went out of its way to make it clear that it was applying an
"objective" rule fairly and impartially. Although rejecting the lex
loci delicti rule, the court would not substitute a policy-centered
approach in its stead, observing that "this analysis is much to be
preferred over an approach which merely looks to the fortuitous
place of the happening of the accident, or simply applies the law
of the domicile, or one which blithely applies the public policy of
the forum under the denomination of 'governmental interests.' "241
The court then demonstrates how "cosmopolitan" it is by observ-
ing further:
Judicial hostility to "guest" statutes and a preoccupation
with New York social welfare problems and the relative
liability of insurers should not be treated as "contacts" which
are found then to outweigh the factual contacts. These views
also depend on the mores of the particular forum and its
29 Id.
240 But see D. CAvERS, THE CHOICE oF LAW PROCESS 297-300 (1965).
241 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 126, 209 N.E.2d 792, 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463, 468 (1965).
[Vol. 56,
BABcocK v. JAcKsON IN KENTUCKY
allied public policy. Such a tack is altogether too pro-
vincial.
24
Further examples disclaiming a policy-centered approach will
also be found in the opinion. 43 Judge Fuld's dissent stressed that
"contacts," as he used the term in Babcock, had to be evaluated
with respect to the policies of the states involved and not with
reference to the place where the relationship was "centered." 244
Judge Desmond's dissent was simply on the ground that New
York's "public policy" was to "protect its own residents from
foreign state deprivations of reasonable protection and indemnity"
without regard to where the relationship was centered.245 Dym v.
Gordon makes it clear that New York has not adopted a policy-
centered approach, at least as the concept is generally understood.
The New York courts have been trying to identify the
"most significant contacts" ever since the Dym decision. In Macey
v. Rozbicki24 6 the parties were New Yorkers who had a summer
home in Waverly Beach, Ontario, just across the river from
Buffalo. The parties were staying at the summer home (the
plaintiff was a sister of the defendant-driver and a sister-in-law of
the defendant owner) and decided to drive to Niagara Falls,
Ontario, and to return to Waverly Beach. The accident occurred
during that trip. The court held that the Ontario statute did
not apply on the ground that "the relationship of two sisters
living permanently in New York was not affected or changed by
their temporary meeting together in Canada for a short visit there,
especially since the arrangements for that visit had undoubtedly
been made in New York State."2 47 Thus, the important contacts
were with New York and not Ontario.
These cases make it quite clear that the "grouping of con-
tacts" test is not one susceptible of easy application. The simplicity
of the lex loci delicti rule is lost, but a policy-centered approach
is not substituted. In all three cases-Babcock, Dym, and Macey-
the plaintiffs and defendants were New Yorkers, temporarily out
242 Id. at 126, 209 N.E.2d at 795-96, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468.
243 Id. See particularly the criticism of "public policy."
244 Id. at 129-34, 209 N.E.2d at 797-800, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 470-74.
245 Id. at 134-36, 209 N.E.2d at 800-01, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 474-76.
246 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1966).
247 Id. at 292, 221 N.E.2d at 381, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
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of the state, and the automobiles were insured in New York,
which has compulsory insurance.2 48 In all cases, recovery would
have been from the proceeds24 9 of insurance taken out on a vehicle
insured in New York for the benefit of a New York plaintiff. It
is difficult to see why the all-important question of recovery for
personal injuries should be decided differently in any of these
cases, but under the "grouping of contacts" rule it was.
2 5 0
, An entirely different kind of question is presented when two
Ontario residents are involved in an accident in New York. Fol-
lowing Babcock, the "state of the most significant relationship"
would seem to be Ontario. This is reverse Babcock-the parties
were residents of Ontario, the trip originated there, the relation-
ship was formed there, the parties were returning there, and
the accident happened while the parties were temporarily in New
York. But in this situation the New York lower courts have held
that New York law applies.251 The majority-in the appellate divi-
sion said that Babcock was not intended to change the established
law of New York that a guest had a cause of action against his host
for an accident occurring in New York whether or not the
parties were New Yorkers.2 52 The trial court also emphasized that
a car upon the highways of New York "must be subject to New
York law." This could be construed as a more policy-centered
approach and may be the "tack of provincialism" that Judge
Burke criticized in Dym. The court of appeals has not yet passed
on the question. If there is anything that Babcock did not do, it
was to clarify the law in New York. But so far as the court of
appeals is concerned, New York is following the "rules" approach
of the Restatement Second rather than any notion of a policy-
centered conflict of laws.
248 Judge Keating, concurring in Macey, took the position that Dym should
be overrld
249 Cases in which the guest would recover in excess of the policy limits
should be rather rare.
250 Again, note that Professor Cavers might not agree with this assertion.
D. CAVERS, supra note 240.
251Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965), afF'd, 26
App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
252 The case arose on a question of amendment of pleadings, in which the
defendant sought to amend in order to allege the guest statute defense. Two of
the judges of the Appellate Division would have permitted the amendment, but
two refused to allow it on the ground stated above, and one refused to allow
it on the ground that the plaintiff would be "prejudiced." The decision, therefore,
does not represent a majority view.
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However, the "seeds of policy" planted in Babcock may have
found a more nourishing environment elsewhere. If, when the
Kentucky Court was deciding Wessling, it wished to find sup-
port for a policy-centered approach, it could have looked to the
decisions of the Wisconsin, Minnesota, and New Hampshire
courts when faced with a Babcock situation. 53 In Wilcox v. Wil-
cox,254 the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the "most signifi-
cant relationship" test of the Restatement Second, but interpreted
it in a much different light than did the New York court in Dym
v. Gordon (and, it is submitted, than the drafters of the Restate-
ment). Wilcox stressed that "contacts" had to be considered
"qualitatively rather than quantitatively in light of policy con-
siderations." The weight of the contacts set forth in the Restate-
ment would depend, according to the court, "on their relevancy
to the place of the wrong and the forum." The court analyzed the
situation solely with reference to the policies of the two states in-
volved, Wisconsin (the domicile of the parties and the place
where the insured vehicle was garaged) and Nebraska (where the
accident occurred). The Nebraska law, denying recovery, could
hardly be said to further the safe use of Nebraska's highways. The
purpose of a guest statute under this court's application was to
protect the host from suit by an ungrateful guest, to protect the
insurance company from collusive suits, or perhaps to protect
the host and insurer from any suit.255 The purpose would be
served only if a Nebraska host and a Nebraska insurer were in-
volved, and therefore, Nebraska had no interest in the application
of her guest statute to the present case. The insurance had been
issued with respect to a Wisconsin-garaged vehicle, so that to the
extent law was considered at all, it was Wisconsin law. Therefore,
Wisconsin was necessarily the state of the most significant relation-
ship. Although adopting the Restatement "rule," Wisconsin con-
ceives of it in a different way and that court is unlikely to draw
the kind of "come to rest" distinctions that the New York court
has drawn in subsequent cases.
253 These and other opinions were cited by the court in Wessling.
25426 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).
255 This would reduce liability insurance rates to the extent that host-guest
loss experience would be relevant in their computation. On this point, see Morris,
Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight,
70 YALE L.J. 554, 574-76 (1961).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court has also adopted the Restate-
ment approach, at least as to family immunity, but when faced
with a Babcock situation has decided the case solely with reference
to the interests of the various states. In Balts v. Balts256 a Min-
nesota mother and son were involved in an automobile accident
in Wisconsin. The court held that the question of intra-family
immunity was governed by Minnesota law, the state of domicile,
rather than by Wisconsin law, and allowed the suit.2 57 The deci-
sion was based on Section 390g of the Restatement Second, which
provides that family immunity is determined by the law of the
family domicile. However, the court stressed that only Minnesota
had an interest in applying its law to this issue, and that in future
cases it would render its decision with reference to the interests
of the various states involved.
In Kopp v. Rechtzigel,258 decided the same day, the rationale
of Balts was applied to the case of Minnesota parties involved in
an accident in a guest statute-state. After commenting on the pre-
sent purpose of guest statutes as being to prevent collusive suits
against the insurer, the court noted that the owner intended to
protect his passenger against negligent injury as well as to secure
his own indemnity. Since the parties were Minnesota residents
and the automobile was garaged and insured there, it concluded
that "Minnesota has an overriding concern in the relationship of
the parties and in the adjudication of their rights."25 9 Although
the extent to which Minnesota has adopted the Restatement test
is questionable, it is clear that the court is rendering its decisions
with reference to considerations of policy.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court appears to have gone
even further in adopting a policy-centered approach, although
choosing to express its approach in terms of "relevant choice-in-
256 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966).
'5 In so doing, it changed the substantive law of Minnesota, which had
recognized parental immunity. It also employed the technique of prospective
overruling.
258 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966).
259 Id. at-, 141 N.W.2d at 528. The court also observed that the state of
injury's interest lay in promoting highway safety and perhaps providing reim-
bursement to its medical creditors, and that that interest would be better
served by applying Minnesota's law. The point is that before a state can be said
to have an interest, it must have a policy, and the policy of the state of injury
was not to allow recovery. Since the defendant was not a resident of that state
and the automobile was not insured there, it had no interest in applying its
policy of denying recovery in the present case.
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fluencing considerations." Clark v. Clark260 refused to apply the
guest statute of the place of injury, Vermont, but unlike Babcock
and Wilcox, and perhaps the Minnesota cases, the most significant
relationship test of the Restatement Second was not accepted. In-
stead the New Hampshire Court reviewed what it considered to
be the relevant choice of law influencing considerations and re-
lied principally upon those set forth by Professor Leflar. This
court also gave great weight to Professor Cavers' "principles of
preference."26' 1 Applying the choice of law influencing considera-
tions, the court concluded that the most important were those
of "governmental interests" and the "preferable rule." The court
viewed Vermont as having no interest in the application of its
statute to New Hampshire residents and also regarded guest
statutes unsound in light of modem conditions. The most im-
portant factor is that the court limited its decision to the precise
fact-law pattern before it. This fact also stands out most strikingly
in the opinion of the Kentucky Court in Wessling v. Paris.262 This
is what lies at the heart of what the author conceives to be the
crucial matter of judicial method. This thesis will now be fully
developed, concluding with the actual decision in Wessling v.
Paris.
260 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).
261 Citing Lefllar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267 (1966), and D. CAvERS, supra note 240.
262 It is not clear whether the Minnesota court is following this approach. In
Baits, the court adopted the "rule" that the domicile governed all questions of
parental immunity 'unless there are unusual circumstances which result in the
state of the tort or the forum state's having an overriding interest in particular
litigation." However, it reserved consideration on other possible tort cases, saying
that "consistent with the rationale we apply to this case, [we] will weigh the
interest of the domiciliary state, whether Minnesota or otherwise, to the extent it
is constitutionally permissible against any peculiar concern the state of the tort or
forum state may have." Balts v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66, 70-71
(1966). In Kopp, it merely discussed the fact-law pattern presented. Perhaps I
am influenced by the fact that the Minnesota court seemed to adopt the
Restatement rule and did not specifically limit its decision to the particular fact-
law pattern. Nonetheless, on the whole, the court's approach is encouraging from
the standpoint of judicial method. See also Kuchinic v. McChory, 422 Pa. 620,
222 A.2d 897 (1966), where the Pennsylvania court held that the guest statute of
the place of injury would not be applied in a suit arising from an airplane
accident involving Pennylvania parties. The court analyzed the interests of
both states and concluded that the case was one presenting a "false conflict."
Pennsylvania had previously adopted the "grouping of contacts" rule of the
Restatement Second in Griffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796
(1964). The court said that it was applying the Griffith rule. Nonetheless, it an-
alyzed the case from the standpoint of relevant policy considerations, which it
also did in Griflith. In time courts that have adopted the Restatement "rule"
because of the desire to avoid the application of the lex loci delicti rule, may
abandon the new rule in favor of a straight policy,-centered approach.
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V. JUDICIAL METHOD AND THE SOLUTION OF CONFLICTS PROBLEMS:
THE EXAMPLE OF WESSLING V. PARIS
Throughout this paper it has been submitted that in dealing
with conflicts problems, courts have departed from the essential
methodology of the judicial process as it has operated in other
areas. It cannot be said that a "body of conflicts law" has emerged
from principles developed in decided cases. For the most part,
cases have been decided in accordance with a priori rules stem-
ruing from a particular theory as to the nature of the conflict of
laws. Almost from the beginning the goal has been to find a
"universal solution" to conflicts problems. In this area, more so
than in any other, American courts have accepted the "authority"
of the academic commentators and particularly that of the
Restatement.
Sometimes courts are able to achieve a desired result by the
employment of manipulative techniques. Perhaps, as Professor
Ehrenzweig insists, if we look at the results of cases in which an
actual conflict of laws question was presented, "true rules" and a
"basic lex fori" emerge.263 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the
courts have not, by their decisions in particular cases, developed
principles for the solution of conflicts problems. Our ideas about
the solution of such problems do not come from the decisions of
the courts; rather the court decisions are examined primarily
from the standpoint of whether they lend support to a particular
theory of the conflict of laws. 264 The "rules" have been looked to
for the purpose of providing guidance for the solution of future
cases, not principles developed in prior judicial opinions. Judicial
method has not been applied to the conflict of laws.
Exploring the reasons for this departure from the ordinary
workings of the judicial process reveals that the justification
advanced for the acceptance of a "system of rules" approach was
that such a system was necessary to insure uniformity of result.
This is somewhat difficult to credit in view of our law of jurisdic-
tion, which operates to produce the widest possible forum-shop-
263 For the contention that the results of the cases do not support his con-
clusion, at least in one area, see Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds:
An Inquiry into the Rule of Validation, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 243 (1965). See also
Briggs, An Institutional Approach to Conflict of Laws: "Law and Reason Versus
Professor Ehrenzweig," 12 U.C.L.A. L. Brov. 29 (1964).
264 This is also true of Babcock. See Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63
COLUM. L. Ri.v. 1212-57 (1963).
[Vol 56,
BABCOCK V. JACKSON IN KENTUCKY
ping, which in itself works against uniformity of result. In any
event, if the goal was to insure uniformity of result, the system
was defective, particularly insofar as it left an opening for the use
of manipulative techniques. As regards the goal of uniformity,
the system has been a dismal failure. However, we have also con-
cluded that the quest for uniformity was not the primary
motivating force behind the judicial acceptance of the rules ap-
proach and the unwillingness to fashion a body of conflicts law by
judicial decision. Instead, the "political aura" surrounding con-
flicts questions has caused the court to seek refuge in an externally
established system of "objective" rules. There is evidence today
that courts are less afraid of "policy" and may be willing to move
toward the policy-centered conflict of laws. If this is so, and the
system of rules approach will be abandoned, it may also be
possible for the courts to reinstate judicial method as applied to
the solution of conflicts problems. The time has come to take
a new look at the court's function in a conflicts case.
If the reason for the displacement of the law of the forum
cannot be found in a search for uniformity, it may be asked
whether, in the nature of things, there is any objection to the
court's applying its own law in all cases coming before it. What
would happen if the courts, as they originally did in England,
26
simply ignored the foreign element and decided the case according
to the substantive law of the forum? This might produce tech-
nological unemployment among conflicts teachers and remove the
fascinating subject from law school curricula, but apart from this
deplorable effect, would anything else happen? Would this pro-
duce injustice? Would this be violative of the interests of other
states in the legal order?
The answer, of course, is that it would in some cases. Even if
the concept of transient jurisdiction were abolished, and juris-
diction were limited to a forum conveniens, the application of the
forum's law in all cases266 would not be proper. There are cases
where the application of the forum's law would simply be unfair
in the sense that it would defeat the legitimate expectations of the
parties. There are others where, if the interests of other states are
265 See the discussion, supra notes 35-40, and accompanying text.
2G 6 See the discussion in Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A
Restatement of the Lex Fori Approach, 18 OKLA. L. REv. 340, 350-52 (1965).
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considered relevant,2 7 the application of the forum's law would
be violative of those interests, which, under the circumstances, it
can be said the forum should recognize.
Simply stated, the law of the forum should be displaced where
the failure to do so would defeat the legitimate expectations of the
parties or would be violative of the interests of other states which,
under the circumstances, the forum should recognize. It is sub-
mitted that there would be agreement with this as a general
proposition,2 8 but the question remains how to identify these
cases. The traditional view was that this could be done by dividing
the legal order into a series of "jurisdictions" with each having the
power to create "rights" in certain kinds of cases, which would be
recognized when called into question in other states. Experience
indicated, however, that the law to be applied under the juris-
diction-selective rule would not necessarily coincide with the ex-
pectations of the parties nor necessarily be the laiir of a state having
any interest-when analyzed from the perspective of relevanfsocial
and economic policies. This may be the danger that results from
approaching the question in terms of "what law governs" rather
than in terms of whether the law of the forum should be dis-
placed. The "more realistic rules" approach of the Restatement
Second also attempts to solve the problem by examining the law
of a particular jurisdiction on each issue. It is submitted this ap-
proach may contain the same deficiencies.
Is it not sounder to approach the problem in terms of the basic
criteria and try to answer the question contained therein: in the
fact-law pattern presented, should the law of the forum be dis-
placed in order to protect the legitimate expectations of the parties
or to give proper recognition to the interests of another state? The
decision would be based on more realistic considerations if made
with reference to the basic criteria and the particular fact-law
pattern rather than attempting to fit the case within the frame-
work of a rule. More importantly, it must be remembered that
not only are we talking about a threshold question, but about a
267 It must be remembered that among the policy-centered commentators
there is disagreement as to just what is meant by "interest" and how relevant this
is. See the discussion in D. CAvans, supra note 261, at 98-102. Nonetheless, under
each approach, "interest"-however defined-has some relevance.
268 Noting, however, the disagreement on the scope of "interest," as discussed
above.
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threshold question that is presented in relatively few cases coming
before the courts. In searching for a system we have been asking
the wrong questions. In the Babcock-Wessling situation it is
possible to frame the issue in choice of law terms such as "what
law governs liability for torts." On the other hand, if we frame the
issue narrowly-the way common law courts ordinarily frame
issues-with reference to the fact-law pattern of the particular case,
the result is quite different.
Suppose the issue were framed as follows: where two resi-
dents of New York (Kentucky), which does not have a guest
statute, are involved in an automobile accident in Ontario
(Indiana), which does have a guest statute, should the law of
the forum be displaced and the law of the place of injury applied?
Our consideration is limited to that precise issue; we need not
consider what law governs a libel, a battery, a suit between a resi-
dent and a non-resident, and so on, because they are not involved.
Most important from the perspective of judicial method is that re-
search of the "torts" conflicts cases that have come before the
Kentucky Court of Appeals since 1950-and the last one before
that which research had disclosed was decided in 1940-reveals
that every case involved the identical fact-law pattern. It is not
necessary-and in the common law tradition not proper-for the
Kentucky Court to decide what law governs liability for tort. The
decision should be limited to the question of what law governs a
host's liability to his guest where two Kentucky residents are in-
volved in an accident in a state that has a guest statute, because
that has been the only question presented in all these cases. The
number of fact-law patterns will vary with the state involved, and
many more conflicts cases with different patterns will come before
a court in a state like New York. But even there the cases will not
"run the gamet," so to speak. The courts have misconceived the
judicial function in conflicts cases. It is not necessary to adopt a
"rule" for all cases, particularly not a comprehensive system of
rules designed to solve all conflicts problems that may arise. All
that is necessary is to decide whether the law of the forum should
be displaced in the particular fact-law pattern before it. The court
will decide this question in light of the basic criteria of displace-
ment: the law of the forum will be displaced when protection of
the legitimate expectations of the parties or proper recognition of
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the interests of another state so requires. The decision will be
made with reference to considerations of policy and fairness
rather than with reference to abstract and analytical doctrine. The
decision in that case would, of course, serve as a precedent when
another case involving the identical fact-law pattern came before
the court. When a case involving a different fact-law pattern arose,
the ratio decidendi of the former decision would be considered
and the precedent would be extended, restricted, or distinguished
as the court thought proper. To the extent that cases involving
different fact-law patterns arose, a body of conflicts "law" based on
judicial decision would be developed. What is more likely in states
like Kentucky is that few conflicts questions would arise. This is
not to be regretted. But whenever a case did arise, the decision
would be based on realistic considerations and would not represent
an attempt to fit the case within the framework of a system of
rules.
Stated simply, this is what is meant by judicial method and the
policy-centered conflict of laws. The decision as to displacement
would be made by the court in light of policy considerations and
with a view toward the basic criteria of fairness to the parties and
accommodation of the interests of the various states that make
up the legal order. The threshold question would be disposed of
on this basis, and the court could proceed with a decision on the
merits. Thus, just as a court should reject a system of rules ap-
proach, there is no reason for it to accept a particular policy-
centered theory. In all fairness, the policy-centered theorists have
not contended that the courts should accept their theory as the
"ultimate solution" to all conflicts problems.2 6 9 What is necessary
is that the court employ the traditional method of judicial
decision in a conflicts case as it has done in all other areas of law.
If the reason for a court to apply foreign law rather than its
own is that in certain cases, fairness to the parties or the proper
recognition of the interests of another state so requires, it makes
more sense to approach the problem with reference to the basic
justification rather than in terms of specific rules or even in
269 There is a significant difference between developing a theory that one
hopes courts will follow-as to some extent everyone does when he writes-and
putting forth an "ultimate solution"-as I think Professor Beale and the drafters
of the first Restatement were trying to do. See also the disclaimer of intent in
B. CuRniE, SELEcTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 585 (1963).
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terms of a specific policy-centered theory. Rather than treat the
question as one of "choice of law," the court would treat it as one
of displacement of the forum's law in the particular case-cases
which would be relatively few in number and for some states,
such as Kentucky, very few at all. From the standpoint of method-
ology much can be learned from the local law theory developed
by Professor Walter Wheeler Cook many years ago. Cook focused
his attention on the processes that a court employed in deciding
a conflicts question. Looking to Cook for the methodology and to
the modern policy-centered theorists for guides to the substantive
solutions of conflicts problems would provide a wise course for
courts to follow. In doing so, the court will develop decisions as
to the displacement of the law of the forum which will serve as
the basis of a judicially-established conflict of laws.270 The proposi-
tions on which this concept is based will now be discussed.
The first proposition is that the basic law is the law of the
forum, and that law will not be displaced absent valid reasons for
such displacement. It is important to recall the thesis of Cook's
local law theory,271 and indeed of the highly homologous right
270 At this point a comment on Professor Cavers' classic article, A Critique of
the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HAIv. L. REv. 173 (1933) is in order. For, in a
sense, what I am now proposing-development of a body of conflicts law based
on judicial decision-was also proposed by Professor Cavers at that time. His
concept, "justice in the individual case," also foresaw "a body of rules, principles
and standards of a new sort, developing through the workings of stare decisis
and the combined efforts of courts and scholars."' D. GAvEs, supra note 240, at 78.
He noted at that tme that "nothing in the proposed approach is inconsistent
with the continuance of the doctrine of stare decisis, properly conceived." 47
HAv. L. REv, at 196. In re-reading that article, done only after completing a
draft of this one, I find that many of the points that I have made with respect to
the judicial function were also made by Professor Cavers in 1933.
Nonetheless, the thesis of the present article has vastly different dimensions.
In 1933, Professor Cavers, like Cook, Lorenzen, Yntema, and others, was attacking
the choice of law methodology then employed. His proposal was limited in scope,
see D. CAVEns, supra note 240, at 79-80, and he now had developed a complete
methodology based on the concept of principles of preference. This methodology
is but one example of the policy-centered approach, which has been developed
by a number of writers in the years since Professor Cavers first wrote. I propose
to take advantage of the policy-centered approach and relate this approach to
judicial method. The experience of the thirty-odd years that have passed since
the publication of Professor Cavers' article now makes it possible to think in terms
of a judicially-established conflict of laws based on considerations of policy
and fairness. Thus, I am now trying to do something that Professor Cavers was
not trying to do at that time, and I have gone about it in a rather different way
than Cavers. It is for this reason that-after some reflection-there was no attempt
to "build" this article around the earlier article of Professor Cavers, and perhaps
too little reference is made to it. But let it be made clear the path traveled in this
article is already lighted.
271 See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
YALE L.J. 457, 469 (1924).
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theory developed by Learned Hand,272 that theoretically the
forum does not "apply" foreign law nor enforce "foreign-created
rights." When the law of the forum is displaced, the foreign law
is used only as a model for the rule of decision in the particular
case. Strictly speaking, one court cannot apply the law of another
state, for it cannot authoritatively declare that law. A court can
only make a prediction as to what the court of the other state
would do. In other words, Kentucky could only "apply" Indiana
law as it thinks the Indiana court would apply it; only the Indiana
court can apply Indiana law as "law." In the same sense, in cases
governed by state law, a federal court is only making a prediction
as to the law of the state in which it sits. 273 This point becomes
significant in the context of displacement, and when foreign law
is used, it is as a model for the rule of decision in the particular
case.
If the forum is only using foreign law as a model, the question
arises as to what happens when the forum is unable to "make the
prediction," 'because it is unaware of the content of foreign law.
Suppose that the case is completely foreign in the sense that all of
the legally operative facts occurred outside of the forum, as in
the well-known case of Walton v. Arabian-American Oil Com-
pany.2 Suit was brought in a federal court in New York, where
the defendant was incorporated, to recover damages for an auto-
mobile accident occurring in Saudi Arabia. Neither the plain-
tiff nor the defendant offered any proof as to Saudi Arabian law.
The court held that since the tort occurred in Saudi Arabia, the
plaintiff's "rights," if any, "arose under Saudi Arabian law." The
plaintiff had the burden of showing that he had a "right" under
Arabian law, and since he failed to prove his "right," the suit was
dismissed. The case clearly raises the question of what the court
should do when no proof of the content of the foreign law is
offered, and the court answered the question by dismissing the
plaintiff's suit.
Courts have developed a number of ways of dealing with the
272 See, e.g., Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
273 It is interesting to note that the Judiciary Act refers to such law as the
"rules of decision." 28 U.S.C. § 725, for the federal court cannot apply the
'law" that it cannot authoritatively declare.
27
4 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956).
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problem in certain cases other than requiring dismissal, 275 but
they do not appear to have considered the basic question of when
and for what purpose it is necessary to bring information as to the
content of the foreign law to the court's attention. 276 In Kentucky,
the courts take judicial notice of the law of sister states in ac-
cordance with provisions of the Uniform Judicial Notice of
Foreign Law Act.' 7 However, prior to the enactment of the
statute, foreign law (including the law of a sister state) was treated
as a question of fact. If that state was a common law jurisdiction,
the court was willing to "presume" that its common law was the
same as Kentucky's. So, in Yellow Poplar Lumber Company v.
Ford,278 where the plaintiff was injured in Virginia, the Court
allowed recovery by looking to the common law of Kentucky.
The presumption was not extended to the statutes of a sister state
even where Kentucky had the same kind of statute.
In Murray's Administrator v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad
Company,279 suit was brought to recover damages for the wrongful
death of a Kentucky resident killed in Tennessi. The -plaintiff
failed to plead or prove the Tennessee wrongful death statute.
Since he failed to do so, and the Court would not presume that the
Tennessee statute was the same as that of Kentucky, it looked to
the Tennessee common law, presumed that the law was the same
as Kentucky's, and denied recovery. Likewise in Stewart's Ad-
ministrator v. Bacon,280 where the death occurred in Ontario, the
Court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant on the ground
that the plaintiff had failed to plead and prove the wrongful death
statute of Ontario.
With the enactment of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law statute, the plaintiff is no longer required to plead and prove
the law of a sister state,281 but the statute leaves unanswered the
question as regards the law of a foreign state. If the foreign state
275 See the discussion of the various methods in Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J.
260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
276 In all cases the assumption is made that "foreign law governs," and then
the question is how the foreign law is to be proved, and what happens if it is
not.
277 Ky. REv. STAT. § 422.081-.082 (1962).
278 141 Ky. 5, 131 S.W. 1010 (1910).
279 132 Ky. 386, 110 S.W. 334 (1908).
280 253 Ky. 748, 70 S.W.2d 522 (1934).
281 See the discussion of the effect of the statute in Vogt v. Power's Adm'r,
291 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1956).
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follows the common law, the Court will presume the law is the
same as that of Kentucky, 282 but as to statutes and the law of a
state that does not follow the common law, it would seem that, if
past decisions are followed, the plaintiff would have to plead and
prove that law. If he fails to do so, the result would be the same
as in Walton: the plaintiff's suit would be dismissed.
The question may be asked why the plaintiff is required to
raise a conflicts issue by pleading foreign law and why the plaintiff
should have the burden of proving the content of that law. As
Professor Currie, commenting on Walton, has said, the answer can
only be that this is required by the "rights" theory of the conflict
of laws and that in a case such as Walton, the law of the forum
"is displaced by the logic of the system itself." 283 If the court thinks
of Saudi Arabia or Ontario as the only state having "jurisdiction"
to create a right, which the forum enforces, it follows that proof of
the content of the foreign law is a necessary part of the plaintiff's
case. He must prove that law to show that he has a-"right" under
the law of the only state having "jurisdiction" to create such a
right. On the other hand, if the court conceives the basic law as
the law of the forum, to be displaced only if there is a specific
reason for such displacement, it follows that if no proof is
introduced as to the content of foreign law, no conflicts issue can
arise.
Let us review Cook's discussion of the "law" of a state.2 84 The
domestic rule is the rule of decision that a court applies in the
absence of a foreign element, i.e., the forum's substantive law.
There is also the foreign rule, i.e., the rule of decision that will be
applied in a particular case involving a foreign element. The
foreign rule of decision may be one that uses the law of a foreign
state as a model. However, if there is no knowledge as to the
content of the foreign law, foreign law cannot be used as a model
for the rule of decision, and the forum's domestic law must be
applied.
Theoretical considerations apart, the approach of the court in
Walton and the past practice of the Kentucky courts ignores the
realistic consideration of why it would be objectionable for the
282 Stewart's Adm'x v. Bacon, 253 Ky. 748, 70 S.W.2d 522 (1934).
283 B. CuRmE, supra note 269, at 4-5.
2-M Cook, supra note 270.
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forum to apply its own law in a case before it where the content of
any relevant foreign law is unknown. There are situations where
the forum's statutory law cannot be applied to a case involving a
foreign element, because the statute has been interpreted as being
inapplicable to the foreign situation presented. An example is
the Kentucky or New York wrongful death statute, which is not
applicable to deaths occurring outside the boundaries of the
state.285 Other than these cases, it may be asked why there should
necessarily be an issue as to the applicability of foreign law merely
because a foreign element is present. Why should not the law of
the forum be applied where neither party is sufficiently interested
in the foreign law to raise the question (presumably by his plead-
ings or according to some other procedure), 2s" and more im-
portantly, where neither party demonstrates that the foreign law
differs from the law of the forum?
In a number of cases a court under a choice of law rule,
"applies" foreign law, but it does not appear that the foreign
law differs from the forum's own law.2 7 Since all American states
but one follow the common law, it may be questioned just how
frequently the substantive laws of the states involved actually
differ. They will differ only where the courts of one state have put
a different interpretation on a particular aspect of the "common
law" or where one state has a statute that the other does not, or
where the terms of the two statutes differ. If there is no difference,
there is no utility in a court's "applying" the law of another state,
i.e., looking to the other state's decisions for the same substantive
law principles that are found in the forum's own decisions with
which the court is no doubt more familiar. Where there is a
difference, it may be asked why the party who will derive the
advantage from this difference, and, therefore, who wants foreign
law to be used as the rule of decision, should not be required to
raise the conflicts issue at the outset and demonstrate the dif-
ference to the court.288 Failing to do so, the forum should decide
the case in accordance with its own substantive law or in most
2 8 5 Whitford v. Panama R.R., 28 N.Y. 465 (1861); Murray's Adm'r v. Louis-
ville & N. R.R., 132 Ky. 336, 110 S.W. 334 (1908).286 See the suggestions in D. CAVERS, supra note 240, at 268-79.
287 These are among the cases Professor Ehrenzweig discounts in searching
for the "true rule," and as his research indicates, they are quite numerous.2 88 See the discussion in B. CGumE, supra note 269, at 46-48.
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cases in accordance with the general principles of the common law
applicable to the issue in question.
A leading case in the law of offer and acceptance of contracts
is Fairmount Glass Works v. Cruden-Martin Woodenware Com-
pany.28 9 The plaintiff mailed a letter from St. Louis, Missouri, to
the defendant at Fairmount, Indiana. The defendant replied by
mail, and telegrams were exchanged. When the defendant failed
to ship the goods requested by the plaintiff, the plaintiff sued for
breach of contract. The issue was whether the exchange of letters
amounted to a valid offer and acceptance. The writer is told that
almost invariably first year law students ask what the case was
doing in the Kentucky Court (they are not yet familiar with our
law of transient jurisdiction) and perhaps what law would
"govern" the case. The answer will not be found in the opinion.
Although the case was purely "foreign," the Court never indicated
that it was treating it other than as a domestic one,. where all the
legally operative facts occurred in Kentucky.
The Court cited two cases, one from Massachusetts and one
from Minnesota, but concluded that in determining whether the
exchange of letters amounted to a valid contract, "each case must
turn largely upon the language there used." But was the Court
"applying" Missouri law, Indiana law, or Kentucky law? The
answer is that it was applying general principles of common law,
which prevailed in Kentucky, and so far as it knew, since
neither party contended otherwise, prevailed in Missouri and
Indiana as well.290 Neither party nor the Court was concerned
about the "governing law," because there was no reason to assume
that on the particular issue presented, there was any difference in
those "laws." Where neither party raises an issue as to the ap-
plicability of foreign law, he may be said to "consent" to the
application of the law of the forum. As a practical matter, there
is no "conflict of laws," and many cases containing foreign
elements, including ones where the court "applies" the law of
another state under a jurisdiction-selecting rule, fall into this
category.
The result should be the same where a party raises an issue as
289 106 Ky. 659, 51 S.W. 196 (1899). This case is a textbook favorite.
290 Because such "general principles of law" exist, it is possible for law
schools to teach "national law" out of 'national casebooks."
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to the applicability of foreign law, but fails to prove the content of
that law, so that it is impossible to determine whether there is a
conflict of laws in the sense that the law of the other state differs
from the law of the forum. In Leary v. Gledhill,-91 suit was
brought in New Jersey by an American plaintiff against an
American defendant to recover payment for an alleged loan
made in France. The New Jersey court assumed that under its
choice of law "rule" French law would govern. The plaintiff
neither pleaded nor proved French law, and as in Walton, the
defendant moved that the complaint be dismissed for failure to
state a cause of action. This, the court, unlike the court in Walton,
refused to do. The court did not engage in any "presumptions,"
since France was not a common law jurisdiction, but took the
position that if neither party proved the content of the applicable
foreign law, the parties were deemed to "consent" to the applica-
tion of the law of the forum. Of course, the defendant, who was
contending that French law should apply, did not "consent" to
the application of New Jersey law. Apparently, the court was
saying that since it was the defendant who wished to rely on the
foreign law, it was up to him to prove that that law differed from
the law of the forum, and as he failed to do so, the law of the
forum would not be displaced.
292
It must be recognized, as did the Kentucky Court implicitly
in Fairmount, and the New Jersey court in Leary, that the pri-
mary responsibility of a court is to decide the case before it in
accordance with principles of substantive law. Where the case
contains a foreign element, there may be a threshold question of
whether the law of the forum should be displaced and the law
of another state used as a model for the rule of decision in the
case. But this is a threshold question only. If a party wishes to
raise that question, the burden should be on him to persuade the
court that the content of the law of the other state, on which he
wishes to rely, differs from the law of the forum. If the court is
not apprised of the content of the foreign law, it obviously can-
291 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
2 92 In commenting on the opinion, Professor Currie observes that, "In this
thorough and perceptive opinion, Judge Vanderbilt stopped just short of adopting
in its entirety the rule under discussion [that the law of the forum applies in the
absence of proof of foreign law], preferring to bolster the application of the law
of the forum by the dubious 'acquiescence theory as well as by some attention
to the procedural situation." B. CurarE, supra note 269. at 49 n. 113.
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not know whether there is a conflict of laws at all, and in any
event, cannot make a reasoned choice as to whether its law should
be displaced. As Professor Currie has observed:
The most shocking aspect of the Walton decision is the hold-
ing that Saudi Arabian law displaced the law of the forum
although the court presumably had no idea what the relevant
provisions of that law-if any-were. The application of for-
eign law is justified when the law expresses a policy of the
foreign state, when the connections of the case with the for-
eign state are such as to give it a legitimate interest in having
its policy applied, and when there is no conflicting interest
of the forum state. A court is not justified in holding that
foreign law displaces local law as the rule of decision when
it cannot make the determination that the interest of the
foreign state is entitled to recognition, and it can seldom
make that determination when it has no information con-
cerning the foreign law and policy.293
Furthermore, in any case the parties are seeking to determine
their legal rights and obligations. This adjudication must be made
under substantive law, and in the absence of proof of foreign law,
why should not the substantive law be that of the forum? Again,
to quote from Professor Currie:
[L]aw is not an instrument of social control alone. It re-
tains something of the quality and function that were com-
monly attributed to it before we became so acutely conscious
of its sociological role. It is an accumulated body of experi-
ence and principle that has served well, on the whole as
a guide to the adjudication of disputes between parties in
court. Grant that no governmental policy of New York re-
specting the problem of personal injuries will be advanced by
the application of its law to a dispute between two foreigners
arising out of a collision in Saudi Arabia; grant also that
neither party regulated his conduct or planned his affairs
with reference to New York law. The fact remains that
there is a lawsuit pending in a New York court. The harsh
alternative to deciding it according to New York law is to
dismiss it. No conflict of interest among states being ap-
parent, justice between the parties becomes the sole con-
sideration. Justice between the parties requires a decision
on the merits. And where should the New York court look
for a rule of decision that will do justice between the parties
293 Id. at 48.
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but to the body of principle and experience which has served
that purpose, as well as the ends of governmental policy, for
the people of New York in their domestic affairs?
294
The approach of the court in Walton and the approach of the
Kentucky Court in cases such as Murray and Stewart can only
be explained as following from the "system of rules" concept of
the conflict of laws. Once courts accept the view that the basic
law is the law of the forum, which will not be displaced absent
valid reasons for such displacement, no case will be dismissed be-
cause the court is "ignorant" of the content of foreign law. Not-
withstanding provisions for the taking of judicial notice of the
law of sister states, the burden should still be on the party wishing
to rely on foreign law to raise the question of displacement, and
he should have the primary responsibility to provide information
as to the content of the foreign law. 295 Where no issue is raised
as to the applicability of foreign law or the content of the
foreign law is not known, the case should be decided in accordance
with the substantive law of the forum.
Closely related is the proposition that there is only a conflict
of laws where the result, were the case heard in the courts of the
state whose law is sought to be used as a model, would be dif-
ferent than the result that would be reached under the sub-
stantive law of the forum.296 It is difficult to justify displacement
of the law of the forum where the state whose law is sought to be
used as a model would, if the very case were brought before it,
decide according to the substantive law of the forum. As pre-
viously stated, Cook's analysis lists two parts to the "law" of a
state, the domestic rule and the foreign rule.297 In a case such as
IVessling, there is an apparent conflict between the "law" of
Kentucky and Indiana, but the apparent conflict is in connection
only with the domestic rules of the two states. Indiana's domestic
rule is that a guest cannot recover from the host in the absence of
wanton or willful conduct, and is to be applied to purely domestic
cases, i.e., an Indiana host and an Indiana guest involved in an
294 Id. at 64-65.
295 The statute provides that the parties shall render assistance to the court
in determining the content of the law, and the party relying on that law will be
fully aware of its content.
293 This is true because that state would either apply its own law or the
law of a third state.
:207 Cook, supra note 271.
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accident in Indiana. This is a rule of substantive law, but it does
not necessarily follow that the domestic rule is the same as the
foreign rule which would be applied in cases involving a foreign
element, i.e., not all the legally operative facts are connected with
Indiana.
By looking to the substantive law of Indiana, the Kentucky
Court "knows" how the Indiana court will decide the domestic
case, but it cannot "know" the outcome of the case before the
Kentucky Court, because that case is foreign to the Indiana court
as well. To determine if there is a true conflict of laws in the
sense that the result that would be reached by the Indiana courts
would differ from the result that would be reached by applying
the substantive law of the forum, the Kentucky court must pre-
dict how Indiana would decide that very case.
If the same case arose before the Indiana court, would that
court hold that the Indiana guest statute was applicable in a suit
between two Kentuckians injured in Indiiia? There is no deci-
sion in point and no recent Indiana decisions involving choice of
law in tort cases.29s However, the Seventh Circuit is of the
opinion that, in tort cases, Indiana would not apply the lex loci
delicti rule, but some form of "grouping of contacts" rule. Thus,
if a suit was brought by the administrator of a Kentucky decedent
killed in Illinois by an Indiana defendant, and the decedent's
beneficiaries were Indiana residents, the court would apply
Indiana law rather than Illinois law on an issue relating to
wrongful death. 99 If the Seventh Circuit is accurate in its analysis
of Indiana law, it might very well be that if Wessling v. Paris
arose in Indiana, the Indiana court would apply Kentucky law.
298 In Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965), the court
found an absence of Indiana conflicts cases involving torts questions. A com-
mentator writing in 1958 stated that Indiana had no case involving choice of law
as to guest statutes. Kelso, Automobile Accidents and Indiana Conflict of Laws:
Current Dilemmas, 33 IND. L. J. 297 (1958). My own research has disclosed no
cases since that time. His article also indicates that there are relatively few recent
cases on choice of law in tort situations. The latest case decided by the Indiana
Supreme Court appears to be Louisville & N. R.R. v. Revlett, 224 Ind. 313, 65
N.E.2d 731 (1946), where the court applied the lex loci delicti rule, and the
last appellate case research has disclosed was Slinkard v. Babb, 125 Ind. App. 76,
112 N.E.2d 876 (1953), also applying the lex loci delicti. Admittedly the re-
search has not been thorough, but if digest listings are any indication, Indiana
has not been a fertile ground for the raising of conficts questions in the tort
area.
299 Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965). The court
analogized from Barber v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945), which
applied a "grouping of contacts" rule in a contracts situation.
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Yet the Kentucky Court never considered the question of what
Indiana would do if a similar case arose before it.300 This is in
accordance with the practice of most courts in only looking
to the substantive law of the state whose law is sought to be used
as a model-to the domestic rule rather than the foreign rule
notwithstanding that the case is also foreign to that court. This is
because all courts wish to avoid dealing with the delightful prob-
lem of the renvoi. The problem of the renvoi arises when the
choice of law rule of the forum looks to a state whose choice of law
rule looks back to the locus.30' So, if Kentucky were committed to
the lex loci delicti rule and Indiana to the "grouping of contacts"
or "state of significant relationship" rule, and Indiana would char-
acterize Kentucky as the state of the most significant relationship,
each state would look to the other and the court would find it-
self in an "inextricable circle." To avoid the problem, most courts
simply look to the substantive law of the state whose law "governs"
under its choice of law rule.30
2
This is the theoretical fallacy of the vested rights theory, long
ago demonstrated by Cook.303 It is absurd to say that the plaintiff
cannot recover in Kentucky because he has no "right" to recover
under Indiana law whereas if the case arose in Indiana, the court
would hold that the plaintiff had a "right" to recover, looking to
Kentucky law. By ignoring the result that would be reached in
the courts of the state to which the forum's choice of law "rule"
refers, the forum is not enforcing a "right" created by the law of
that state, but is, in effect, enforcing a "right" created under its
own law using the substantive law of the other state as a model.304
Where the case is foreign to the other state as well as to the
300 It is interesting to note that counsel for the appellant in Wessling
observed that Indiana rejected the le-x loci delicti rule, relying on Watts v. Pioneer
Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965). However, he did not develop the
argument that for this reason Kentucky law should not be displaced.
301 See generally G. STUmBERc, CoNFLIcr OF LAws 10 n. 27 (3d ed. 1963)
and the references therein.3 02 See IESTATEMENT OF THE CoNFLrCT OF LAWS § 7(b) (1934). The only
exceptions are questions involving title to land and the validity of a decree of
divorce. REsrATE ENT OF THE CoNFLicT OF LAWS § 8 (1934). The Restate-
meat Second increases the number of references to the "whole law" of a state,
but retains the general rule that the conflicts rules of the other state are not
considered.
303 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE
L.J. 457, 468-69 (1924). See also the discussion in Carswell, The Doctrine of
Vested Rights in Private International Law, 8 INT. & COMP. L.Q. 268, 280-83
(1959).
304 Cook, supra note 303, at 469-70.
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forum, Cook says that the forum must predict how that state
would decide the case, that is, it must make a prediction as to its
foreign rule as well as to its domestic rule. The prediction is made
by "observing concrete judicial phenomena,"30 5 namely, the past
behavior of judicial officials of the other state, and, based on such
behavior, concluding how they would decide this very case. If the
prediction results in the conclusion that they would decide the
case in accordance with the substantive law of the forum, there is
simply not a conflict of laws. There is no need to get involved with
the renvoi. The renvoi problem presupposes that the forum and
the other state each has "jurisdiction-selecting" rules. If the
question is approached from the standpoint of the law of the
forum as the basic law, choice of law rules have no place in the
analysis. The forum is not "required" to look to the law of any
state. Where one party desires the application of the law of
another state as the rule of decision, he must persuade the court
that if the case arose there, that state would decide the case in
accordance with its own law and not in accordance with the law
of the forum.306 If the law of the forum is the basic law, and the
courts of the state whose law is sought to be used as a model would
also decide the case in accordance with the substantive law of
the forum, there is no reason to displace the law of the forum, for
there is no conflict of laws.
Distinguished commentators such as Professors Cavers and
Ehrenzweig would disagree with this proposition. However, the
former refers to the situation where both the forum and the
other state may have an interest in the application of their law-
which is not so in the present case-and the forum has concluded
that a "moderate interpretation" of its policy and interest would
justify the refusal to apply its own law. In such a case it is also
possible that the other state, either because of a choice of law
"rule" or because of it own "moderate interpretation," would not
305 Id. at 475-77.
306 To the extent that the other state has also adopted a policy-centered
approach, the prediction will result in the conclusion that that state would apply
the law of the forum, where, as in Wessling, the forum is the only state having
any interest in the application of its law. If my assumption, that a reat many of
the tort cases actually coming before the courts are "false conflicts' cases is cor-
rect, the basis of the decision of the forum court would be simply that there was
no "conflict of laws."
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apply its own law, or, "the forum finds that the X law doesn't
'want' to be applied." Professor Cavers' answer in this situation is:
Why ought the forum not adhere to its own self-restricting
interpretation and apply the law of the other state, even
though that law doesn't want to be applied? Useful as it is to
take into account the way the other state would apply its own
rules, the forum has the responsibility of adjudicating the
case. If the forum is satisfied that its domestic rule should
not be applied and that the X rule provides an appropriate
norm, given its purposes and the connection of the event of
transaction with State X, then why should the forum refrain
from using the X rule?
307
He thus divorces the question from the concept of the renvoi,
which, as pointed out earlier, comes into play only when the
forum and the other state have rigid choice of law "rules," and the
rule of each causes it to look to the law of the other. His point is
that the choice of law the other state would make should "neither
be ignored nor be controlling."
Professor Ehrenzweig likewise, and correctly, rejects the con-
cept of the renvoi as "unnecessary and misleading." But like Pro-
fessor Cavers, he takes the position that once the forum has
decided to displace its own law for valid reasons, it should in
most cases apply the law of the other state, even though that state
would not apply its own law. He gives the example of a New York
court passing on the applicability of a limitation on recovery exist-
ing under the law of Connecticut where the accident occurred,
to a New York airplane passenger on a flight originating in New
York. He supposes the New York court characterizing the question
as one of "tort" and the Connecticut court characterizing it as one
of "contract," and then assumes that on this basis New York would
apply the law of the place of the accident and Connecticut would
apply the law of the place of contracting. He goes on to say:
Assume further that the principal policy of the New York tort
conflicts rule is the distribution of inevitable loss rather than
the admonition of the wrongdoer, and that this policy is held
more properly effected under the law of the place of accident
than under the law of the place of the wrongful conduct or
3' 07 D. CAvEas, supra note 261, at 106.
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the law of the forum. It will be found that once the law of
the place of accident has been chosen on this policy ground,
a conflicts rule of that law is irrelevant from the standpoint
of this policy.
308
The author's disagreement with this theory may be due to
approaching the question at a different point of time in the
choice of law process. The court should not consider the policies
of the respective states until it is persuaded that the other state
would not decide the case in accordance with the substantive law
of the forum for whatever reason. It is not the function of the
court to resolve questions of the conflict of laws, nor to adjust the
policies of various states, nor decide how losses should be dis-
tributed in an interstate accident. Its function is to adjudicate the
merits of a dispute before it. The law of the forum, representing
the "accumulated body of principle and experience," is suitable
for this task. In an appropriate case, fairness to the parties or rec-
ognition of the governmental interests of another state may
justify the displacement of the law of the forum. But where the
state on whose law one party wishes to rely would decide the case
in accordance with the substantive law of the forum, there is no
reason for the forum to displace its own law. Perhaps, it is pos-
sible to conceive of a case where considerations of fairness to the
parties might require displacement, even though the other state-
because it is committed to jurisdiction-selecting rules-would
look to the law of the forum, or where the other state's approach
may not take into account the forum's conception of what is
fair.309 But there is no utility in creating a choice of law issue,
where if the case arose in the state whose law is sought to be used
as a model, that court would decide in accordance with the sub-
stantive law of the forum.
Therefore, if the basic law is assumed to be the law of the
forum, there is no conflict of laws and no reason to consider the
question of displacement unless the result that would be reached
in the courts of the other state, if the same case arose there, is
3 0 8 
EIMENZWEIG, CONFLICT oF LAws 235 (1962).
809 Suppose that in a contracts case the parties have made an express choice
of law, but the state whose law they chose would not recognize their choice. In
this situation, the forum should recognize the choice of law, notwithstanding that
the other state would not, if the forum concludes that to refuse to recognize the
choice would defeat the legitimate expectations of the parties.
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different from the result that would be reached by applying the
substantive law of the forum.3 10 In short, if the other state would
decide the case in accordance with the substantive law of the
forum, the law of the forum should not be displaced except per-
haps in the rare instance where it would be required by considera-
tions of fairness to the parties.
Obviously, an attempt is being made to eliminate the "thresh-
old question" of choice of law whenever this is reasonably pos-
sible. Emphasis on the application of the law of the forum may
be troubling, but this may be attributed to orientation to the
present law of transient jurisdiction, and the "disinterested third
state," i.e., the state that has no interest in the application of its
own law to the particular dispute.31' It is true that the law of
transient jurisdiction enables many potential cases to arise where
the forum has no interest in the application of its own law; in-
deed, if it were to make an express choice of law, it could not
constitutionally apply-its own law. 312 This situation receives too
much emphasis. In a state like Kentucky, which does not have the
attraction of high jury verdicts and is not a state where a large
number of national and international concerns "do business,"
most cases will not place the court in the position of a purely
disinterested forum. Usually one or both of the parties will be
Kentuckians or Kentucky enterprises. If the problem of the
"disinterested third state" is to be dealt with, it is sounder to re-
form the law of transient jurisdiction.
Even where the forum is "disinterested," however, the applica-
tion of its law in accordance with our first two propositions is
justified. It will be rare when a party wishing to rely on foreign
law cannot introduce proof of the content of that law, and it is
310 It should be noted that the other state might apply the law of a third
state under its choice of law analysis. In such a case the forum would have to
decide whether its law should be displaced in favor of the "whole law" of the
other state, or more realistically, whether it should reach the same result as the
courts of the other state would reach.
311 It is interesting to note that the drafters of the Restatement Second
approach problems from the perspective of the "disinterested third state." Reese,
Confitct of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CoNrEn'l. PiioB. 679,
692-93 (1963). For a discussion of the problem in light of governmental
interests, see Currie, The Disinterested ThirdState, 28 LAw & CoNmMp. PRoB.
754 (1963).
312 As in cases such as John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1980). See the discussion of
these cases in B. CuRRIE, supra note 269, at 232-36.
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not unfair to require him to do so. Where no proof is introduced
as to the content of foreign law, and the court decides that in
justice it cannot dismiss the case,313 it must render a decision, and
its law as "an accumulated body of principle and experience" is
the only law to which it could reasonably be expected to look.
Where the other state would decide the case in accordance with
the substantive law of the forum, this is because either the "rule"
of that state or its interpretation of its policy or interest causes it
to do so. Assuming that its looking to the law of the forum would
be constitutional3 14 the refusal to displace the law of the forum,
even if the forum can be said to be "disinterested" when relevant
policies and interests are considered, is justifiable on the grounds
that: (1) the other state disclaims an interest or is not concerned
with its interest; (2) it is not ordinarily unfair to reject a party's
"reliance" on foreign law where the very law on which he relies
would not support him if suit were brought. It is not the
function of the forum court "to police the international legal
order" and decide which law should apply in all cases. It should
decide the case in accordance with its own law unless there are
valid reasons for displacement. Where the state whose law is
sought to be used as a model would decide a case in accordance
with the substantive law of the forum, there is no valid reason
why the law of the forum should be displaced.
When the forum's prediction is that the other state would not
decide the case in accordance with the substantive law of the
forum, there is a conflict of laws. To the extent that some courts
follow a "rules approach," this will occur frequently, and the
question is how a court committed to the policy-centered ap-
proach should resolve the conflict. The third proposition, then,
is that the court should make a decision only with reference to the
fact-law pattern presented in the particular case. Traditionally,
313 As, for example, where the plaintiff's claim would be barred by the
statute of limitations of the a p propiate forum.
314 There is not any doubt that a choice of law rule based on "reasonable
contacts" would be fully constitutional notwithstanding the lack of "interest"
from a policy standpoint of- the state to which the choice of law rule refers. Were
this not so, courts would have been acting "unconstitutionally" for quite some
time. Emphasis on the constitutionality of choice of law based on interest should
not obscure the fact that it is equally constitutional for a state to approach the
choice of law problem on another basis. It might be well to recall the attitude of
the Supreme Court in Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171, 176 (1916), that "a
mistaken application of the doctrine of conflict of laws" raises no federal
question.
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courts framed the issue in the broadest possible terms, adopting
a choice of law rule for a category of cases and applying that rule
to all cases coming within its scope. In the original opinion in
W1essling, the Court found the issue to be "whether or not the
substantive law of Kentucky applies in the trial of the case, or as
stated in Latin phraseology, does the principle of Lex Loci Delicti
apply as against the law of Lex Domicilii?"3 15 On rehearing, how-
ever, the Court framed the issue with reference to the fact-law
pattern of the particular case, observing, after stating the facts:
"The sole question is whether the Indiana Guest Statute shall
apply."3
1
The difference in the statement of the issue demonstrates a
complete difference in approach. At first, the Court was looking
for a "rule" that would govern all conflicts cases where a tort had
occurred. On rehearing, the Court was dealing with the problem
at hand and rendered its decision with reference to the fact-law
pattern presented. The holding of the case, in light of the issue
framed, was that where two residents of the forum, which does not
have a guest statute, were involved in an automobile accident in
a state which had such a statute, the law of the forum would
apply on the issue of host-guest liability. The fact-law pattern
presented in Wessling was the only fact-law pattern that occurred
in tort conflict cases before the Kentucky Court in recent years.
The holding would have the effect of stare decisis if the identical
fact-law pattern arose before the Court in a subsequent case and
would be binding on lower courts in Kentucky when they were
presented with the question.
Moreover, the fact that the decision was rendered with refer-
ence to the fact-law pattern presented does not mean that it is a
"meaningless ad hoc" decision. 317 The precedential value of the
decision will be determined by the ratio decidendi found in the
Court's opinion. To the extent that the Court has "developed the
considerations which it has taken into account in resolving the
specific issue, the decision will be helpful to a court that is later
315 This is also a misstatement of the issue. The argument in favor of Ken-
tucky law was not so much that it was the domicile of the parties as that it was
the only state interested in the application of its law to the case.316 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967).
317 As to a "meaningless" choice of law decision, see D. CAvERS, THE
CHOIcE oF LAw PRocEss 121 n. 8 (1965).
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faced by a similar, if distinguishable, issue."318 This is how
precedents are employed in other cases, and there is no reason
why they may not be employed in conflicts cases as well.
Perhaps the failure of courts to frame the proper issue in
conflicts cases has been the most serious deficiency of the tradi-
tional system. This deficiency also exists in the approach of the
Restatement Second. Courts are asked to decide all "tort" cases
in accordance with the "law of the state of the most significant
relationship" or in accordance with other specific rules. This
causes the court to frame the wrong issue. If only one kind of
fact-law pattern comes before the court, as has been the case in
Kentucky, there is no need for the court to "anticipate future
cases." Where a variety of fact-law patterns presents itself to a
court, its decisions in those cases will "coalesce" to form a body of
conflicts "law" developed by judicial decision. In either situation,
all that is necessary is for the court to decide the precise issue
presented in the particular case.
Thus, courts, in conflicts cases, should return to the method
of judicial decision from which the common law has evolved. The
issue should be framed with reference to the fact-law pattern
presented. The holding will be a holding on that issue, and the
"rules" or "principles" as enunciated in the court's opinion will
serve as a guide for decision in future cases with similar fact-law
patterns. Depending on the rationale of the former decision, the
precedent may be extended or distinguished, and a new precedent
will emerge. As in other areas of the law, a case involving a
completely different fact-law pattern will be treated as a case of
first impression. If there have been too few cases to form a
"complete body of conflicts law," lawyers will simply have to make
predictions, as they do in any area of law where there is little
decisional authority. As a distinguished jurist, Judge Roger Tray-
nor of the California Supreme Court, has stated:
Cook and Lorenzen and other scholars such as Currie,
Ehrenzweig, Cavers and Stumberg have demonstrated that
superlaw is the most impractical law on earth. There is com-
pelling logic in the corollary that within constitutional limita-
tions local law is supreme. Judges must then painstakingly
318 Id.
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evolve pragmatic exceptions to the local law that will coalesce
into a realistic law of conflicts. However hard their task is
as they work their way out of the wreckage of meretricious
theories, they can at least evaluate competing policies free
of the misconceptions which led to mechanical decision.
Given a focus properly on local lav and vision presumably
free of parochialism, judges can apprise the appropriateness
of local law for the case in comparison with any plausible
exceptions.31
9
The first step in this direction is for the court to frame the
issue, and thereby the resultant holding, with reference to the
fact-law pattern presented in the particular case.
Once the court has framed the issue, it must then decide
the question of displacement. The fourth proposition is that the
law of the forum should be displaced only where considerations
of fairness to the parties or proper recognition of the governmental
interests of another state so requires. No guide to the court's
decision in a particular case is furnished nor is any intended. The
court must, as Judge Traynor has said, "painstakingly evolve
pragmatic exceptions to the local law." The fourth proposition
merely restates the justification for the displacement of the law
of the forum. With such an orientation, the court will render its
decision on displacement with reference to the fact-law pattern
presented. It will do so realistically, and upon considerations of
fairness and policy.
Guides to choice of law abound in the writings of various
theorists, which the court may and should consult. But just as a
court should reject the comprehensive rules approach of the
Restatement and the Restatement Second, it should not accept
in toto the approach advocated by a particular theorist. As
pointed out previously, the modern policy-oriented theorists are
proposing their theories only as a guide for the solution of con-
flicts problems. Courts should look to solutions proposed by
academic commentators and consider the soundness of a particular
solution and the rationale behind it. In time, enough cases may
have been decided to enable the court to conclude that it should
follow a particular approach, but how likely is this? In any event,
319 Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TFx. L. REv 657, 667
(1959).
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the court's responsibility is to decide the question of displace-
ment in the case before it rather than to decide on a consistent
approach to the solution of all conflicts problems.
In areas of law where reliance on the application of the law of
a particular state may be present, the court will have to decide
whether there has been such reliance on the law of another state
that, in fairness to the parties, the law of the forum should be
displaced. Here there may be a policy common to all states of
protecting the legitimate expectations of the parties so that the
displacement of the law of the forum will be more frequent.32 0
This is particularly true as long as our law of transient jurisdiction
remains in effect. However, the questions of "fairness" and "legiti-
mate expectation" can only be decided with reference to the
fact-law pattern of a particular case. Perhaps some of the "local-
izing" rules of the Restatement Second may furnish a sound basis
of solution in some cases. For example, the law of the situs at the
time of transfer should govern all transfers of movable property
and thus insure security of transactions. 321 But is this assumption
sound in a case involving the validity of a repossession where the
"situs" of the property at the time of the transfer between a Mas-
sachusetts corporation and a New Hampshire corporation pursuant
to a contract executed in Massachusetts, was Vermont, with pri-
mary use of the property and repossession in New Hampshire?322
A rule cannot be a substitute for a judicial consideration of the
problem presented in a case, and such consideration will promote
fairness and security of transactions far more effectively than the
application of an a priori rule.
In the absence of reliance on the law of a particular state so
that the application of the forum's law would defeat the legitimate
320 A state interested in encouraging commercial transactions might well
wish to permit parties a wide latitude in choosing the governing law. This is
particularly so in the international sphere, where less-developed nations wish to
encourage foreign transactions and recognize that there will be a reluctance onthe part of foreign businessmen to have their transactions governed by that
state s law. See the discussion of this point in R. SDLE-, TEs CoNFLICr OF
LAws IN ETHIOPIA 82-85 (1965).
321 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF T CONFLICT OF LAws, § 254a (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1959).
322 See Shanahan v. George Landers Construction Co., 266 F.2d 400 (1st
Cir. 1959), where the court concluded it would not. See also Cavers, The
Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process, 35 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 1126, 1135-36 (1960).
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expectations of the parties, 23 the decision on displacement should
be made with reference to the policies and interests of the
respective states. When such policies and interests are considered
realistically, it may often appear that only one state has an interest
in the application of its policy and law to the particular issue, and
if that state is one other than the forum, the law of the forum
should be displaced. Where both the forum and the other state
have an apparent interest in the application of their law, the
forum must resolve this "conflict of interest." The decision must
be based on relevant factors, and the court must conclude whether
its law should be displaced in the particular fact-law pattern pre-
sented. Views of the commentators on how this conflict should
be resolved-and this is the point on which they differ 324-may be
helpful, but courts should not adopt a particular theory as to
''conflict resolution."
In regard to "fairness" and "policy," court decisions will
operate as precedents in future cases where similar questions are
presented. On the basis of these decisions, it will be possible to
"predict" how the court will decide future cases. These four
propositions, it is submitted, are the essence of judicial method as
it relates to the policy-centered conflict of laws.
Wessling v. Paris should be considered in the light of this
method. The opinion is a clear example of its application in a
conflicts case, although it is not likely that a court's opinion will
ever fully satisfy an academic commentator.325 The first proposi-
tion was that the basic law is the law of the forum, which will not
be displaced absent valid reasons for such displacement. This
was accepted by the Court, which observed that "there is no
other requirement that the law of a foreign state be applied in
323 But note that even where there could be said to have been reliance, the
forum may conclude that its own policy precludes displacement of its law. An
example of a displacing choice of law provision may be found in a contract
of insurance on the life of the forum's domiciliary, as to which (even disregarding
the adhesion aspect) the forum would want its own law to apply. Cf. New
England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lauffer, 215 F. Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
324 This will be demonstrated in our discussion of guest statutes, infra.
325 It cannot be expected that it will. The court has the opportunity to
decide very few conflicts cases, and must prepare many opinions on many sub-
jects each term. The academic commentator has the time for careful reflection
on the subject and the particular case. However, the brush of academic criticism
should be applied gingerly and with recognition of the "built-in" advantage.
See the example given in Currie, supra note 311, at 628 n. 2.
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the local forum except the adopted policy of such forum. 3 26 It
was for that reason that the Court concluded it was free to re-
consider the "jurisdiction-selective" rule of the lex loci delicti.
The Court, of course, did not decide whether it would apply the
law of the forum where no issue was raised as to the applica-
bility of foreign law or no proof was introduced as to its content.
The defendant moved to dismiss on the basis of the Indiana guest
statute, of which the Court was required to take judicial notice,
so that question was not presented.
The second proposal, that there is a conflict of laws only
where the result that would be reached in the courts of the other
state is different than the result that would be reached under the
substantive law of the forum, finds no support in the opinion.
Typical of most courts anxious to avoid the problem of the renvoi,
that question was not considered. Since the Court's conclusion
was that the law of the forum should not be displaced, this makes
no difference. Nonetheless, the Court should have inquired as to
the result that would have been reached in Indiana had the case
arisen there. If the basic law is that of the forum and, as the
Court said, "there is no requirement that the law of a foreign
state be applied," it would seem that if the foreign state would
apply the law of the forum as the rule of decision in the case, the
forum should not even consider applying the foreign law.
The third proposition, that the court should decide the case
only with reference to the particular fact-law pattern presented, is
aptly demonstrated in Wessling, particularly by a comparison
between the original and substituted opinions. The Court saw the
question not as being one of "what law governed in tort cases,"
but whether the Indiana guest statute should be applied in the
case of two Kentuckians injured in Indiana. Although it quoted
the "state of the most significant relationship" rule of the Re-
statement Second along with other "authorities," it did not adopt
the rule as one applicable in all tort cases. Ambiguity remains as
to exactly what was done with the Restatement approach, but at
least it was not adopted as a rule for all cases. The Court
specifically observed: "We recognize that an attempt to apply
this rule in complex situations might involve an unstable exercise
326 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259,260 (Ky. 1967).
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in legal gymnastics. Consequently, at this time we limit the ap-
plication of the rule to a very clear case, such as we have here."
32
Thus, the holding is limited to the precise fact-law pattern-the
only fact-law pattern presented in Kentucky torts conflicts cases
in recent years. This was the same approach followed by the
New Hampshire Supreme Court in the Clark case, which carefully
limited its decision to the question of whether the guest statute of
the place of injury would be applied in a suit between two New
Hampshire residents.
The final proposition is that the law of the forum should be
displaced only where considerations of fairness to the parties or
proper recognition of the governmental interest of another state
so requires. The Court concluded that this was a "very clear
case" for the application of Kentucky law. And so it is when view-
ed from the perspective of policy considerations. The first step in
"deciding whether the law of the forum should be displaced on
-policy" grounds is obviously to consider the policies involved,
the purpose behind the enactment of guest statutes, and the
legitimate policy a state may serve by their enactment.u8 While,
at one time, the purpose may have been to protect hosts from
suits by "ungrateful guests," it is now generally recognized that
the primary purpose is to protect insurance companies from col-
lusive suits. 32 9 Insurance companies, rather than associations of
automobile owners, lobby for the passage of guest statutes. When
a guest has been injured, the dispute is between the guest and
the host's insurer, which directs the defense, for the host probably
favors recovery (within the limits of insurance coverage) by the
guest.
The policy-centered theorists whose views have been discussed
would all agree that the law of Kentucky should not be displaced.
Professor Ehrenzweig would not find justification for a departure
3271 Id. at 261.
328 The inquiry is only as to the "legitimate policy." Perhaps the reason that
most members of the legislature voted for a guest statute was that they succumbed
to pressure from the insurance lobby and that the "policy" was to enable the
insurance com anies to realize greater profits. But a legislative policy must be
determined wit reference to the justification that can be found for the enactment.
See the discussion in B. CuRRm, SELEcTED EssAys ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws
143-44 (1963).
329 See the discussion of the difference between the "policy" and the "theory"
in NV. Pnosszn, THm LAw OF ToRTs 190-91 (1964).
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from the "basic rule" of the lex fori.330 As he points out, the
forum will usually be the state where the host and guest reside.
More importantly, the state where the host resides will be the
state where the insured automobile is permanently kept. It is
there that the insurance relationship is "centered," if that term
may be used, and there that rates are computed.331 If that state
does not have a guest statute, the host will arrange his insurance
protection to include possible liability to a guest; if there is a
guest statute, any prospective guest desiring insurance could
purchase his own accident insurance.332 Since the automobile
was permanently kept in Kentucky, which is also the forum, there
was no reason for displacement of the forum's law.
For Professor Currie this is the classic case of the false conflict,
the case where only one state has an interest in the application of
its law. In such a case, the court "should apply the law of the
only interested state."333 The purpose of the Indiana guest statute
would be to protect Indiana insurers, that is, insurers of auto-
mobiles garaged in Indiana. Indiana insurance rates will be based
on loss experience of drivers resident in Indiana or a particular
part of Indiana.334 Only the state where the insured is resident and
the vehicle is kept has an interest in protecting the insurer from
such suits and thereby possibly reducing insurance rates (at least
to the extent that recoveries by guests against hosts will not figure
in the loss experience of insureds in that state). That state is
Kentucky rather than Indiana, so the law of Kentucky should be
applied on the issue of guest-host liability.
Professor Cavers stresses the necessity of "separating the issue
of host-guest immunity from any issue regarding the tortiousness
330 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 308, at 580.
331 Id. at 580-81.
332 Professor Morris has demonstrated rather persuasively that the existence
of a guest statute as such does not have actuarial significance; rates will be affected
only by the incidence of guest host claims, and if there is a pattern of travel
from a guest statute state into a non-guest statute state, loss experience will re-
flect this fact. See Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The
Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALs L. J. 554, 574-77 (1961). Professor Ehrenz-
weig concedes that the insurer does not calculate the premium with reference to
the existence or absence of a guest statute. A. EHIRENZwEI, supra note 308, at 581.
Moreover, he also admits that the guest does not take out first person insurance
because of the existence of a guest statute. Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v.
Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1243, 1246 n. 18 (1963). Rather his position is that
insurability considerations furnish the basis of the "true rule."
338 Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLubm. L. R-v. 1233,
1242 n. 42 (1963).
334 See Morris, supra note 332, at 567-69.
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of the host-driver's conduct, and of identifying the policies rele-
vant to host-guest immunity." 3 5 Upon an analysis of the respective
policies in this fact-law situation, it is clear that the state of injury
has no interest in applying its policy. He also views this as a false
conflict case and one in which there is no reason for the forum to
displace its law.
The Kentucky Court likewise viewed Wessling as presenting
a false conflict. The following language is significant:
In the present case appellant and appellee were residents of
and domiciled in this state. The automobile trip was initiated
here. By fortuitous circumstances the accident happened on
the other side of the Ohio River instead of on this side. The
suit was brought in this state. It would be strange if under
Kentucky law the respective rights of the parties should
undergo some metamorphosis at a point on the bridge just
before reaching the Indiana shore. -
While it might be said that Indiana has a policy of pro-
tecting drivers on their highways from claims by passengers,
surely this must extend no further than an interest in pro-
tecting Indiana residents or those who sue in Indiana
courts.336 No highway safety problem is involved. In fact the
State of Indiana has no interest whatsoever in this Ken-
tucky lawsuit and it is hard to discern what interest a Ken-
tucky court would be promoting by applying the Indiana
law.
All of the interests involved (other than the fortuitous place
of the accident) are Kentucky interests. The guest passenger's
right of action against the driver will be determined by Ken-
tucky law, the law of the state in which both are domiciled
and to which they intended to and did return.
337
The Court went on to say that it was against Kentucky's "public
policy" to take away the right to recovery for a negligent act,
citing Ludwig v. Johnson.A-8 However, the "public policy" tech-
nique is being confused with considerations of policy. The point
is that it is Kentucky's policy-as reflected in its Constitution-
to permit recovery to all Kentucky plaintiffs where negligence has
336 Cavers, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLum. L. REv. 1219, 1221
(1963).
336 Presumably this means those defendants who are sued in Indiana courts.
Does this suggest a "procedural policy" against collusive suits, or does it suggest
Indiana insurers? The expression is unfortunate.
337 Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259, 260-61 (Ky. 1967).
338 243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).
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occurred, and this policy is no different when the accident
"happened on the other side of the river."
Of course, the opinion is not all that the author would like.
It is wished that the Court had treated the problem frankly as one
involving insurance considerations and recognized that Indiana
had no interest in protecting the Kentucky insurer.339 The
Restatement rule, with indications that it might have some ap-
plicability in Kentucky, should not have been discussed. 340 Finally,
the "public policy" technique was confused with realistic con-
siderations of policy. But this is cavilling. The basic law was
recognized as the law of the forum. The decision was limited to
the precise fact-law pattern, as in Clark v. Clark, and a new
"choice of law rule" was not adopted. The decision was based on
relevant policy considerations, with analysis of the policies of the
states involved and their interest in the application of their law and
policy to the particular issue presented. The Court concluded
that only the forum had an interest in having its law applied in
the fact-law pattern before it and, therefore, refused to displace
the forum's law. In so doing, it adopted a policy-centered ap-
proach to the solution of conflicts problems and proceeded in
accordance with the method of judicial decision. The decision,
along with Clark v. Clark, serves to illustrate the concept of
judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of laws.341
339 
The insurance considerations were frankly discussed in Kopp v. Rechzigel,
273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222
A.2d 205 (1966); and Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408
(1965).
340 But this appears to be unavoidable. Courts, looking for "authority," can
often find support from the Restatement in a "false conflicts case. Note that in
Baits v. Balts, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966), the forerunner of Kopp v.
Rechzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966), and in Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26
Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965), the court adopted the Restatement
"rule." The Restatement was also cited as "authority" in the Clark case.
341 After the final draft of this article was completed, I discovered the
recent New Jersey case of Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625
(1967). This opinion likewise furnishes an example of judicial method and the
policy-centered conflict of laws. In holding that the Ohio Guest Statute would
not be applied in a suit between New Jersey residents injured in Ohio, the court
limited its holding to the precise fact-law pattern presented. It discussed the
views of various policy-centered commentators, noting that while each had dif-
ferent reasons, all would reach the same conclusion. It quoted the Restatement
rule, of course, but did not expressly adopt it. It considered the interests of both
states, stressing insurance considerations, and concluded that the case presented
a false conflict. The same court has also held that its law of spousal immunity
governed in a suit between New Jersey spouses involved in an accident in
another state before they were married. Koplik v. C. P. Trucking Corp., 27
N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958).
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VI. GUEST STATUTES IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:
THE PERSPECTIVE OF JUDICIAL METHOD
We have now come full circle. If all the events had occurred in
Kentucky, this would have been a simple case: there would have
been a trial on the merits under Kentucky substantive law. The
case was "complex" only because the accident occurred in Indiana,
and because in previous cases the Court had committed itself to
a "system of rules" approach to the solution of conflicts problems.
The approach now adopted demonstrates that the case is no less
"simple" because the accident occurred in Indiana, since as to
the issue of host-guest immunity, when viewed from the stand-
point of considerations of policy, that fact becomes irrelevant.
342
The interest of Kentucky in the application of its law is no dif-
ferent than if the case were purely domestic, so in the fact-law
pattern presented, the law of the forum should not be dis-
placed.3 4
3
The Court has performed its function when a decision has
been rendered on whether the law of the forum should be dis-
placed in the fact-law pattern presented. If experience is any guide,
this is likely to be the only kind of fact-law pattern that will come
342 It is hoped that this word can come to replace "fortuitous," a favorite of
courts and teachers alike. It is not "fortuitous" that the accident occurred in
Indiana. Had the parties not been driving there at the time, the accident would
not have "happened." The same accident, in all probability, would not have
occurred in Kentucky.3 4 3 An analysis of the "leading" conflicts cases of recent years will reveal that
many of them presented false conflicts. These are the cases that involve an
automobile accident between two residents of the forum in another state, usually
riding in the same vehicle, and perhaps related to each other. Liability exists
under the law of the forum, but not under the law of the place of injury. The
forum applies its own law imposing liability because it has an interest in doing
so, and because the state of injury has no interest in applying its policy of im-
munity. Cases falling into this category would include: Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.
2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955) (parental immunity); Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal.
2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survival of actions); Fabricus v. Horgen, 257
Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965) (capacity to sue and measure of damages
for wrongful death); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d
365 (1957) (Dram Shop Act); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d
130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959) (spousal immunity). Some of these cases have had
counterparts. By the same token, where the forum has had no interest, it has
applied the law of the only interested state. See, e.g., McGinty v. Ballentine
Produce, 241 Ark. 533, 408 S.W.2d 891 (1966) (refusal to apply forum law
where automobile accident occurred in Missouri, plaintiff was resident there, and
defendant, an Arkansas corporation, did business in Missouri during the course
of which the accident arose); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, 357 F.2d 581
(D.C.Cir. 1965) (New York parties injured in District of Columbia, New York
statute imposing vicarious liability on former owner who failed to change
registration of vehicle applied).
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before the Kentucky courts. But there may be others, and in such
cases the prior decision will serve as a precedent. If the ratio
decidendi is equally applicable to the new fact-law pattern, the
precedent will be extended. If not, the precedent will be dis-
tinguished, and a new one established. Thus, a "common law of
conflicts" will develop.
In considering the application of the precedent to other fact-
law patterns involving guest statutes so as to further demonstrate
the operation of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict
of laws, the academic prerogative of "rewriting" the Wessling
opinion will be exercised, and then applied to different fact-law
patterns. The author would have set forth the following limited
"principle," or if you wish "rule," 344 had he written the opinion:
At the present time the purpose of a guest statute is to pro-
tect the insurer against collusive suits by the guest against
the host, the nominal defendant. Kentucky's policy-as
reflected in the Constitution-is to permit full recovery by
the guest and not to extend this immunity to the insurer.
Indiana's policy is to the contrary. The only state interested
in providing immunity to the insurer is the state where the
insurance relationship exists, that is, the state where the auto-
mobile is kept and where the insured driver resides. If no im-
munity is given under the law of that state the insurer is not
entitled to immunity. Since the automobile is kept in Ken-
tucky, Kentucky is the only state having an interest in pro-
viding immunity and it has not done so. Therefore, the law
of Kentucky will not be displaced, notwithstanding that the
accident occurred in Indiana.
If no immunity is given by the law of the state where the in-
surance relationship exists, that is, the state where the insured
automobile is kept, the insurer is not entitled to immunity. The
reason for the "rule" is that only that state has any interest in
immunizing the insurer. The insurance relationship was entered
into there, the automobile is kept there, and the allowance of
recovery would only affect insurance rates there and not in the
state of injury. Since the plaintiff was a Kentucky resident, Ken-
344 "But lawyers are a rule-making sect." Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-
of-Law Process, 47 Hnv. L. REv. 193 (1933). "Rules" will emerge from con-
flicts cases as from all others. To achieve desired fledbility we tend to refer to
them as "principles." The terminology does not matter. The important thing is
that courts do not resort to broad generalizations and a priori rules.
[Vol. 56,
BABcoCK V. JACKSON iN KENTUCKY
tucky's interest in providing compensation for him should be
stressed. Its policy is to provide such compensation, even against
a host, and the interest is the same irrespective of where he was
injured. Moreover, the Kentucky host had insured against liability
to his guest.
Having "rewritten" the opinion, its application as a precedent
to other fact-law patterns involving guest statutes will be con-
sidered, as well as the results favored in such cases by Professors
Ehrenzweig, Currie, and Cavers. All will be approached from the
perspective of judicial method. To borrow a leaf from Professor
Currie, the following fact patterns will be charted. 345 In all cases,
suit is brought in Kentucky.
Residence of Residence of
Plaintiff Defendant
Case No. and Situs of Automobile Place of Injury
1 ................................ I ...K.............. I
2 ................................ I .............K ............ K
3 ................................ K .............I ...... K
4 ............................. I ... ... .I ........... K
5 ................................ K .............I ...... I
Number one involves what Professor Currie calls the "un-
provided for case. '"34" Indiana is the state with an interest in allow-
ing recovery to the injured plaintiff, who is a resident of that
state and was injured there. If he does not recover, there is the
danger that he and his family will suffer deprivation. Moreover,
he may have incurred hospital and medical expenses to Indiana
creditors, and perhaps if he does not recover, they will not be
paid.347 But Indiana's policy is not to allow recovery against a
host, and a state's interest must be defined with reference to its
policy as expressed in its law. Thus, Indiana law does not provide
for recovery here, although it would have an interest in allowing
recovery.
Kentucky, on the other hand, would have an interest in im-
munizing the Kentucky insurer from suits by guests, but its
policy is not to do so. From the standpoint of governmental
interests, neither state has an interest in the application of its
law. Professor Currie would say that Kentucky should apply Ken-
345 See, e.g., the table in B. CuRIUm, supra note 328, at 84.
346 Id. at 152-53.
347 Id. at 366.
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tucky law, since it should not discriminate against out-of-state
claimants. It allows a Kentucky plaintiff to recover against a Ken-
tucky defendant where the accident occurred in Indiana and
would not discriminate against an Indiana plaintiff also injured
in Indiana. To do so, he submits, would raise serious constitu-
tional questions. 34s Moreover, Indiana has no general policy
against allowing recovery to injured plaintiffs when they are in-
jured while a guest in an automobile. Since an Indiana automobile
is not involved, Indiana's restrictive policy in the host-guest
situation is inapplicable, and its general policy favoring recovery
would come into play. For these reasons Kentucky law should
apply.
Professor Ehrenzweig would also say that Kentucky should
apply its own law. He is looking to the law of the place where
the automobile is kept and insured, i.e., Kentucky. The host
would take out insurance to cover his guest; an Indiana guest
riding with a Kentucky host would not feel the need to take out
accident insurance. 349 This case does not come within Professor
Cavers' principles of preference, since they are applicable only to
true conflicts, and this case involves essentially a negative conflict,
since neither state has any interest in the application of its law.
He would probably classify this case as one where any conflict
could be readily avoided, and probably for the same reason as
Professor Currie. At any rate, all would agree that Kentucky law
should not be displaced by the Kentucky court.
This is also an easy case in light of the holding of Wessling v.
Paris and the ratio decidendi (as contained in the "rewritten
opinion"). The holding or "rule" was that if no immunity is given
by the law of the state where the insurance relationship exists, the
insurer is not entitled to immunity. That holding is, therefore,
applicable and the precedent thereby is extended whenever we
have a Kentucky defendant. So, it would also furnish the basis for
decision in case two. The important state, in light of the policy
behind the enactment of guest statutes, is the state where the
insurance relationship exists rather than the state of the plaintiff's
residence or the state of injury. The forum should not discrimi-
nate against out-of-town residents, whether injured in the forum
348 Id. at 152-55. See generally id. at Chapter 10.
349 A. EmRENZWmG, supra note 308, at 580-81.
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or elsewhere. Only the state of the insurance relationship has any
interest in providing immunity, and any principle must be applied
evenly. So, whenever the fact pattern in a guest statute case has
a Kentucky resident as defendant (and this means a Kentucky
insured automobile), Kentucky law should not be displaced.
Wessling can be extended under ordinary principles of stare
decisis and provide the basis for solution in cases one and two.
It is clear that the holding in Wessling and this aspect of the
ratio decidendi will be inapplicable in cases three, four, and
five because each has an Indiana defendant (and an Indiana in-
surance relationship). Remember that the rewritten holding was
with reference to the fact-law pattern there presented, and more
importantly, a choice of law rule was not enunciated. The holding
was not that host-guest immunity was governed by the law of
the state of the insurance relationship; 350 rather the state of the
insurance relationship could provide immunity and if it did not,
the defendant was not entitled to such immunity. The fact-law
situation wherein immunity existed under the law of the state of
the insurance relationship, but not under the law of the state of
injury, was not presented, and in the common law tradition,
decision on that question is reserved until such a case arises.
Since the accident occurred in Kentucky, and since the tradi-
tional rule was that liability was governed by the law of the place
of occurrence, Indiana law should first be scrutinized to determine
whether there was a conflict of laws in the sense that that term is
used here. If Indiana would apply the traditional rule or adopt
the center of gravity rule causing it to look to the place of
accident, and apply Kentucky law, the conflict would be avoided.
This is equally true in cases two and four. The court could take
the position that since it was the defendant who was relying on
Indiana law, the burden was on him to show that Indiana would
not apply Kentucky law there. On the other hand, courts may
be unwilling to rest their decision on this basis and ignore the
second proposition unless persuaded that the other state would
clearly apply the law of the forum. Assume that the Kentucky
Court would not base its decision on the fact that Indiana would
3
!0 Cf. RESTATENCENT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 390g (Tent.
Draft No. 8, 1963). "In accordance with the rule of § 379, whether one member
of a family is immune from tort liability to another member of the family is
determined by the local law of the state of their domicile."
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apply Kentucky law. Further, assume that the Kentucky Court
concludes that Indiana's position would be the converse of the
position taken in Wessling: if the defendant has immunity under
the law of the state of the insurance relationship, he will be im-
mune notwithstanding that he lacked such immunity under the
law of the place of injury. It would now be necessary to decide
whether the law of the forum should be displaced.
Professors Ehrenzweig and Currie would disagree. The former
would argue that Kentucky law should be displaced. He would
look to the law of the state where the insured automobile is per-
manently kept, since this is the law whose application the host
and guest should anticipate.
If the car is permanently kept in a state which has enacted a
guest statute, the host could arrange his protection with a
view to that statute without fear of being subjected to a
broader liability in a common-law state. And the prospective
guest, aware of his limited protection, could be expected to
purchase his own accident insurance.351
Professor Currie, however, would see this as a true conflict of
governmental interests, which could not be avoided by a "more
moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of
one state." Kentucky's policy is that the guest should recover for
his injuries, and it obviously has a real interest in applying that
policy in favor of a Kentucky plaintiff injured in Kentucky.
Indiana's policy is that the host and his insurer should be im-
munized, and it likewise has a real interest in applying that
policy to Indiana hosts and insurers wherever the accident oc-
curred. His position is that neither court can decide that the
interest of the other state "outweighs" its own, so that where
there is a true conflict of governmental interests, each state must
apply its own law. 352 Since Kentucky has this interest, its law
should not be displaced.
Professor Cavers would resolve the conflict under his principles
of preference in favor of Kentucky law.
Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher
standard of conduct or of financial protection against injury
351 A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 308.
352 See the discussion in B. CutRm, supra note 328, at 181-82. It may be
said with fairness that Professor Currie stresses no point more than this one.
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than do the laws of the state where the person causing the
injury acted or had his home, the laws of the state of injury
should determine the standard and the protection applicable
to the case, at least where the person injured was not so re-
lated to the person causing the injury that the question
should be regulated to the law governing their relation-
ship.35
3
Here Professor Cavers stresses the interest of the state where the
injury occurred in maintaining physical and financial protection
for persons injured there. His "relationship" exception will be
discussed in the next example. While this would not seem to be
particularly significant in this case, let us assume the host-guest
relationship was created in Kentucky. In this case, Professor
Cavers would hold Kentucky law applicable.
Under the approaches of Professors Ehrenzweig and Cavers,
it would be expected that Indiana and Kentucky would reach the
same result: the former would say that both should apply Indiana
law; the latter that both should apply Kentucky law. Professor
Currie's approach would admit of Indiana applying Indiana law
and Kentucky applying Indiana law. Actually, what Indiana
should do does not concern the author, since no attempt is being
made to formulate an "approach to the solution of conflicts prob-
lems," but only to demonstrate the application of judicial method.
Therefore, the approach is solely from the standpoint of the Ken-
tucky Court, where the suit was filed.354
In the rewritten opinion of Wessling the absence of immunity
under the law of Kentucky was stressed, the basis of the decision
being that only the states where the automobile was insured had
an interest in immunizing the host and the insurer. However,
Kentucky's policy-as reflected in its Constitution-to permit full
recovery by the guest and its interest in applying that policy for
the benefit of an injured Kentuckian was also discussed. While
this is dicta in the sense that it was not necessary for the decision
in the case, which turned on the absence of immunity, it may
serve as an indication of how Kentucky would decide a case with
a different fact-law pattern. Kentucky's interest in providing
-153 D. CAVERS, supra note 317, at 139.
354 And whose judgment, no matter how the case was decided, would have
to be recognized in Indiana. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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compensation for an injured resident plaintiff is clear, whether
injured in the state or elsewhere, and whether injured by a Ken-
tuckian or an Indianan. It is extremely unlikely that a passenger
would actually think in terms of taking out accident insurance,
and Professor Ehrenzweig would not dispute this. He contends
that the "true rule" is based on considerations of insurability.355
This is particularly true, since it is not unfair to subject the
defendant and his insurer to Kentucky law when the accident
occurred here. This much of the territorial concept is embodied
in our concept of "fairness."3 56 The defendant is insured against
liability wherever the accident occurs, and the insurer can expect
that an accident may occur in a state having a higher standard of
liability than the state in which the automobile is insured. This is
the case of the true conflict of interest, and the Kentucky forum
should not displace its own law. It is submitted that what Indiana
would do is not important, and as a practical matter, this question
will not arise since the defendant is subject to suit in Kentucky
under its non-resident motorist statute.3 57 The following holding,
therefore, is formulated: where a Kentucky plaintiff is injured in
Kentucky by a non-resident from a guest statute state, the Ken-
tucky law allowing recovery should not be displaced.
Thus, Kentucky law should not be displaced whenever: (1)
the defendant is a Kentucky resident and his automobile is in-
sured there, and (2) the plaintiff is a Kentucky resident injured in
Kentucky. Under this approach, recovery is allowed to a Kentucky
plaintiff against an Indiana defendant, and to an Indiana plain-
tiff against a Kentucky defendant. While there may be "dis-
crimination" in favor of the application of the law of the forum,
there is none in favor of Kentuckians against Indianans.
Case four is the most troublesome to the author. It is readily
distinguishable from number three because the plaintiff is a non-
resident, and Kentucky's interest is not that strong. It is not likely
that an Indianan injured in Kentucky will be unable to get back
365 Ehrenzweig, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLmi. L. REV. 1243,
1246 (1963). He contends that "the fact that the potential traffic victim does not
usually calculate his risk and plan his insurance program accordingly hardly
detracts from the consideration that he can fairly be made to bear the conse-
quences of not doing so." A. EHRnszwnvc, supra note 308, at 575.
356 See the discussion in D. CAVRs, supra note 317, at 140-41.
357KY. REv. STAT. §§ 188.010-.070 (1962).
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into Indiana and thereby become a "public charge" in Ken-
tucky.358 On the other hand, there are some similarities. The
Indiana plaintiff injured in Kentucky may have incurred medical
and hospital expenses to Kentucky creditors, and they may not
receive payment unless he is able to recover from the defendant. 35 9
Furthermore, he was injured in Kentucky, and it is recognized
that all states have an interest in providing recovery for a person
:injured there as a part of its policy of protecting people injured
within its boundaries. 360 The fact remains, however, that its
interest is not the same as where the plaintiff is a resident.
Professor Ehrenzweig would displace the law of the forum
since the vehicle was permanently kept in Indiana. In theory, the
Indiana host would not procure liability insurance to protect his
guest, who, if he were concerned about protection, would pur-
chase his own accident insurance. How Professor Currie would
handle this case may be questioned. He has stressed the interest
of the place of injury in allowing recovery so that its residents
and institutions who furnished medical assistance to the accident
victim can be reimbursed. 361 In later writings, he developed the
principle that a "more moderate and restrained interpretation of
the policy or interest of one state" might avoid the conflict.
Whether he would say that Indiana could avoid the conflict by
holding that its policy of protecting the insurer was not applicable
to injuries occurring elsewhere or whether it would be Kentucky
that could avoid the conflict by holding that its policy allowing
recovery was inapplicable to out-of-state plaintiffs injured by a
defendant who is a resident of the same state, is open. However,
he would probably say that this conflict could not be avoided by
a more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or
interest of either state and, therefore, each should apply its own
law.
3 5
8 Cf. Pacific Em ployers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493 (1939). See also Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n
of California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935). The concern of the injured worker thirty
years ago may have been quite valid, and perhaps may even be valid today.
See B. CtRmUE, supra note 328, ch. 7. But it is reasonable to assume that the out-
of-state automobile victim will get back home-particularly if it was his host
vwho injured him.
Ir5 See B. Cutrnm, supra note 328, at 366.
360 See the discussion in D. CAvEns, supra note 317, at 143-45.
901 See B. CuRRiE, supra note 328, at 368-72.
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This case demonstrates very well Professor Cavers' principles
of preference approach. Here the state of injury set a higher
standard of protection than the state where the defendant had his
home..3 62 The law of that state would be applied unless the person
injured was so related to the person causing the injury that the
question should be regulated to the law governing their relation-
ship. Under his first tort principle, the higher standard of the
state of injury would govern, but under the fifth, if the case
should be governed by the law of the state of their relationship,
the lower standard of that state would be applied. He does not
generally favor the application of the fifth principle,363 and it is
clear that he would not favor its applicability in guest statute
cases. The principle of preference approach does represent a way
of solving this difficult case, and the arguments that Professor
Cavers puts forth in support of his first tort principle of pre-
ference are impressive. 3
64
If this case was decided from the perspective of the Kentucky
Court, prior decisions would be of little assistance. In Wessling
and cases one and two, it was held that if no immunity were
granted by the law of the state where the automobile was in-
sured, immunity would not be recognized. But here immunity
did exist under the law of that state. While the converse of the
proposition-immunity will be recognized if it exists under the
law of that state-does not necessarily follow, as in case three, the
result in that case was predicated upon Kentucky's strong interest
in providing compensation for its injured resident, a weaker
interest when a non-resident is involved. Assuming that the court
concludes that Indiana would decide the case in accordance with
Indiana law, a difficult choice of law question is presented.
The author's difficulty is not lessened by considering the views
of the commentators. That the guest could have taken out ac-
cident insurance is not persuasive, because the guest never thought
about this, and the decision should be based on practical realities
rather than on considerations of insurability. While the in-
surability factor when applied to enterprises is impressive, it
362 In that the state of injury would allow recovery for ordinary negligence
while the home state would allow recovery only if the conduct were "wanton or
wilful."
303 D. CAVERS, supra note 317, at 177.
364 Id. at 139-45.
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should not be employed in the case of individuals who are not
likely to insure. Professor Currie's governmental interest approach
is sound in many instances. His view, that in the case of a true
conflict, the forum should apply its own law seems to the author
to be a more acceptable solution that the proposal to decide in
accordance with principles of preference as suggested by Pro-
fessor Cavers. 365 Professor Currie's argument that a court cannot
"balance" conflicting interests is persuasive,36 6 and although this
is not the methodology employed, this appears to be what Pro-
fessor Cavers is doing with some of his principles of preference,
or more accurately, is the result of the application of those
principles. However, this is not the case that presents a conflict
between the approaches of these two commentators. Professor
Currie would probably say that there is a true conflict of interests
and, therefore, the forum should apply its own law, while Pro-
fessor Cavers would look to the place of injury under his first tort
principle of preference. However, both would ultimately agree
that Kentucky should apply its own law, and this is the point that
is most troublesome.
Somehow the instinctive reaction is that in this case the law
of the forum should be displaced.36 7 If Kentucky applies Kentucky
law when two Kentucky residents are injured in Indiana, it should
apply Indiana law when two Indiana residents are injured in
Kentucky. There is a difference in the two situations to be sure.
In the former case, no policy of Indiana would be served by ap-
plying Indiana law to deny recovery to the Kentucky plaintiff,
while in the latter, Kentucky's policy of providing compensation
for those injured in Kentucky would be affected by applying
Indiana law to deny recovery. But how seriously would it be
affected? Realistically, the kind of interest Kentucky has in allow-
ing recovery by the injured Indiana plaintiff is questionable. He
365 Perhaps this is because I studied Professor Currie's views before those of
Professor Cavers. Since I propose to approach a number of conflicts areas in future
writings from the perspective of judicial method, it is not necessary that I make
a "choice' between these views.
366 1 also think that I can distinguish between a more moderate and
restrained interpretation" and "balancing of interests," although I am not sure
how to articulate it. Suffice it to say that I think a court can identify a "true"
conflict of interests, and that in such a case it should apply its own low.367 But see Kell v. Henderson, 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1965),
aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966), where a New York court
applied New York law in such a case.
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will "get back across the river," and will not become a "public
charge" in Kentucky. 368 Perhaps, what we are trying to say is that
Kentucky's interest is more theoretical than real. Although this
interest is sufficient to justify Kentucky's constitutionally applying
its own law,3 69 that is not the end of the matter. In a federal
system, it is vitally necessary that one state recognize and accom-
modate the interests of other states. While a choice of law sym-
metry is not being advocated, it does seem that if Kentucky ap-
plies Kentucky law to a suit involving two Kentuckians injured
in Indiana, recognition of the interests of sister states requires
that Kentucky apply Indiana law to a suit involving two Indianans
injured in Kentucky.
As a practical matter, the injured plaintiff is Indiana's concern.
Kentucky's interest in providing compensation for its medical
creditors does not seem important enough to justify application of
Kentucky law. The primary purpose of permitting recovery by a
host against a guest is not to reimburse the medical creditors of
the plaintiff; it is to make the plaintiff "whole," particularly when
damages for pain and suffering are included, and the amount of
medical recovery forms a small part of the award.37 0 If the basis
of recovery was a statute rather than a common law rule, could it
be said that a purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute
was to guarantee recovery by medical creditors?371 This is most
doubtful. The same reasoning is applicable, i.e., the portion of the
award allocated to medical expenses usually forms too small a
part of the total compensation to be significant.
Moreover, regardless of whether the defendant's home state
has a guest statute, there is a good possibility that the host would
have medical payments coverage, which is becoming much more
common.3 7 2 The availability of medical payments coverage would
368 See the discussion, note 357 supra, and accompanying text.
369 Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
370 See Professor Currie's concern on tls point. B. CuRuri, supra note 328,
871 This would appear in the Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d
944 (1953), situation, where the cause of action survived under a statute of the
forum. When I posed this ei:ample to my class, a student replied, "But you told
us to consider the purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute, and the
purpose certainly wasn't to protect medical creditors, but to protect the injured
plaintiff." This is true and justified; it is very difficult to accept the "medical
creditors" rationale for the application of the law of the state of injury in this
situation.
372 See Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing Concept,
28 INs. CouNsEL J. 276 (1961), for a discussion of this type of insurance.
[Vol. 56,
BABcocK v. JACKSON iN KENTUcKY
lessen the interest of the forum in allowing recovery so that its
medical creditors could be reimbursed, since they could be re-
imbursed from the medical payments the guest would receive,
even if the guest himself did not carry first person medical in-
surance. If medical payments coverage is sold as part of an
"automobile insurance package" rather than as a separate in-
dorsement,373 it may be assumed that wherever there is liability
coverage-which gives rise to an issue as to the applicability of the
guest statute-there is medical payments coverage as well. Indiana
has determined that Indiana insurers should be protected against
claims by guests, and, for the most part, loss experience-and
resultant insurance rates-reflects an absence of coverage for guests.
This kind of case demands a "more moderate and restrained"
interpretation of the forum's interest or, looking to principles of
preference, one that should be governed by the law of the state
of relationship rather than the state of injury. Kentucky has no
real interest merely because the injury occurred here.
Applying Indiana law to this case in no way discriminates
against the Indiana plaintiff, although if a Kentucky plaintiff and
an Indiana defendant were involved, the Court would apply Ken-
tucky law. It is reasonable and non-discriminatory to give an out-
of-state plaintiff the same protection that his own law gives him
as against a resident of his home state. The Kentucky plaintiff
receives protection against an Indiana defendant while the Indi-
ana plaintiff does not. This is because the Court limits each plain-
tiff to the protection afforded him by his own law.3 74 To deny an
Indiana plaintiff recovery against a Kentucky defendant while
allowing it to the Kentucky plaintiff would be discriminatory
against the Indiana plaintiff, because no interest of his home
state would be served by denying recovery.375 Recovery is denied
against an Indiana defendant, because Indiana, their home state,
has a strong interest in denying recovery. In the suit against the
Indiana defendant both the Kentucky plaintiff and the Indiana
373 Id. at 277-78.
374 If there is no objection to applying the "personal law" concept where
twvo Kentuckians are involved in an accident in Indiana, there should likewise be
no objection whcre two Indianans are involved in an accident in Kentucky.
37 See the discussion in B. CuRRiE, supra note 328, at 508. See also D.
CAVErS, Tim CaoIcE oF LAW PRocMss 144 (1965). A contrary result might well
violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and in the
ease of a resident of a sister state, the Privileges and Immunities clause as well.
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plaintiff are given the protection afforded by the laws of their
respective states.378
The author's result is the same as that Professor Ehrenzweig
would reach, although his rationale has been rejected,377 and op-
posite from the results of Professors Currie and Cavers, even
though some support for the conclusion is found in their theories.
This is not paradoxical and may represent an important point in
the analysis of judicial method. It is not the function of a court
to "adopt" the theory and approach of Professor Ehrenzweig,
Professor Currie, Professor Cavers, or any other commentator;
rather, it should decide whether the law of the forum will be
displaced in a particular case. In making the decision, past pre-
cedents must be considered in accordance with principles of
stare decisis, and guidance may be found in the writings of the
commentators. The decision must be based on the court's view as
to what is the sound result with respect to the particular fact-law
pattern before it rather than on theoretical consistency. Thus,
where two residents of a state with a guest statute are involved
in an accident in Kentucky, Kentucky law will be displaced.
The rationale of the decision would be applicable to future
cases involving parties from another state who had an accident in
Kentucky, where immunity existed under the law of their home
state. Kentucky's interest in providing compensation in such
cases is minimal and it should defer to the immunity policy of
the home state. Where spouses from a state in which spousal
immunity was recognized were involved in a Kentucky accident,
the claim of immunity should be upheld.378 But the decision
376 This is not a case of persons "needing special protection," on which basis
Professor Currie finds justifiable a reference to the law of the plaintiff's home
state. B. CuruuE, supra note 328, at 524-25. Nonetheless, the classification is
reasonable, since it is designed to give effect to the policy of a sister state in a
case where the forum has no real interest in applying its protective policy.
377This is true to the extent that his rationale is based on considerations of
insurability. Nonetheless, I agree with Professor Ehrenzweig to the extent that he
sees the problem as basically one of insurance. I would apply the law of the
state where the automobile is insured in this case, because there is no real interest
on the part of the state of injury. Where, however, the injured plaintiff is a
Kentuckian, I would conclude that Kentucky must prefer its own interest in
providing compensation over Indiana's interest in protecting its insurer. The fact
that I conceive the problem to be one of insurance insofar as the granting of
immunity is concerned does not mean that the law of the state where the auto-
mobile is insured should necessarily be applied in all cases.378 See Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966), where the
court held that as to Massachusetts spouses injured in New Hampshire, Mas-
(Continued on next page)
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would not be precedent for cases in which the fact-law pattern
gave rise to different policy considerations.
Suppose that a husband and wife are domiciled in a state that
recognized spousal immunity, including immunity for the in-
fliction of intentional torts. While they are vacationing in Ken-
tucky, the husband beats the wife unmercifully, throws her un-
conscious form into the automobile, and returns at break-neck
speed to the home state. The wife sues him in Kentucky to recover
for her injuries, obtaining personal service there. Kentucky law
should not be displaced. This is an admonitory tort, and Kentucky
is obviously trying to deter such conduct by allowing recovery
for the battery, including punitive damages.37 9 The strong interest
of the place of acting in applying its law to govern admonitory
torts cannot be doubted.380 There may be a conflict between the
interest of the domicile in providing immunity and the place of
acting in controlling conduct that occurred there, and this is the
clearest case where the forum must prefer its own governmental
interest. With a view toward relevant policy considerations and
the precise fact-law pattern presented, Kentucky should displace
its law in the case of the automobile accident but not in the case
of the intentional tort.381
In case five, the Kentucky plaintiff was injured by the Indiana
defendant in Indiana. This is improbable, since the defendant is
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
sachusetts law providing spousal immunity would be applied. I am assuming that
the state of the marital domicile would apply its own law. See Wartell v.
Formusa, 34 M11. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa.
86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966). On the other hand, if that state would allow the suit,
applying Kentucky law, i.e., it still followed the lex loci delicti rule, the Kentucky
Court should also allow the suit, since there is no "conflict of laws." The question
of spousal immunity inter se must be distinguished from the question of con-
tribution against the spouse. If the accident occurred in Kentucky, and the other
party were a Kentuckian, Kentucky should apply its own law with respect to
contribution against joint tortfeasors, including a non-resident spouse who enjoyed
immunity under the law of his home state. See LaChance v. Service Trucking Co.,
215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963). But see Haynie v. Hanson, 16 Wis. 2d 299, 114
N.W.2d,443 (1962), where the court failed to perceive this distinction.
379 "Since battery usually is a matter of the worst kind of intentions, it is
a tort which frequently justifies punitive damages." W. PRossEa, LAw OF TORTS
34 (3d ed. 1964).
3 8 0 Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in Intentional Multistate Torts, 36
MINN. L. Rnv. 1 (1951).
381 This again points out the distinction between the "jurisdiction-selecting"
rules of the Restatement Second and the policy-centered approach. The Re-
statement requires the application of the law of the marital domicile in all cases.
REsTATEMNT (SEcoND) OF THE CONFLcT OF LAWS § 390g (Tent. Draft No.
8, 1963).
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a non-resident and the tort occurred outside of Kentucky.28 2 But
under our present law of transient jurisdiction, the case could
arise if the defendant were personally served in Kentucky. It will
be evident that the fact-law pattern may not be complete, for it
has not been stated where the host-guest relationship was formed,
and in this case, that factor may be significant. Suppose that the
plaintiff was visiting in Indiana, met the defendant there casually,
and was offered a ride from one point in Indiana to another.
While Kentucky's interest in providing compensation for the
Kentucky plaintiff is no different from other cases where a Ken-
tucky plaintiff is also involved, it is doubtful if Kentucky could
constitutionally apply its law in this case. That much of the ter-
ritorial principle remains, i.e., a state may not apply its law to
govern liability for events occurring elsewhere on the sole ground
that the plaintiff is a resident of that state. The defendant did
nothing in Kentucky, and while the concept of "consent to
legislative jurisdiction 383 may be questionable, the causing of in-
jury to a Kentucky resident in Indiana is not a sufficient "contact"
to justify Kentucky in applying its law to this case.384
Suppose, however, that the Indiana defendant had by pre-
arrangement come to Kentucky to take the Kentucky plaintiff to
Indiana and back again to Kentucky. Although the accident may
have occurred in Indiana, it would now seem that Kentucky has
sufficient "contact" with the transaction so as to make it reasonable
and, therefore, constitutional for Kentucky to apply its own law.
This example demonstrates that it is not always possible to neatly
categorize fact-law patterns. In the guest statute situation factors
other than the residence of the parties and the place of injury may
be relevant. This is all the more reason for a case-by-case analysis
of whether the law of the forum should be displaced, or, in a rare
case, constitutionally may have to be displaced 385
382 This precludes the taking of jurisdiction under the non-resident motorist
statute.383 Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 F. 2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934).
3841 am not aware of any tort case where the forum tried to apply its law
on this basis, i.e., where nothing happened in the forum, but the plaintiff was a
forum resident.
385 Professor Currie has contended that the results of Supreme Court cases
indicate that whenever the forum has an interest in applying its own law, it may
constitutionally do so. B. CumuE, SELECrED EssAYs ON TIE CONFLIcrr OF LAWS
271 (1963). However, he has not explored the question of "whether the power
of an interested state to apply its law is qualified if the party adversely affected
(Continued on next page)
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VII. SoME FURTHER NoTEs ON JUDICIAL METHOD AND THE
POLICY-CENTERED CONFLICT OF LAWS
By these examples, an attempt has been made to demonstrate
the application of judicial method to the solution of conflicts
problems with reference to considerations of fairness and policy.
This was done in Wessling v. Paris and Clark v. Clark. It is not
necessary nor desirable to formulate "rules of universal applica-
tion." Conflicts cases are sufficiently few in number that a sound
decision can be made with reference to the fact-law pattern of the
particular case which can serve as a starting point for judicial
reasoning when a later case arises.
Under a policy-centered approach, the law of the forum quite
frequently will not be displaced, because in many cases the forum
will have a real interest in the application of its law. This will be
even more true when jurisdiction is based on more realistic
factors than transient presence within the forum. The application
of the law of the forum can be anticipated at least in tort cases. It
is important to remember that the vast majority of significant
conflicts cases in recent years have been cases where tort recovery
was sought. This may be a result of the advent of the automobile
and the interstate highway, for even in purely domestic cases,
personal injury litigation exceeds all other by far. While the
policy-centered approach-and the resulting emphasis on the ap-
plication of the law of the forum-is not limited to tort cases, it is
in those cases where it is most significant. Of all the jurisdiction-
selecting rules spawned by the vested rights theory, the lex loci
delicti has been the most unsound and the one most frequently
avoided by the use of manipulative techniques. Also, it is in tort
cases that social and economic policies most frequently come into
play, and the policies of the different states may conflict.
Moreover, in tort cases, rarely can it be said that there was
reliance on the law of a particular state or even on legal rules at
all. For this reason, courts have not hesitated to overrule lex loci
delicti holdings because of "reliance on settled law," 386 just as
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
has not in some fashion 'subjected' himself to that law." Id. at 266, n. 294. If
there is a qualification, it may not be in terms of "subjection," but some concept
of "contact' remains to limit the application of forum law solely on the basis of
"interest." The unlikelihood of such a case arising, as our example indicates,
makes further inquiry questionable.
386 See note 179 upra.
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there has been little hesitation to radically alter substantive
principles of tort liability.38 7 Even where there may have been
reliance on settled rules, injustice can be avoided by prospective
overruling.388 Since tort litigation itself is perhaps the most
"policy-centered," it is there that the forum will be most reluctant
to displace its own law.
The application of the policy-centered approach in fields such
as contracts and property, where reliance on settled law and the
need for certainty is more significant, raises different questions. In
these areas there may be a policy common to all states of pro-
tecting the legitimate expectations of the parties, and this policy,
coupled with considerations of fairness, may require the displace-
ment of the law of the forum more frequently. 38 9 But even here,
"rules" cannot be a substitute for judicial consideration of the
problem presented in the particular case. Past decisions represent
the "law," the application of which can be anticipated by the
parties until changed. Changes will have to be made with reference
to possible reliance on past practice, but how often such reliance
can be shown is questionable. If law represents "a prophecy of
what the court will do in fact," 390 lawyers will have to make this
prediction in conflicts cases as in all others. Because conflicts cases
are still relatively few in number, abandonment of a "rules ap-
proach" will not seriously affect the fabric of commercial and
contractual relations. Whatever uncertainty results is preferable
to the perpetuation of an unsound approach to the solution of all
conflicts problems.
One more observation on the policy-centered approach as it
relates to the displacement of the forum's law should be made
because it becomes relevant in a particular fact-law pattern which
has caused some concern to courts. The controversy over the
enactment of wrongful death statutes391 led to a "compromise" in
387 As with products liability, for example. The modem "law" of products
liability can be said to be a development of the last ten years.
388 See Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966), where the
court overruled the substantive doctrine of parental immunity prospectively, but
the prospective overruling was not extended to the conflicts question.
389 See note 320 supra. To the extent that courts recognize the principle of
party autonomy, the law of the forum may be displaced more frequently,
particularly where the forum is a "weak" state in the commercial sense.
390 Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAnv. L. REv. 457, 460-61 (1897).
391 Professor Currie suggests that "doubt and fear" about the new remedy
may have been the reason for the prohibition against suits on wrongful deaths
(Continued on next page)
[Vol. 56,
BABcocK v. JACKSON IN KENTUCKY
some states by which limitations, which have become quite un-
realistic in view of present-day awards, were placed on the amount
recoverable. 9 2 The problem arises when an airplane crashes in a
state which has such a limitation, and suit is brought in the state
of the decedent, whose law does not contain the limitation. Some
courts have used a "grouping of contacts" approach, stressing
that the journey began in the forum, the decedent was resident
there, and so forth, to justify the application of their wrongful
death statute rather than the statute of the place of injury. 93 How
ever, in some states, e.g., New York394 and Kentucky,39 5 the wrong-
ful death statute is not applicable where the death occurred out-
side the state. The plaintiffs must then recover under the foreign
wrongful death statute or not at all. The forum court, however,
is reluctant to accept the limitation imposed by the law of the
place of death, and the question is whether the court can allow
recovery under the foreign statute without including the foreign
limitation on recovery.
In this connection, the concept of the law of the forum as the
basic law is most helpful. Since the forum is only using foreign
law as a model for the rule of decision in the particular case, as
Cook long ago pointed out, it is not necessarily required to in-
corporate the whole law of the foreign state.396 Some of the law
of the foreign state can be used as a model to supplement the basic
law of the forum. In a case such as Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines,397 where New York refused to apply the limitation of Mas-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
occurring outside the state. Since at that time the forum resident could not have
been sued in the state of injury, he would be effectively immune to suit if his
homestate were to refuse to entertain the action. See B. CuRart, supra note 385,
at 302-307. Such restrictions have been held unconstitutional. Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951); First Nat'1 Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396
(1952).
392 Prior to 1959 the maximum amount of recovery in Massachusetts was
$15,000. It has been successively raised to $20,000, $30,000 and now $50,000.
At the time of the accident involved in the cases we are discussing it was
$15,000. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 229 (1966).393rriffith v. United Air Lines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964). See also
Long v. Pan-American World Airways, 16 N.Y. 2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796, 266
N.Y.S. 2d 513 (1965), in which a "disinterested third state" applied the law of
the decedent's home state, where the roundtrip ticket was purchased, rather than
the law of the state of injury.394 WvVhitford v. Panama R.R., 23 N.Y. 465, 8 N.Y.S. 466 (1861).
395 Murray's Adm'r v. Louisville & N. R.R., 132 Ky. 336, 110 S.W. 334
(1908).
396 Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YA.t:
L.J. 457, 480-85 (1924).
397 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.-2d 133 (1961).
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sachusetts to a suit by the beneficiaries of a New York decedent on
a flight originating from New York and crashing in Massachusetts
because it was against its "public policy" to do so,398 the result
may be explained on this basis.399 New York used the Massa-
chusetts wrongful death act as a model to determine the issue of
liability, but refused to incorporate as a model that portion
limiting recovery. 400 Since New York had a sufficient interest to
justify the application of its law in toto, and since the defendant
could not be said to have "relied" on the Massachusetts limita-
tion, 401 use of only part of the Massachusetts law as a model was
constitutional.
402
398The court also said that damages, which "went to the remedy," could be
classified as a matter of "procedure." This was subsequently repudiated in
Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E.2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1962).
399 See the discussion in Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Sub-
stance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 813, 828-30
(1962). In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962), involving
the same accident, Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, explained the result
on this basis:
"New York has done nothing more than to apply a traditional choice
of law rule which designates the law of Massachusetts as the source
of liability for a wrongful death. It has absorbed the Massachusetts
rule into the corpus of New York law for purposes of adjudicating this
case fairly .... We believe that in doing so New York is not bound to
model all of the rules governing this litigation in which it has a legitimate
interest, on Massachusetts law. We are convinced that New York may
examine each issue in the litigation ... and by weighing the contacts of
various states with the transaction, New York may, without interfering
with the Constitution, shape its rules controlling the litigation." 309
F.2d at 560-61.
400 Compare Slater v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). Suit was
brought in Texas by a Texas resident to recover damages resulting from a rail-
road accident that occurred in Mexico. Under Mexican law damages for personal
injuries were awarded by means of periodic payments subject to modification
upon changed circumstances. The court held that the forum could not apply the
Mexican law of liability without applying the Mexican law of damages, and since
it lacked the "judicial machinery" to award periodic payments, it could not award
damages at all. The opinion was written by Justice Holmes in accordance with
principles of vested rights. It is interesting to note that Cook, although criticizing
this approach, did not disagree with the result in Slater. He says that "it would be
unjust for the forum to create a right of a very different character." Cook, supra
note 394, at 480. But, then, perhaps we are "out-Cooking Cook," as we have
often done with our commentators, using their rationale to support a result
different from that which they would favor.
401 Since the defendant carried on its activities in a number of states which,
like New York, had no limitation, its insurance coverage would be based on un-
limited liability. It is also not likely that its pilots were instructed to "crash in
Massachusetts if at all possible." Compare, however, Holzer v. Deutsche Reichs-
bahn-Cesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798 (1938), where in a suit to re-
cover damages for breach of a contract made between a German national and a
German corporation in Germany and to be performed there, the plaintiff alleged
that to recognize the defense asserted would be against New York's "public
policy." The defendant pleaded that it discharged the plaintiff in obedience to
German law requiring the discharge of persons of non-Aryan descent. It would
(Footnote 401 continued on next page and footnote 402 on next page)
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Another case involving the use of part of the law of another
state as a model and part of the law of the forum to fashion the
rule of decision is Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store.40 3
Both Illinois and Michigan had Dram Shop Acts, making the
dispenser of liquor liable for harm caused by the sale of liquor to
intoxicated persons, 404 but both were applicable only where the
sale of liquor and the harm resulting from the sale occurred in
that state.405 The liquor was sold in Illinois, but the accident in-
juring the plaintiff occurred in Michigan. Strictly speaking, the
plaintiff could not recover under the statute of either state, not-
withstanding that if both the sale and harm had occurred in
Illinois or in Michigan he could have recovered.40s Suit was
instituted in Illinois, and the court quite properly allowed re-
covery on the theory that there was a "common law" action in
Michigan, the place of injury. It would have been sounder to say
that the forum could look to both the law of Illinois and Michi-
gan. The forum law was used to determine that the sale which
occurred there was wrongful and the Michigan law as a model to
hold the seller responsible for the harm that resulted from the
intoxication. Our notions of territoriality, reflected in the limited
scope of the statutes' applicability, may make this kind of mental
gymnastics necessary.
Nonetheless, this case demonstrates how the concept of the
law of the forum as basic law with the law of another state used
as a model, in whole or in part, for the rule of decision enables
the court to arrive at a sound result. Here both states had an
interest in allowing recovery: Illinois to regulate the conduct of
the Illinois liquor dispenser, and Michigan to provide compen-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
have been unfair to deprive the defendant of the defense valid,,(indeed required)
under German law, so the court could not "shape its rule, disregarding the
German law on this issue.
402 Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
401 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
404 ILL. REV. STAT. § 135, ch. 43 (1957); 13 MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.993-
18,1000 (1957).
405 Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512
(1950). The court in Waynick concluded that the Michigan statute likewise would
not be applicable where the sale took place in another state and the harm
occurred in Michigan. 269 F.2d at 324.
400 Cf. Marie v. Garrison, 13 Abb. N. Cas. 210 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1883),
where the court construed the Statute of Frauds of the state whose substantive
law governed as "procedural' and the Statute of Frauds of the forum as "sub-
stantive," and enforced a contract which was unenforceable under either state's
statute.
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sation for a person injured there.40 7 Since the defendant would be
liable if both the sale and injury occurred in either state, the
result should be no different where the sale occurred in one and
the injury in another.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has been the thesis of this paper that courts have abandoned
their accustomed method of judicial decision when presented with
a problem of the conflict of laws. Rather than proceed on a case-
by-case basis with reference to the fact-law pattern before them,
developing principles to be applied in future cases, a priori rules
have been applied based on a consistent theory as to the nature of
the conflict of laws. These rules were of a "jurisdiction-selecting"
kind and ignored realistic considerations of social and economic
policy so prevalent in other areas of law. The embodiment of
the rules approach is the Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, and
the Restatement Second which is based on the same approach, but
changes many of the "rules." The problems and undesirable re-
sults perpetuated by judicial acceptance of the original Restate-
ment will not be obviated by acceptance of Restatement Second;
it is the rules approach itself that is unsound, for it is antithetical
to the judicial method. Academic commentators have been de-
veloping policy-centered approaches to the solution of conflicts
problems. While each has stressed a particular "approach," there
is agreement that these problems should be solved by a considera-
tion of relevant social and economic policies and fairness to the
parties.
The choice that courts must make today is not between the
"few simple" rules approach of the original Restatement and the
"many complex" rules of the Restatement Second, but between the
rules approach and the policy-centered conflict of laws. Moreover,
courts must decide whether they are now willing to accept re-
sponsibility for the establishment of a body of conflicts law in
accordance with the traditional principles of judicial method. Past
judicial reluctance to deal realistically with conflicts cases may be
explained by the courts' sensitivity to the "political aspects" of
407 The defendant, doing business in both the states, would be aware of both
laws. If such liability could be insured against, presumably it would be insured
without regard to where the sale or harm occurred.
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choice of law among sovereign states. The "dismal swamp" of
conflicts law may be the result of this reluctance to discharge the
judicial function. There is evidence that this attitude is changing,
and the decision in Wessling v. Paris represents an assertion of
judicial responsibility.
The rules approach should be replaced by a policy-centered
conflict of laws, but it should be done in the context of judicial
method, by the decisions of courts in particular cases with re-
ference to the fact-law pattern presented therein. In time, in ac-
cordance with the normal workings of the common law system, a
body of modem conflicts law, policy-centered in nature, would
emerge. It is certainly possible and desirable to build on past
experience. Perhaps, as Professor Ehrenzweig suggests, the actual
results of past judicial decisions-as opposed to the rules en-
unciated-may have produced "true" choice of law rules. If so,
courts can examine the "soundness" of these rules in light of
modern conditions. These decisions may then be related to the
policy-centered conflict of laws approach. The views of the aca-
demic commentators, present and future, can also furnish a fruit-
ful source of guidance.408 The process of judicial decision in con-
flicts cases was well described by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court in Clark v. Clark:
This case is a comparatively easy one, and in cases like it the
result will hereafter be reasonably easy for lawyers and trial
judges to calculate. Admittedly there will be harder cases,
more difficult to decide, cases that will not yield sure answers
in terms of proper choice-influencing considerations as readily
as this case does. That will not be a new phenomenon in con-
flict of laws. Nor will it be as bad as choice based on mechan-
ical rules which do not take the relevant considerations into
account. In course of time perhaps we will develop 'prin-
ciples of preference' based upon relevant considerations, to
guide us more exactly (citing Cavers, The Choice of Law
Process). Most of the choice of law rules and results that
have been reached in the past were supported by good sense
408 The refusal of courts to accept a particular methodology enables them to
consider a wide variety of views. In view of the relatively few conflicts cases that
come before courts, the reliance on the views of academic commentators will
continue, and this is desirable. Perhaps we will arrive at what Professor Cavers has
called "a body of rules, principles and standards of a new sort, developing
through the workings of stare decisis and the combined efforts of courts and
scholars." D. CAvERs, supra note 875, at 78, referring to his forecast in A Critique
of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. ftV. 173, 196 1933).
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and sound practical analysis, and will not be affected by
reexamination in terms of the relevant choice-influencing con-
siderations.40 9 Some, like the place of injury rule for torts,
clearly will be affected. That is as far as this decision need
go.
410
The essential propositions of the analysis of judicial method
and the policy-centered conflict of laws will be briefly reviewed.
The first proposition is that the basic law is the law of the forum,
and that law will not be displaced absent valid reasons for such
displacement. This means that if no issue as to the application of
foreign law is raised or no proof of the content of foreign law is
introduced, the forum should apply its own law unless it is pre-
cluded from doing so by the express terms of its own statutory law
or by constitutional limitations if such exist.41 1 Moreover, since
the basic law is that of the forum, it follows that if foreign law
is used as a model, the forum is not required to use all of that law,
but may fashion a rule of decision based in part on the sub-
stantive law, of the forum and in part on relevant foreign law.
Second, there is only a conflict of laws where the result that would
be reached if the case were heard in the courts of the state whose
law is sought to be used as a model would be different than the
result that would be reached under the substantive law of the
forum. If the court of that state would decide the case in accord-
ance with the substantive law of the forum, the forum should not
even consider the displacement of its own law.
Where there is a conflict of laws, in the sense that term is used
here, the court should render a decision on displacement only
with reference to the fact-law situation presented in the particular
case. The decision in that case will operate as a precedent and
decisions in a number of cases will coalesce to form a body of
conflict law. The fourth and major proposition is that the law of
the forum should be displaced only where considerations of fair-
ness to the parties or proper recognition of the governmental
interests of another state so requires. Each case must be decided
from the standpoint of fairness and policy without regard to a
409 This is doubtful unless a distinction is drawn between "choice of law"
rules and "results."
410222 A.2d 205, 210 (1966).
411 Where neither party has introduced proof of foreign law, it is difficult
to see why it would be unconstitutional for the forum to apply its own law. But
if the forum is a "disinterested third state," such an interpretation is possible,
though undesirable.
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"system of rules" or a methodology favored by a particular com-
mentator. In areas of law where factors of "reliance" and "cer-
tainty" are present, the court must consider whether the law of
the forum should be displaced to protect the legitimate expecta-
tions of the parties. In the absence of these factors, displacement
will depend upon a consideration of the policies and interests of
the respective states. It will often be clear that only one state will
have any interest in the application of its law and policy to the
particular issue. Where both the forum and another state may be
said to have an apparent interest in the application of their law
and policy, the forum must resolve this "conflict of interest." Its
decision must be based on the factors that it considers relevant in
the particular fact-law pattern presented. These propositions are
the essence of judicial method and the policy-centered conflict of
laws.
The primary function of courts is to determine the rights and
liabilities of the parties before it. The vast majority of cases are
"domestic," and decision is rendered in accordance with the
forum's substantive law. In the relatively few cases that contain a
foreign element, threshold consideration may have to be given
to the displacement of the law of the forum and the use of the
law of another state as a model for the rule of decision in the case.
For most courts this process has been a "distasteful" one, and the
inherent "political implications" have deterred courts from follow-
ing the judicial method of decision. Instead they have substituted
a "system of rules" divorced from considerations of policy and
fairness. Courts must now return to the judicial method of de-
cision in conflicts cases as in all others, to develop a body of con-
flicts law by a series of decisions in actual cases. The frequency
and complexity of cases will vary from state to state, but when all
courts adopt the policy-centered approach, the results in conflicts
cases will be more uniform than when courts were allegedly ap-
plying uniform rules, but actually employing manipulative tech-
niques to avoid their effect.
The responsibility of the courts in the solution of conflicts
problems has been well-stated by a distinguished judge:
For some time to come, therefore, the main responsibility for
the rational development of conflict of laws is bound to re-
1967]
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main with the state courts.412 The responsible court will have
to be on its mettle. It must be prepared to reject unrealistic
rules, yet cautious enough not to make formulations that
reach too zealously into the future or give too zealous a scope
to local policy. It must distinguish between real and spurious
conflicts at the outset. It must temper its freedom to declare
local policy and its scope with a sense for harmonious inter-
state relations as well as for the justifiable expectations of
the parties.
There are always some to remind us that those who make
decisions on our courts, like those who make decisions else-
where, may sometimes be provincial in outlook. They say no
more than that there is always a shortage of wise men. It is
answer enough to the misanthrope that the forces against pro-
vincialism are strong today and that a judge trained to look
through the partisan wrappings of a conflict will be inclined
to look through provincial wrappings as well. There is no
reason why he should be less dispassionate in a conflicts case
than in any other. The hazard is less of impassioned pro-
vincialism than of the lingering ills of a passive formalism.
413
It is on this note that our discussion of judicial method and the
policy-centered conflict of laws may be ended.
412 Because the Supreme Court is not "elevating choice-of-law rules to
constitutional rank."
413 Traynor, Is this Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 657, 675
(1959).
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